There are many things that organisations of any size can do to prepare for a disaster or crisis. Traditionally, the advice given to business has focused on identifying risks, reducing their likely occurrence, and planning in advance how to respond. More recently, there is growing interest in the broader concept of organisational resilience which includes planning for crisis but also considers traits that lead to organisational adaptability and ability to thrive despite adverse circumstances. In this paper we examine the policy frameworks1 within New Zealand that influence the resilience of small and medium sized businesses (SMEs). The first part of the paper focuses on the New Zealand context, including the prevailing political and economic ideologies, the general nature of New Zealand SMEs and the nature of New Zealand’s hazard environment. The paper then goes on to outline the key policy frameworks in place relevant to SMEs and hazards. The final part of the paper examines the way the preexisting policy environment influenced the response of SMEs and Government following the Canterbury earthquakes.
This study analyses the success and limitations of the recovery process following the 2010–11 earthquake sequence in Christchurch, New Zealand. Data were obtained from in-depth interviews with 32 relocated households in Christchurch, and from a review of recovery policies implemented by the government. A top-down approach to disaster recovery was evident, with the creation of multiple government agencies and processes that made grassroots input into decision-making difficult. Although insurance proceeds enabled the repair and rebuilding of many dwellings, the complexity and adversarial nature of the claim procedures also impaired recovery. Householders’ perceptions of recovery reflected key aspects of their post-earthquake experiences (e.g. the housing offer they received, and the negotiations involved), and the outcomes of their relocation (including the value of the new home, their subjective well-being, and lifestyle after relocation). Protracted insurance negotiations, unfair offers and hardships in post-earthquake life were major challenges to recovery. Less-thanfavourable recovery experiences also transformed patterns of trust in local communities, as relocated householders came to doubt both the government and private insurance companies’ ability to successfully manage a disaster. At the same time, many relocated households expressed trust in their neighbours and communities. This study illuminates how government policies influence disaster recovery while also suggesting a need to reconsider centralised, top-down approaches to managing recovery.
The Kaikoura earthquake in November 2016 highlighted the vulnerability of New Zealand’s rural communities to locally-specific hazard events, which generate regional and national scale impacts. Kaikoura was isolated with significant damage to both the east coast road (SH1) and rail corridor, and the Inland Road (Route 70). Sea bed uplift along the coast was significant – affecting marine resources and ocean access for marine operators engaged in tourism and harvesting, and recreational users. While communities closest to the earthquake epicentre (e.g., Kaikoura, Waiau, Rotherham and Cheviot) suffered the most immediate earthquake damage, the damage to the transport network, and the establishment of an alternative transport route between Christchurch and Picton, has significantly impacted on more distant communities (e.g., Murchison, St Arnaud and Blenheim). There was also considerable damage to vineyard infrastructure across the Marlborough region and damage to buildings and infrastructure in rural settlements in Southern Marlborough (e.g., Ward and Seddon).
Research in the governance of urban tourist spaces is characterized by a lack of argumentative inquiry and scant use of critical theory. This is evident, particularly, in the study of tourism and post-disaster urban recovery, with very few contributions assessing the phenomenon from a social theory perspective. This thesis examines the complex phenomenon of planning and governance for urban tourism spaces in contexts facing physical recovery from natural disasters. It does so by looking at the governance dynamics and the mechanism of decision- making put in place before and after triggering events like earthquakes and tsunamis. This thesis provides evidence from Christchurch, New Zealand, by focusing on the policies and strategies for the regeneration of the city centre put in place before and after the disruptive earthquakes of 2010 and 2011. The thesis looks at power relations, structures and ideologies through a Lukesian appraisal of pre-and-post disaster governance from two relevant urban tourist spaces located in the Christchurch central city area: the Arts Centre of Christchurch and the Town Hall and Performing Arts Precinct. The research strategy adopted for the study combined archival research, interviews with key stakeholders and fieldwork notes over a period of two years. The research deployed a comparative case study methodology that focuses on projects taking place within a spatially defined area of the city centre where special legislation was enacted as result of the earthquakes. The findings from the interviews and their triangulation with documents retrieved from national and local authorities suggest that the earthquakes affected the engagement among stakeholders and the mechanisms of decision-making. Also, the findings show patterns of disaster capitalism in post-earthquake governance for urban tourist spaces in the Christchurch CBD, with episodes of exclusion, lobbying and amendment of rules and legislation that directly benefited the interests of a narrow group of privileged stakeholders. Overall, the study shows that the earthquakes of 2010 and 2011 accelerated neoliberal practices of site development in Christchurch, with the seismic events used as a pretext to implement market-oriented site projects in the CBD area.
Hon STEVEN JOYCE to the Minister of Finance: Can he confirm he plans to increase net core Crown debt from $59.5 billion as at 30 June 2017 to $67.6 billion by 2022; and can he confirm debt will not increase by any more than that?
MARAMA DAVIDSON to the Minister of Conservation: What has been the Department of Conservation’s biggest recent success in predator control to better protect our native plants and wildlife?
Hon Dr JONATHAN COLEMAN to the Minister of Health: What measurable outcomes, if any, will his policies deliver?
SIMON O'CONNOR to the Minister of Corrections: Does he stand by his Government’s intention to reduce the prison population by 30 percent over the next 15 years; if so, how?
KIERAN McANULTY to the Minister of Transport: Has he received any reports commissioned under the previous Government that show the value of investment in rail?
Hon JACQUI DEAN to the Minister of Tourism: Does he stand by all his statements?
Hon GERRY BROWNLEE to the Prime Minister: Does she stand by all her statements?
Dr DUNCAN WEBB to the Minister for Greater Christchurch Regeneration: What was the expected date, prior to the General Election, that the Residential Advisory Service would cease operations, and what steps has she taken since becoming Minister to ensure the service continues for people affected by the Canterbury and Kaikōura earthquakes?
BRETT HUDSON to the Associate Minister of State Services (Open Government): Does she stand by her statement in Parliament yesterday that this will be “the most open, most transparent Government that New Zealand has ever had”; if so, how?
Hon LOUISE UPSTON to the Minister for Children: Is she committed to implementing the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child in full?
TAMATI COFFEY to the Associate Minister of Finance: How is the Government preserving the right of New Zealanders to own land in New Zealand?
JAMI-LEE ROSS to the Minister of Local Government: What steps will she take to support the local government sector to achieve greater efficiency and control spending?
