The Leader Fault was one of at least 17 faults that ruptured the ground surface across the northeastern South Island of New Zealand during the Mw 7.8 2016 Kaikōura Earthquake. The southern ~6 km of the Leader Fault, here referred to as the South Leader Fault (SLF), ruptured the North Canterbury (tectonic) Domain and is the primary focus of this study. The main objective of the thesis is to understand the key factors that contributed to the geometry and kinematics of the 2016 SLF rupture and its intersection with The Humps Fault (HF). This thesis employs a combination of techniques to achieve the primary objective, including detailed mapping of the bedrock geology, geomorphology and 2016 rupture, measurement of 2016 ground surface displacements, kinematic analysis of slip vectors from the earthquake, and logging of a single natural exposure across a 2016 rupture that was treated as a paleoseismic trench. The resulting datasets were collected in the field, from terrestrial LiDAR and InSAR imagery, and from historical (pre-earthquake) aerial photographs for a ~11 km2 study area. Surface ruptures in the study area are a miniature version of the entire rupture from the earthquake; they are geometrically and kinematically complex, with many individual and discontinuous segments of varying orientations and slip senses which are distributed across a zone up to ~3.5 km wide. Despite this variability, three main groups of ruptures have been identified. These are: 1) NE-SW striking, shallow to moderate dipping (25-45°W) faults that are approximately parallel to Cenozoic bedding with mainly reverse dip-slip and, and for the purposes of this thesis, are considered to be part of the SLF. 2) N-S striking, steeply dipping (~85°E) oblique sinistral faults that are up to the west and part of the SLF. 3) E-NE striking, moderate to steeply dipping (45-68°N) dextral reverse faults which are part of the HF. Bedding-parallel faults are interpreted to be flexural slip structures formed during folding of the near-surface Cenozoic strata, while the steeply dipping SLF ruptured a pre-existing bedrock fault which has little topographic expression. Groups 1 and 2 faults were both locally used for gravitational failure during the earthquake. Despite this non-tectonic fault movement, the slip vectors for faults that ruptured during the earthquake are broadly consistent with NCD tectonics and the regional ~100-120° trend of the principal horizontal stress/strain axes. Previous earthquake activity on the SLF is required by its displacement of Cenozoic formations but Late Quaternary slip on the fault prior to 2016 is neither supported by pre-existing fault scarps nor by changes in topography across the fault. By contrast, at least two earthquakes (including 2016) appear to have ruptured the HF from the mid Holocene, consistent with recurrence intervals of no more than ~7 kyr, and with preliminary observations from trenches on the fault farther to the west. The disparity in paleoearthquake records of the two faults suggests that they typically do not rupture together, thus it is concluded that the HF-SLF rupture pattern observed in the Kaikōura Earthquake rarely occurs in a single earthquake.
On November 14 2016 a magnitude 7.8 earthquake struck the south island of New Zealand. The earthquake lasted for just two minutes with severe seismic shaking and damage in the Hurunui and Kaikōura districts. Although these are predominantly rural areas, with scattered small towns and mountainous topography, they also contain road and rail routes that are essential parts of the national transport infrastructure. This earthquake and the subsequent recovery are of particular significance as they represent a disaster following in close proximity to another similar disaster, with the Canterbury earthquakes occurring in a neighboring district five years earlier. The research used an inductive qualitative case study to explore the nature of the Kaikōura recovery. That recovery process involved a complex interplay between the three parties; (a) the existing local government in the district, (b) central government agencies funding the recovery of the local residents and the national transport infrastructure, and (c) recovery leaders arriving with recent expertise from the earlier Canterbury disaster. It was evident that three groups: locals, government, and experts represented a multi-party governance debate in which the control of the Kaikōura earthquake recovery was shared amongst them. Each party had their own expertise, adgenda and networks that they brought to the Kaikōura recovery, but this created tensions between external expertise and local, community leadership. Recent earthquake research suggests that New Zealand is currently in the midst of an earthquake cluster, with further seismic disasters likely to occur in relatively close succession. This is likely to be compounded by the increasing frequency of other natural disasters with the effects of climate change. The present study investigates a phenomenon that may become increasingly common, with the transfer of disaster expertise from one event to another, and the interface between those experts with local and national government in directing recoveries. The findings of this study have implications for practitioners and policy makers in NZ and other countries where disasters are experienced in close spatial and temporal proximity.
This study is a qualitative investigation into the decision-making behaviour of commercial property owners (investors and developers) who are rebuilding in a city centre after a major disaster. In 2010/2011, Christchurch, the largest city in the South Island of New Zealand, was a site of numerous earthquakes. The stronger earthquakes destroyed many buildings and public infrastructure in the commercial inner city. As a result, affected property owners lost all or most of their buildings, a significant proportion of which were old and in the last phase of their life span. They had to negotiate pay-outs with insurance companies and decide, once paid out, whether they should rebuild in Christchurch or sell up and invest elsewhere. The clear majority of those who decided to reinvest in and rebuild the city are ‘locals’, almost all of whom had no prior experience of property development. Thus, in a post-disaster environment, most of these property owners have transitioned from being just being passive investors to active property developers. Their experience was interpreted using primary data gathered from in-depth and semi-structured interviews with twenty-one “informed property people” who included commercial property owners; property agents or consultants; representatives of public-sector agencies and financial institutions. The study findings showed that the decision-making behaviour of property investors and developers rebuilding after a major disaster did not necessarily follow a strict financial or profit motive as prescribed in the mainstream or neo-classical economics property literature. Rather, their decision-making behaviour has been largely shaped by emotional connections and external factors associated with their immediate environment. The theoretical proposition emerging from this study is that after a major disaster, local urban property owners are faced with two choices “to stay” or “to go”. Those who decide to stay and rebuild are typically very committed individuals who have a feeling of ownership, belonging and attachment to the city in which they live and work. These are people who will often take the lead in commercial property development, proactively making decisions and seeking positive investment outcomes for themselves which in turn result in revitalised commercial urban precincts.
