A team of earthquake geologists, seismologists and engineering seismologists from GNS Science, NIWA, University of Canterbury, and Victoria University of Wellington have collectively produced an update of the 2002 national probabilistic seismic hazard (PSH) model for New Zealand. The new model incorporates over 200 new onshore and offshore fault sources, and utilises newly developed New Zealand-based scaling relationships and methods for the parameterisation of the fault and subduction interface sources. The background seismicity model has also been updated to include new seismicity data, a new seismicity regionalisation, and improved methodology for calculation of the seismicity parameters. Background seismicity models allow for the occurrence of earthquakes away from the known fault sources, and are typically modelled as a grid of earthquake sources with rate parameters assigned from the historical seismicity catalogue. The Greendale Fault, which ruptured during the M7.1, 4 September 2010 Darfield earthquake, was unknown prior to the earthquake. However, the earthquake was to some extent accounted for in the PSH model. The maximum magnitude assumed in the background seismicity model for the area of the earthquake is 7.2 (larger than the Darfield event), but the location and geometry of the fault are not represented. Deaggregations of the PSH model for Christchurch at return periods of 500 years and above show that M7-7.5 fault and background source-derived earthquakes at distances less than 40 km are important contributors to the hazard. Therefore, earthquakes similar to the Darfield event feature prominently in the PSH model, even though the Greendale Fault was not an explicit model input.
This paper presents the probabilistic seismic performance and loss assessment of an actual bridge– foundation–soil system, the Fitzgerald Avenue twin bridges in Christchurch, New Zealand. A two-dimensional finite element model of the longitudinal direction of the system is modelled using advanced soil and structural constitutive models. Ground motions at multiple levels of intensity are selected based on the seismic hazard deaggregation at the site. Based on rigorous examination of several deterministic analyses, engineering demand parameters (EDP’s), which capture the global and local demand, and consequent damage to the bridge and foundation are determined. A probabilistic seismic loss assessment of the structure considering both direct repair and loss of functionality consequences was performed to holistically assess the seismi risk of the system. It was found that the non-horizontal stratification of the soils, liquefaction, and soil–structure interaction had pronounced effects on the seismic demand distribution of the bridge components, of which the north abutment piles and central pier were critical in the systems seismic performance. The consequences due to loss of functionality of the bridge during repair were significantly larger than the direct repair costs, with over a 2% in 50 year probability of the total loss exceeding twice the book-value of the structure.
Infrastructure damage in Lyttelton.
Damaged footpath in Lyttelton.
Landslides around Lytteton Harbour.
Landslides around Lytteton Harbour.
On 4 September 2010, a magnitude Mw 7.1 earthquake struck the Canterbury region on the South Island of New Zealand. The epicentre of the earthquake was located in the Darfield area about 40 km west of the city of Christchurch. Extensive damage occurred to unreinforced masonry buildings throughout the region during the mainshock and subsequent large aftershocks. Particularly extensive damage was inflicted to lifelines and residential houses due to widespread liquefaction and lateral spreading in areas close to major streams, rivers and wetlands throughout Christchurch and Kaiapoi. Despite the severe damage to infrastructure and residential houses, fortunately, no deaths occurred and only two injuries were reported in this earthquake. From an engineering viewpoint, one may argue that the most significant aspects of the 2010 Darfield Earthquake were geotechnical in nature, with liquefaction and lateral spreading being the principal culprits for the inflicted damage. Following the earthquake, a geotechnical reconnaissance was conducted over a period of six days (10–15 September 2010) by a team of geotechnical/earthquake engineers and geologists from New Zealand and USA (GEER team: Geo-engineering Extreme Event Reconnaissance). JGS (Japanese Geotechnical Society) members from Japan also participated in the reconnaissance team from 13 to 15 September 2010. The NZ, GEER and JGS members worked as one team and shared resources, information and logistics in order to conduct thorough and most efficient reconnaissance covering a large area over a very limited time period. This report summarises the key evidence and findings from the reconnaissance.
7.1 Earthquake in Christchurch, New Zealand.
Research Report: 2010-02The objective in writing this report is to provide a guide to structural engineers on how to assess the potential seismic performance of existing hollow-core floors in buildings and the steps involved in the design of new floors. Hollow-core units in New Zealand do not contain stirrups within the precast concrete section. This is due to the way that they are manufactured. The only reinforcement in the great majority of hollow-core units consists of pretensioned strands that are located close to the soffit. A consequence of this is that hollow-core units have a number of potential brittle failure modes that can occur when adverse structural actions are induced in the units. These adverse actions can be induced in a major earthquake due to the relative vertical, horizontal and rotational displacements that occur between hollow-core units and adjacent structural elements, such as beams or structural walls. A number of large scale structural tests backed up by analytical research has shown that extensive interaction occurs between floors containing prestressed precast units and other structural elements, such as walls and beams. The constraint that prestressed units in a floor can apply to adjacent beams can result in an increase in strength of the beams to a considerably greater strength than that indicated in editions of the New Zealand Structural Concrete Standard published prior to 2006. The extent of this increase is such that it could in some cases result in the development of a non-ductile failure mechanism instead of the ductile failure mechanism assumed in the design. Prestressed floor units tie the floor bays together leaving a weak section where the floor joins to supporting structural elements. The restraint provided by the prestress restricts the opening of cracks within the bay. In the event of an earthquake this restraint can result in wide cracks developing at some of the boundaries to floor bays. These cracks may have a significant influence on the performance of the floor when it acts as a diaphragm to transfer seismic forces to the lateral force resisting structural elements in the building. The report contains details of; 1. The different failure modes, which may be induced in hollow-core floors, and the failure modes that may develop in a buildings due to the presence of hollow-core units in the floors; 2. Criteria that may be used to assess the magnitude of the design earthquake which may be safely resisted by a hollow-core floor in a building; 3. Details of how construction practice related to the use of hollow-core floors in New Zealand has changed over the last five decades. This highlights particular aspects that need to be considered in carrying out an assessment of existing hollow-core floors; 4. Information on how a new hollow-core floor may be designed to be consistent with the Earthquake Actions Standard, NZS1170.5: 2004 and the Structural Concrete Standard, NZS3101: 2006 (plus Amendment 2); 5. A review of the research findings relevant to the behaviour of New Zealand hollow-core floors under earthquake conditions. Research that was used to develop the assessment and design criteria is described together with details of how the different criteria were developed from this work.
7.1 Earthquake in Christchurch, New Zealand.
7.1 Earthquake in Christchurch, New Zealand.
7.1 Earthquake in Christchurch, New Zealand.
7.1 Earthquake in Christchurch, New Zealand.
7.1 Earthquake in Christchurch, New Zealand.
7.1 Earthquake in Christchurch, New Zealand.
7.1 Earthquake in Christchurch, New Zealand.
7.1 Earthquake in Christchurch, New Zealand.
7.1 Earthquake in Christchurch, New Zealand.
7.1 Earthquake in Christchurch, New Zealand.
7.1 Earthquake in Christchurch, New Zealand.
7.1 Earthquake in Christchurch, New Zealand.
7.1 Earthquake in Christchurch, New Zealand.
7.1 Earthquake in Christchurch, New Zealand.
7.1 Earthquake in Christchurch, New Zealand.
7.1 Earthquake in Christchurch, New Zealand.
7.1 Earthquake in Christchurch, New Zealand.
7.1 Earthquake in Christchurch, New Zealand.
7.1 Earthquake in Christchurch, New Zealand.
7.1 Earthquake in Christchurch, New Zealand.
7.1 Earthquake in Christchurch, New Zealand.