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Images for Main North Road; more images...

Audio, Radio New Zealand

More than a year after North Canterbury's 7.8 magnitude earthquake forced its closure, State Highway 1 north of Kaikoura will re-open to the public on Friday. Thousands of cars and trucks have been diverted inland since one million tonnes of rubble, in the form of 85 landslides, came down on the road, which was the main route between Picton and Christchurch. It's meant a tough year for some of those based along the highway. Reporter Maja Burry checked in with locals and filed this report.

Images, eqnz.chch.2010

20160415_0029_1D3-24 Red Zone Closures The permanent closure (to motor vehicles) of the Bexley red zone streets has started. This was once the main south-north route just west of the Avon River in the New Brighton area, till an expressway (ring road) was built about 80m to the west (right) about 12-13 years ago. Then it became just another ...

Videos, UC QuakeStudies

A video showing part of the demolition of the Ozone Hotel in New Brighton. Steve Taylor comments "She put up a good fight. The Ozone in New Brighton was damaged in the February earthquake in Christchurch, New Zealand. Here is the main corner of the structure being, as they say, deconstructed. At the end there is a reverent bow by the excavator. Just before this the claw had caught on the floor/ceiling and the whole building shook from side to side, but it still stayed in place."

Research papers, University of Canterbury Library

At 00:02 on 14th November 2016, a Mw 7.8 earthquake occurred in and offshore of the northeast of the South Island of New Zealand. Fault rupture, ground shaking, liquefaction, and co-seismic landslides caused severe damage to distributed infrastructure, and particularly transportation networks; large segments of the country’s main highway, State Highway 1 (SH1), and the Main North Line (MNL) railway line, were damaged between Picton and Christchurch. The damage caused direct local impacts, including isolation of communities, and wider regional impacts, including disruption of supply chains. Adaptive measures have ensured immediate continued regional transport of goods and people. Air and sea transport increased quickly, both for emergency response and to ensure routine transport of goods. Road diversions have also allowed critical connections to remain operable. This effective response to regional transport challenges allowed Civil Defence Emergency Management to quickly prioritise access to isolated settlements, all of which had road access 23 days after the earthquake. However, 100 days after the earthquake, critical segments of SH1 and the MNL remain closed and their ongoing repairs are a serious national strategic, as well as local, concern. This paper presents the impacts on South Island transport infrastructure, and subsequent management through the emergency response and early recovery phases, during the first 100 days following the initial earthquake, and highlights lessons for transportation system resilience.

Research papers, University of Canterbury Library

At 00:02 on 14th November 2016, a Mw 7.8 earthquake occurred in and offshore of the northeast of the South Island of New Zealand. Fault rupture, ground shaking, liquefaction, and co-seismic landslides caused severe damage to distributed infrastructure, and particularly transportation networks; large segments of the country’s main highway, State Highway 1 (SH1), and the Main North Line (MNL) railway line, were damaged between Picton and Christchurch. The damage caused direct local impacts, including isolation of communities, and wider regional impacts, including disruption of supply chains. Adaptive measures have ensured immediate continued regional transport of goods and people. Air and sea transport increased quickly, both for emergency response and to ensure routine transport of goods. Road diversions have also allowed critical connections to remain operable. This effective response to regional transport challenges allowed Civil Defence Emergency Management to quickly prioritise access to isolated settlements, all of which had road access 23 days after the earthquake. However, 100 days after the earthquake, critical segments of SH1 and the MNL remain closed and their ongoing repairs are a serious national strategic, as well as local, concern. This paper presents the impacts on South Island transport infrastructure, and subsequent management through the emergency response and early recovery phases, during the first 100 days following the initial earthquake, and highlights lessons for transportation system resilience.

Research papers, University of Canterbury Library

Tens of thousands of landslides were generated over 10, 000 km2 of North Canterbury and Marlborough as a consequence of the 14 November 2016, MW7.8 Kaikōura Earthquake. The most intense landslide damage was concentrated in 3500 km2 around the areas of fault rupture. Given the sparsely populated area affected by landslides, only a few homes were impacted and there were no recorded deaths due to landslides. Landslides caused major disruption with all road and rail links with Kaikōura being severed. The landslides affecting State Highway 1 (the main road link in the South Island of New Zealand) and the South Island main trunk railway extended from Ward in Marlborough all the way to the south of Oaro in North Canterbury. The majority of landslides occurred in two geological and geotechnically distinct materials reflective of the dominant rock types in the affected area. In the Neogene sedimentary rocks (sandstones, limestones and siltstones) of the Hurunui District, North Canterbury and around Cape Campbell in Marlborough, first-time and reactivated rock-slides and rock-block slides were the dominant landslide type. These rocks also tend to have rock material strength values in the range of 5-20 MPa. In the Torlesse 'basement' rocks (greywacke sandstones and argillite) of the Kaikōura Ranges, first-time rock and debris avalanches were the dominant landslide type. These rocks tend to have material strength values in the range of 20-50 MPa. A feature of this earthquake is the large number (more than 200) of valley blocking landslides it generated. This was partly due to the steep and confined slopes in the area and the widely distributed strong ground shaking. The largest landslide dam has an approximate volume of 12(±2) M m3 and the debris from this travelled about 2.7 km2 downslope where it formed a dam blocking the Hapuku River. The long-term stability of cracked slopes and landslide dams from future strong earthquakes and large rainstorms are an ongoing concern to central and local government agencies responsible for rebuilding homes and infrastructure. A particular concern is the potential for debris floods to affect downstream assets and infrastructure should some of the landslide dams breach catastrophically. At least twenty-one faults ruptured to the ground surface or sea floor, with these surface ruptures extending from the Emu Plain in North Canterbury to offshore of Cape Campbell in Marlborough. The mapped landslide distribution reflects the complexity of the earthquake rupture. Landslides are distributed across a broad area of intense ground shaking reflective of the elongate area affected by fault rupture, and are not clustered around the earthquake epicentre. The largest landslides triggered by the earthquake are located either on or adjacent to faults that ruptured to the ground surface. Surface faults may provide a plane of weakness or hydrological discontinuity and adversely oriented surface faults may be indicative of the location of future large landslides. Their location appears to have a strong structural geological control. Initial results from our landslide investigations suggest predictive models relying only on ground-shaking estimates underestimate the number and size of the largest landslides that occurred.

Research papers, Lincoln University

We examined the stratigraphy of alluvial fans formed at the steep range front of the Southern Alps at Te Taho, on the north bank of the Whataroa River in central West Coast, South Island, New Zealand. The range front coincides with the Alpine Fault, an Australian-Pacific plate boundary fault, which produces regular earthquakes. Our study of range front fans revealed aggradation at 100- to 300-year intervals. Radiocarbon ages and soil residence times (SRTs) estimated by a quantitative profile development index allowed us to elucidate the characteristics of four episodes of aggradation since 1000 CE. We postulate a repeating mode of fan behaviour (fan response cycle [FRC]) linked to earthquake cycles via earthquake-triggered landslides. FRCs are characterised by short response time (aggradation followed by incision) and a long phase when channels are entrenched and fan surfaces are stable (persistence time). Currently, the Te Taho and Whataroa River fans are in the latter phase. The four episodes of fan building we determined from an OxCal sequence model correlate to Alpine Fault earthquakes (or other subsidiary events) and support prior landscape evolution studies indicating ≥M7.5 earthquakes as the main driver of episodic sedimentation. Our findings are consistent with other historic non-earthquake events on the West Coast but indicate faster responses than other earthquake sites in New Zealand and elsewhere where rainfall and stream gradients (the basis for stream power) are lower. Judging from the thickness of fan deposits and the short response times, we conclude that pastoral farming (current land-use) on the fans and probably across much of the Whataroa River fan would be impossible for several decades after a major earthquake. The sustainability of regional tourism and agriculture is at risk, more so because of the vulnerability of the single through road in the region (State Highway 6).