Pet Emergency Plan
Articles, UC QuakeStudies
A document produced by SPCA Canterbury outlining a plan for pet owners to follow in order to prepare for a disaster.
A document produced by SPCA Canterbury outlining a plan for pet owners to follow in order to prepare for a disaster.
A video of an interview with Michael Ardagh, Professor of Emergency Medicine at Christchurch Hospital. Ardagh talks about the challenges the emergency department at the Christchurch Hospital faced following the 22 February 2011 earthquake.
Website of Canterbury CDEM Group, which is a partnership of local authorities, emergency services and other organisations tasked with providing effective and comprehensive management of major hazards and their consequences anywhere in Canterbury. Includes community preparedness information, information for emergency managers and CDEM Group plan.
Museums around the world are often affected by major catastrophes, and yet planning for these disasters is an often neglected aspect of museum practice. New Zealand is not immune from these events, as can be seen in the recent series of serious earthquakes in Christchurch in 2010 and 2011. This dissertation considers how prepared the New Zealand museum sector is to handle unexpected events that negatively affect its buildings, staff, operations and treasured collections. The central research question was: What is the overall state of emergency planning in the New Zealand museum sector? There was a significant gap in the literature, especially in the local context, as there has been only one other comparable study conducted in Britain, and nothing locally. This dissertation makes a valuable contribution to the field of museum studies by drawing on theory from relevant areas such as crises management literature and by conducting original empirical research on a topic which has received little attention hitherto. The research employed a number of methods, including a review of background secondary sources, a survey and interviews. After contextualising the study with a number of local examples, Ian online survey was then developed an which enabled precise understanding of the nature of current museum practices and policies around emergency planning. Following this I conducted several interviews with museum professionals from a variety of institutional backgrounds which explored their thoughts and feelings behind the existing practices within the industry. The findings of the research were significant and somewhat alarming: almost 40% of the museum and galleries in New Zealand do not have any emergency plan at all, and only 11% have what they considered ‘complete’ plans. The research revealed a clear picture of the current width and depth of planning, as well as practices around updating the plans and training related to them. Within the industry there is awareness that planning for emergencies is important, but museum staff typically lack the knowledge and guidance needed to conduct effective emergency planning. As a result of the analysis, several practical suggestions are presented aimed at improving emergency planning practices in New Zealand museums. However this study has implications for museum studies and for current museum practice everywhere, as many of the recommendations for resolving the current obstacles and problems are applicable anywhere in the world, suggesting that New Zealand museums could become leaders in this important area.
A video of an address by John Vale, Chief Executive of Vynco, at the 2012 Seismics and the City forum. The talk covers how business continuity planning proved to be crucial to the Vynco's survival, and how the company's employees were able to work in new ways to keep export channels open and flowing.
Information about CDEM planning, programmes and the Ministry itself. Includes emergency preparedness information for the public and downloadable resources for civil defence sector workers. Earthquake related information can be found in the archived instances from September 2010-
A document outlining the Emergency Management Policy at the University of Canterbury in the time between the 4 September 2010 and 22 February 2011 earthquake. This policy was developed to provide a mandate for decisions that need to be taken to most appropriately and expeditiously respond to a planned event or unforeseen critical incident at the University of Canterbury.
The New Zealand Kellogg Rural Leaders Programme develops emerging agribusiness leaders to help shape the future of New Zealand agribusiness and rural affairs. Lincoln University has been involved with this leaders programme since 1979 when it was launched with a grant from the Kellogg Foundation, USA.At 4.35am on 4th September 2010, Canterbury was hit by an earthquake measuring 7.1 on the Richter scale. On 22nd February 2011 and 13th June 2011 a separate fault line approximately 35km from the first, ruptured to inflict two further earthquakes measuring 6.3 and 6.0 respectively. As a direct result of the February earthquake, 181 people lost their lives. Some commentators have described this series of earthquakes as the most expensive global insurance event of all time. These earthquakes and the more than 7000 associated aftershocks have had a significant physical impact on parts of Canterbury and virtually none on others. The economic, social and emotional impacts of these quakes spread across Canterbury and beyond. Waimakariri district, north of Christchurch, has reflected a similar pattern, with over 1400 houses requiring rebuild or substantial repair, millions of dollars of damage to infrastructure, and significant social issues as a result. The physical damage in Waimakiriri District was predominately in parts of Kaiapoi, and two small beach settlements, The Pines and Kairaki Beach with pockets elsewhere in the district. While the balance of the district is largely physically untouched, the economic, social, and emotional shockwaves have spread across the district. Waimakariri district consists of two main towns, Rangiora and Kaiapoi, a number of smaller urban areas and a larger rural area. It is considered mid-size in the New Zealand local government landscape. This paper will explore the actions and plans of Waimakiriri District Council (WDC) in the Emergency Management Recovery programme to provide context to allow a more detailed examination of the planning processes prior to, and subsequent to the earthquakes. This study looked at documentation produced by WDC, applicable legislation and New Zealand Emergency Management resources and other sources. Key managers and elected representatives in the WOC were interviewed, along with a selection of governmental and nongovernmental agency representatives. The interview responses enable understanding of how central Government and other local authorities can benefit from these lessons and apply them to their own planning. It is intended that this paper will assist local government organisations in New Zealand to evaluate their planning processes in light of the events of 2010/11 in Canterbury and the lessons from WDC.
A video of an address by Peter Davie, Chief Executive of Lyttelton Port Company, at the 2012 Seismics and the City forum. The talk is about how, in today's technological and economic environment, the ability to prevent, prepare for, or quickly recover from a disaster is a critical success factor. The seismic simulations that the Port of Lyttelton ran as part of its long term development plan became a key part of the Port's emergency response, and meant that cargo kept flowing with minimal downtime.
The M7.8 Kaikoura Earthquake in 2016 presented a number of challenges to science agencies and institutions throughout New Zealand. The earthquake was complex, with 21 faults rupturing throughout the North Canterbury and Marlborough landscape, generating a localised seven metre tsunami and triggering thousands of landslides. With many areas isolated as a result, it presented science teams with logistical challenges as well as the need to coordinate efforts across institutional and disciplinary boundaries. Many research disciplines, from engineering and geophysics to social science, were heavily involved in the response. Coordinating these disciplines and institutions required significant effort to assist New Zealand during its most complex earthquake yet recorded. This paper explores that effort and acknowledges the successes and lessons learned by the teams involved.
In this paper, we consider how religious leaders and Civil Defence authorities might collaborate to establish a two-way information conduit during the aftermath of a disaster. Using surveys and in-person interviews, clergy in different Christian denominations were asked about their roles in the earthquake, the needs of their congregations and the possibilities and obstacles to deeper collaboration with Civil Defence authorities.
This research examines a surprising partner in emergency management - a local community time bank. Specifically, we explain the role of the Lyttelton Time Bank in promoting community resiliency following the Canterbury earthquakes in 2010 and 2011. A time bank is a grassroots exchange system in which members trade services non-reciprocally. This exchange model assumes that everyone has tradable skills and all labour is equal in value. One hour of any labour earns a member one time bank hour, which can be used to purchase another member’s services. Before the earthquakes struck, the Lyttelton Time Bank (TB) had organised over 10% of the town’s residents and 18 local organisations. It was documenting, developing, and mobilising skills to solve individual and collective problems. This report examines the Lyttelton Time Bank and its’ role before, during, and after the earthquakes based on the analysis of over three and a half years of fieldwork, observations, interviews, focus groups, trading activity, and secondary data.
The world experiences a number of disasters each year. Following a disaster, the affected area moves to a phase of recovery which involves multiple stakeholders. An important element of recovery is planning the rebuild of the affected environment guided by the legislative framework to which planning is bound to (March & Kornakova, 2017). Yet, there appears to be little research that has investigated the role of planners in a recovery setting and the implications of recovery legislative planning frameworks. This study was conducted to explore the role of the planner in the Canterbury earthquake recovery process in New Zealand and the impact of the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Act 2011 (CER Act) on planners’ roles and how they operated. The methodology comprised a combination of document analysis of legislation and related recovery material and 21 semi-structured interviews with key planners, politicians and professionals involved in the recovery. The results suggest that the majority of planners interviewed were affected by the CER Act in their role and how they operated, although institutional context, especially political constraints, was a key factor in determining the degree of impact. It is argued that planners played a key role in recovery and were generally equipped in terms of skills needed in a recovery setting. In order to better utilise planners in post-disaster recovery or disaster risk management, two suggestions are proposed. Firstly, better promote planners and their capabilities to improve awareness of what planners can do. Secondly, educate and build an understanding between central government politicians and planners over each others role to produce better planning outcomes.
Residents of Christchurch's coastal suburbs around New Brighton are being promised they won't have to wait another decade for an urgently needed new bridge. The existing one is a critical emergency escape route but is almost 100 years old and suffered significant damage in the 2011 earthquake. And as Timothy Brown reports, plans for an upgrade are grinding slowly ahead.
There is strong consensus in the civil defence and emergency management literature that public participation is essential for a 'good' recovery. However, there is a paucity of research detailing how this community-led planning should be carried out in the real world. There are few processes or timelines for communities to follow when wanting to plan for themselves, nor is there a great deal of advice for communities who want to plan for their own recovery. In short, despite this consensus that community involvement is desireable, there is very little information available as to the nature of this involvement or how communities might facilitate this. It is simply assumed that communities are willing and able to participate in the recovery process and that recovery authorities will welcome, encourage, and enable this participation. This is not always the case, and the result is that community groups can be left feeling lost and ineffective when trying to plan for their own recovery. In attempting to address this gap, my study contributes to a better understanding of community involvement in recovery planning, based on research with on particular a community group (SPRIG), who has undertaken their own form of community-led planning in a post-disaster environment. Through group observations and in-depth interviews with members of SPRIG, I was able to identify various roles for such groups in the post-disaster recovery process. My research also contributes to an enhanced understanding of the process a community group might follow to implement their own form of post-disaster recovery planning, with the main point being that any planning should be done side by side with local authorities. Finally, I discovered that a community group will face organisational, community and institutional challenges when trying to plan for their area; however, despite these challenges, opportunities exist, such as the chance to build a better future.
Earthquakes and other major disasters present communities and their authorities with an extraordinary challenge. While a lot can be done to prepare a city’s response in the event of a disaster, few cities are truly prepared for the initial impact, devastation, grief, and the seemingly formidable challenge of recovery. Many people find themselves overwhelmed with facing critical problems; ones which they have often never had experience with before. While the simple part is agreeing on a desired outcome for recovery, it appears the argument that exists between stakeholders is the conflicting ideas of How To effectively achieve the main objective. What I have identified as an important step toward collaborating on the How To of recovery is to identify the ways in which each discipline can most effectively contribute to the recovery. Landscape architecture is just one of the many disciplines (that should be) invovled in the How To of earthquake recovery. Canterbury has an incredible opportunity to set the benchmark for good practice in earthquake recovery. To make the most of this opportuntiy, it is critical that landscape architects are more effectively engaged in roles of recovery across a much broader spectrum of recovery activities. The overarching purpose of this research is to explore and provide insight to the current and potential of landscape architects in the earthquake recovery period in Canterbury, using international good practice as a benchmark. The research is aimed at stimulating and guiding landscape architects dealing with the earthquake recovery in Canterbury, while informing stakeholders: emergency managers, authorities, other disciplines and the wider community of themost effective role(s) for landscape architects in the recovery period.
Research undertaken and literature reviewed show that major natural disasters present considerable risk to Governors Bay. Earthquakes, and resulting secondary hazards from natural disasters, could lead to the isolation of the Governors Bay community for an extended period. In particular, the rupture of the Alpine Fault and the resulting mega-quake could leave Governors Bay isolated for well over three weeks. Weaknesses in existing infrastructure in Governors Bay further places residents at risk. Therefore, it is essential that residents are prepared for a period of extended isolation, with little to no access to clean water, power, internet and cellular coverage. Ultimately, community preparedness will be the key to maintaining social cohesion and saving lives during an emergency event. The community hub in Governors Bay establishes a pre-determined locale for community co-ordination, collection, and distribution of supplies as well as a functional place to go when all else fails.
At 4.35am on Saturday 4 September 2010, a magnitude 7.1 earthquake struck near the township of Darfield in Canterbury leading to widespread damage in Christchurch and the wider central Canterbury region. Though it was reported no lives were lost, that was not entirely correct. Over 3,000 animals perished as a result of the earthquake and 99% of these deaths would have been avoidable if appropriate mitigation measures had been in place. Deaths were predominantly due to zoological vulnerability of birds in captive production farms. Other problems included lack of provision of animal welfare at evacuation centres, issues associated with multiple lost and found pet services, evacuation failure due to pet separation and stress impact on dairy herds and associated milk production. The Canterbury Earthquake has highlighted concerns over a lack of animal emergency welfare planning and capacity in New Zealand, an issue that is being progressed by the National Animal Welfare Emergency Management Group. As animal emergency management becomes better understood by emergency management and veterinary professionals, it is more likely that both sectors will have greater demands placed upon them by national guidelines and community expectations to ensure provisions are made to afford protection of animals in times of disaster. A subsequent and more devastating earthquake struck the region on Monday 22 February 2011; this article however is primarily focused on the events pertaining to the September 4 event.
The potential for a gastroenteritis outbreak in a post-earthquake environment may increase because of compromised infrastructure services, contaminated liquefaction (lateral spreading and surface ejecta), and the presence of gastroenteritis agents in the drinking water network. A population in a post-earthquake environment might be seriously affected by gastroenteritis because it has a short incubation period (about 10 hours). The potential for a gastroenteritis outbreak in a post-earthquake environment may increase because of compromised infrastructure services, contaminated liquefaction (lateral spreading and surface ejecta), and the presence of gastroenteritis agents in the drinking water network. A population in a post-earthquake environment might be seriously affected by gastroenteritis because it has a short incubation period (about 10 hours). The aim of this multidisciplinary research was to retrospectively analyse the gastroenteritis prevalence following the February 22, 2011 earthquake in Christchurch. The first focus was to assess whether earthquake-induced infrastructure damage, liquefaction, and gastroenteritis agents spatially explained the recorded gastroenteritis cases over the period of 35 days following the February 22, 2011 earthquake in Christchurch. The gastroenteritis agents considered in this study were Escherichia coli found in the drinking water supply (MPN/100mL) and Non-Compliant Free Associated Chlorine (FAC-NC) (less than <0.02mg/L). The second focus was the protocols that averted a gastroenteritis outbreak at three Emergency Centres (ECs): Burnside High School Emergency Centre (BEC); Cowles Stadium Emergency Centre (CEC); and Linwood High School Emergency Centre (LEC). Using a mixed-method approach, gastroenteritis point prevalence and the considered factors were quantitatively analysed. The qualitative analysis involved interviewing 30 EC staff members. The data was evaluated by adopting the Grounded Theory (GT) approach. Spatial analysis of considered factors showed that highly damaged CAUs were statistically clustered as demonstrated by Moran’s I statistic and hot spot analysis. Further modelling showed that gastroenteritis point prevalence clustering could not be fully explained by infrastructure damage alone, and other factors influenced the recorded gastroenteritis point prevalence. However, the results of this research suggest that there was a tenuous, indirect relationship between recorded gastroenteritis point prevalence and the considered factors: earthquake-induced infrastructure damage, liquefaction and FAC-NC. Two ECs were opened as part of the post-earthquake response in areas with severe infrastructure damage and liquefaction (BEC and CEC). The third EC (CEC) provided important lessons that were learnt from the previous September 4, 2010 earthquake, and implemented after the February 22, 2011 earthquake. Two types of interwoven themes identified: direct and indirect. The direct themes were preventive protocols and indirect themes included type of EC building (school or a sports stadium), and EC staff. The main limitations of the research were Modifiable Areal Units (MAUP), data detection, and memory loss. This research provides a practical method that can be adapted to assess gastroenteritis risk in a post-earthquake environment. Thus, this mixed method approach can be used in other disaster contexts to study gastroenteritis prevalence, and can serve as an appendage to the existing framework for assessing infectious diseases. Furthermore, the lessons learnt from qualitative analysis can inform the current infectious disease management plans, designed for a post-disaster response in New Zealand and internationally Using a mixed-method approach, gastroenteritis point prevalence and the considered factors were quantitatively analysed. A damage profile was created by amalgamating different types of damage for the considered factors for each Census Area Unit (CAU) in Christchurch. The damage profile enabled the application of a variety of statistical methods which included Moran’s I , Hot Spot (HS) analysis, Spearman’s Rho, and Besag–York–Mollié Model using a range of software. The qualitative analysis involved interviewing 30 EC staff members. The data was evaluated by adopting the Grounded Theory (GT) approach. Spatial analysis of considered factors showed that highly damaged CAUs were statistically clustered as demonstrated by Moran’s I statistic and hot spot analysis. Further modelling showed that gastroenteritis point prevalence clustering could not be fully explained by infrastructure damage alone, and other factors influenced the recorded gastroenteritis point prevalence. However, the results of this research suggest that there was a tenuous, indirect relationship between recorded gastroenteritis point prevalence and the considered factors: earthquake-induced infrastructure damage, liquefaction and FAC-NC. Two ECs were opened as part of the post-earthquake response in areas with severe infrastructure damage and liquefaction (BEC and CEC). The third EC (CEC) provided important lessons that were learnt from the previous September 4, 2010 earthquake, and implemented after the February 22, 2011 earthquake. The ECs were selected to represent the Christchurch area, and were situated where potential for gastroenteritis was high. BEC represented the western side of Christchurch; whilst, CEC and LEC represented the eastern side, where the potential for gastroenteritis was high according to the outputs of the quantitative spatial modelling. Qualitative analysis from the interviews at the ECs revealed that evacuees were arriving at the ECs with gastroenteritis-like symptoms. Participants believed that those symptoms did not originate at the ECs. Two types of interwoven themes identified: direct and indirect. The direct themes were preventive protocols that included prolific use of hand sanitisers; surveillance; and the services offered. Indirect themes included the EC layout, type of EC building (school or a sports stadium), and EC staff. Indirect themes governed the quality and sustainability of the direct themes implemented, which in turn averted gastroenteritis outbreaks at the ECs. The main limitations of the research were Modifiable Areal Units (MAUP), data detection, and memory loss. It was concluded that gastroenteritis point prevalence following the February 22, 2011 earthquake could not be solely explained by earthquake-induced infrastructure damage, liquefaction, and gastroenteritis causative agents alone. However, this research provides a practical method that can be adapted to assess gastroenteritis risk in a post-earthquake environment. Creating a damage profile for each CAU and using spatial data analysis can isolate vulnerable areas, and qualitative data analysis provides localised information. Thus, this mixed method approach can be used in other disaster contexts to study gastroenteritis prevalence, and can serve as an appendage to the existing framework for assessing infectious diseases. Furthermore, the lessons learnt from qualitative analysis can inform the current infectious disease management plans, designed for a post-disaster response in New Zealand and internationally.
The University of Canterbury Dept. of Chemistry has weathered the Canterbury Earthquake of September 4, 2010 very well due to a combination of good luck, good planning and dedicated effort. We owe a great deal to university Emergency Response Team and Facilities Management Personnel. The overall emergency preparedness of the university was tested to a degree far beyond anything else in its history and shown to be well up to scratch. A strong cooperative relationship between the pan-campus controlling body and the departmental response teams greatly facilitated our efforts. Information and assistance was provided promptly, as and when we needed it without unnecessary bureaucratic overheads. At the departmental level we are indebted to the technical staff who implemented the invaluable pre-quake mitigation measures and carried the majority of the post-quake clean-up workload. These people put aside their personal concerns and anxieties at a time when magnitude-5 aftershocks were still a regular occurrence.
Editors: G. Williams, P. Statham, N. Brown & B. Cleland ISBN Proceedings USB: 978-1-86295-644-5 published by the University of TasmaniaBlended learning plays an important role in many tertiary institutions but little has been written about the implementation of blended learning in times of adversity, natural disaster or crisis. This paper describes how, in the wake of the 22 February Canterbury earthquake, five teacher educators responded to crisis-driven changing demands and changing directions. Our narratives describe how blended learning provided students in initial teacher education programmes with some certainty and continuity during a time of civil emergency. The professional learning generated from our experiences provides valuable insights for designing and preparing for blended learning in times of crisis, as well as developing resilient blended learning programmes for the future.
Professor Lucy Easthope is one of the world's foremost disaster planners. Her first major job in emergency planning was responding to 9/11 and since then, her career has covered almost every major disaster; the Boxing Day tsunami, the London bombings, the Christchurch earthquakes, the Fukushima nuclear disaster, Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 shot down over Ukraine, the Grenfell Tower fire, Covid-19 and many more. It's her job to help get the bodies identified, repatriate survivors, return personal effects, look after the bereaved, and advise governments for the future. She speaks to Kathryn about her memoir, When the Dust Settles: Stories of Love, Loss and Hope from an Expert in Disaster.
Case study analysis of the 2010-2011 Canterbury Earthquake Sequence (CES), which particularly impacted Christchurch City, New Zealand, has highlighted the value of practical, standardised and coordinated post-earthquake geotechnical response guidelines for earthquake-induced landslides in urban areas. The 22nd February 2011 earthquake, the second largest magnitude event in the CES, initiated a series of rockfall, cliff collapse and loess failures around the Port Hills which severely impacted the south-eastern part of Christchurch. The extensive slope failure induced by the 22nd February 200 earthquake was unprecedented; and ground motions experienced significantly exceeded the probabilistic seismic hazard model for Canterbury. Earthquake-induced landslides initiated by the 22nd February 2011 earthquake posed risk to life safety, and caused widespread damage to dwellings and critical infrastructure. In the immediate aftermath of the 22nd February 2011 earthquake, the geotechnical community responded by deploying into the Port Hills to conduct assessment of slope failure hazards and life safety risk. Coordination within the voluntary geotechnical response group evolved rapidly within the first week post-earthquake. The lack of pre-event planning to guide coordinated geotechnical response hindered the execution of timely and transparent management of life safety risk from coseismic landslides in the initial week after the earthquake. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with municipal, management and operational organisations involved in the geotechnical response during the CES. Analysis of interview dialogue highlighted the temporal evolution of priorities and tasks during emergency response to coseismic slope failure, which was further developed into a phased conceptual model to inform future geotechnical response. Review of geotechnical responses to selected historical earthquakes (Northridge, 1994; Chi-Chi, 1999; Wenchuan, 2008) has enabled comparison between international practice and local response strategies, and has emphasised the value of pre-earthquake preparation, indicating the importance of integration of geotechnical response within national emergency management plans. Furthermore, analysis of the CES and international earthquakes has informed pragmatic recommendations for future response to coseismic slope failure. Recommendations for future response to earthquake-induced landslides presented in this thesis include: the integration of post-earthquake geotechnical response with national Civil Defence and Emergency Management; pre-earthquake development of an adaptive management structure and standard slope assessment format for geotechnical response; and emergency management training for geotechnical professionals. Post-earthquake response recommendations include the development of geographic sectors within the area impacted by coseismic slope failure, and the development of a GIS database for analysis and management of data collected during ground reconnaissance. Recommendations provided in this thesis aim to inform development of national guidelines for geotechnical response to earthquake-induced landslides in New Zealand, and prompt debate concerning international best practice.
Text reads 'Could the wrecking ball be used on structures outside Christchurch?' The cartoon shows Minister for the Reconstruction of Christchurch Gerry Brownlee as the wrecking ball on a crane; he says 'let the fun begin'. To one side is a large house crowded with people which represents 'the welfare state' and is surrounded by a barrier on which are printed the words 'Fiscal emergency'. Context - Gerry Brownlee is seen by many as rather too quick to demolish heritage buildings in his rush to rebuild Christchurch. The wrecking ball idea also suggests that the National government is likely to wreck the welfare state in its efforts to sort out economic problems. Quantity: 1 digital cartoon(s).
Recent surface-rupturing earthquakes in New Zealand have highlighted significant exposure and vulnerability of the road network to fault displacement. Understanding fault displacement hazard and its impact on roads is crucial for mitigating risks and enhancing resilience. There is a need for regional-scale assessments of fault displacement to identify vulnerable areas within the road network for the purposes of planning and prioritising site-specific investigations. This thesis employs updated analysis of data from three historical surface-rupturing earthquakes (Edgecumbe 1987, Darfield 2010, and Kaikoūra 2016) to develop an empirical model that addresses the gap in regional fault displacement hazard analysis. The findings contribute to understanding of • How to use seismic hazard model inputs for regional fault displacement hazard analysis • How faulting type and sediment cover affects the magnitude and spatial distribution of fault displacement • How the distribution of displacement and regional fault displacement hazard is impacted by secondary faulting • The inherent uncertainties and limitations associated with employing an empirical approach at a regional scale • Which sections of New Zealand’s roading network are most susceptible to fault displacement hazard and warrant site-specific investigations • Which regions should prioritise updating emergency management plans to account for post-event disruptions to roading. I used displacement data from the aforementioned historical ruptures to generate displacement versus distance-to-fault curves for various displacement components, fault types, and geological characteristics. Using those relationships and established relationships for along-strike displacement, displacement contours were generated surrounding active faults within the NZ Community Fault Model. Next, I calculated a new measure of 1D strain along roads as well as relative hazard, which integrated 1D strain and normalised slip rate data. Summing these values at the regional level identified areas of heightened relative hazard across New Zealand, and permits an assessment of the susceptibility of road networks using geomorphon land classes as proxies for vulnerability. The results reveal that fault-parallel displacements tend to localise near the fault plane, while vertical and fault-perpendicular displacements sustain over extended distances. Notably, no significant disparities were observed in off-fault displacement between the hanging wall and footwall sides of the fault, or among different surface geology types, potentially attributed to dataset biases. The presence of secondary faulting in the dataset contributes to increased levels of tectonic displacement farther from the fault, highlighting its significance in hazard assessments. Furthermore, fault displacement contours delineate broader zones around dip-slip faults compared to strike-slip faults, with correlations identified between fault length and displacement width. Road ‘strain’ values are higher around dip-slip faults, with notable examples observed in the Westland and Buller Districts. As expected, relative hazard analysis revealed elevated values along faults with high slip rates, notably along the Alpine Fault. A regional-scale analysis of hazard and exposure reveals heightened relative hazard in specific regions, including Wellington, Southern Hawke’s Bay, Central Bay of Plenty, Central West Coast, inland Canterbury, and the Wairau Valley of Marlborough. Notably, the Central West Coast exhibits the highest summed relative hazard value, attributed to the fast-slipping Alpine Fault. The South Island generally experiences greater relative hazard due to larger and faster-slipping faults compared to the North Island, despite having fewer roads. Central regions of New Zealand face heightened risk compared to Southern or Northern regions. Critical road links intersecting high-slipping faults, such as State Highways 6, 73, 1, and 2, necessitate prioritisation for site-specific assessments, emergency management planning and targeted mitigation strategies. Roads intersecting with the Alpine Fault are prone to large parallel displacements, requiring post-quake repair efforts. Mitigation strategies include future road avoidance of nearby faults, modification of road fill and surface material, and acknowledgement of inherent risk, leading to prioritised repair efforts of critical roads post-quake. Implementing these strategies enhances emergency response efforts by improving accessibility to isolated regions following a major surface-rupturing event, facilitating faster supply delivery and evacuation assistance. This thesis contributes to the advancement of understanding fault displacement hazard by introducing a novel regional, empirical approach. The methods and findings highlight the importance of further developing such analyses and extending them to other critical infrastructure types exposed to fault displacement hazard in New Zealand. Enhancing our comprehension of the risks associated with fault displacement hazard offers valuable insights into various mitigation strategies for roading infrastructure and informs emergency response planning, thereby enhancing both national and global infrastructure resilience against geological hazards.
On 14 November 2016, the Mw 7.8 Kaikōura earthquake caused widespread damage along the east coast of the South Island, New Zealand. Kaikōura town itself was isolated from the rest of the country by landslides blocking off major roads. While impacts from the Kaikōura earthquake on large, urban population centres have been generally well documented, this thesis aims to fill gaps in academic knowledge regarding small rural towns. This thesis investigates what, where and when critical infrastructure and lifeline service disruption occurred following the 2016 Kaikōura earthquake in a selection of small towns, and how the communities in these areas adapted to disruption. Following a robust review of literature and news media, four small rural towns were selected from North Canterbury (Culverden & Waiau) and Marlborough (Seddon & Ward) in the South Island, New Zealand. Semi-structured interview sessions with a special focus on these towns were held with infrastructure managers, emergency response and recovery officials, and organisation leaders with experience or expertise in the 2016 Kaikōura earthquake. Findings were supplemented with emergency management situation reports to produce hazard maps and infrastructure exposure maps. A more detailed analysis was conducted for Waiau involving interdependence analyses and a level of service timeline for select lifeline services. The earthquake impacted roads by blocking them with landslides, debris and surface rupture. Bridges where shaken off their abutments, breaking infrastructure links such as fibre landlines as they went. Water supplies and other forms of infrastructure relied heavily on the level of service of roads, as rough rural terrain left few alternatives. Adapting to an artificial loss of road service, some Waiau locals created their own detour around a road cordon in order to get home to family and farms. Performance of dwellings was tied to socioeconomic factors as much as proximity to the epicentre. Farmers who lost water access pulled out fences to allow stock to drink from rivers. Socioeconomic differences between farmland and township residents also contributed to resilience variations between the towns assessed in this study. Understanding how small rural towns respond and adapt to disaster allows emergency management officials and policy to be well informed and flexible with planning for multiple size classes of towns.
Background: We are in a period of history where natural disasters are increasing in both frequency and severity. They are having widespread impacts on communities, especially on vulnerable communities, those most affected who have the least ability to prepare or respond to a disaster. The ability to assemble and effectively manage Interagency Emergency Response Teams (IERTs) is critical to navigating the complexity and chaos found immediately following disasters. These teams play a crucial role in the multi-sectoral, multi-agency, multi-disciplinary, and inter-organisational response and are vital to ensuring the safety and well-being of vulnerable populations such as the young, aged, and socially and medically disadvantaged in disasters. Communication is key to the smooth operation of these teams. Most studies of the communication in IERTs during a disaster have been focussed at a macro-level of examining larger scale patterns and trends within organisations. Rarely found are micro-level analyses of interpersonal communication at the critical interfaces between collaborating agencies. This study set out to understand the experiences of those working at the interagency interfaces in an IERT set up by the Canterbury District Health Board to respond to the needs of the vulnerable people in the aftermath of the destructive earthquakes that hit Canterbury, New Zealand, in 2010-11. The aim of the study was to gain insights about the complexities of interpersonal communication (micro-level) involved in interagency response coordination and to generate an improved understanding into what stabilises the interagency communication interfaces between those agencies responding to a major disaster. Methods: A qualitative case study research design was employed to investigate how interagency communication interfaces were stabilised at the micro-level (“the case”) in the aftermath of the destructive earthquakes that hit Canterbury in 2010-11 (“the context”). Participant recruitment was undertaken by mapping which agencies were involved within the IERT and approaching representatives from each of these agencies. Data was collected via individual interviews using a semi-structured interview guide and was based on the “Critical Incident Technique”. Subsequently, data was transcribed verbatim and subjected to inductive analysis. This was underpinned theoretically by Weick’s “Interpretive Approach” and supported by Nvivo qualitative data analysis software. Results: 19 participants were interviewed in this study. Out of the inductive analysis emerged two primary themes, each with several sub-factors. The first major theme was destabilising/disruptive factors of interagency communication with five sub-factors, a) conflicting role mandates, b) rigid command structures, c) disruption of established communication structures, d) lack of shared language and understanding, and e) situational awareness disruption. The second major theme stabilising/steadying factors in interagency communication had four sub-factors, a) the establishment of the IERT, b) emergent novel communication strategies, c) establishment of a liaison role and d) pre-existing networks and relationships. Finally, there was a third sub-level identified during inductive analysis, where sub-factors from both primary themes were noted to be uniquely interconnected by emergent “consequences” arising out of the disaster context. Finally, findings were synthesised into a conceptual “Model of Interagency Communication at the Micro-level” based on this case study of the Canterbury earthquake disaster response. Discussion: The three key dimensions of The People, The Connections and The Improvisations served as a framework for the discussion of what stabilises interagency communication interfaces in a major disaster. The People were key to stabilising the interagency interfaces through functioning as a flexible conduit, guiding and navigating communication at the interagency interfaces and improving situational awareness. The Connections provided the collective competence, shared decision-making and prior established relationships that stabilised the micro-level communication at interagency interfaces. And finally, The Improvisations i.e., novel ideas and inventiveness that emerge out of rapidly changing post-disaster environments, also contributed to stabilisation of micro-level communication flows across interagency interfaces in the disaster response. “Command and control” hierarchical structures do provide clear processes and structures for teams working in disasters to follow. However, improvisations and novel solutions are also needed and often emerge from first responders (who are best placed to assess the evolving needs in a disaster where there is a high degree of uncertainty). Conclusion: This study highlights the value of incorporating an interface perspective into any study that seeks to understand the processes of IERTs during disaster responses. It also strengthens the requirement for disaster management frameworks to formally plan for and to allow for the adaptive responsiveness of local teams on the ground, and legitimise and recognise the improvisations of those in the role of emergent boundary spanners in a disaster response. This needs to be in addition to existing formal disaster response mechanisms. This study provides a new conceptual model that can be used to guide future case studies exploring stability at the interfaces of other IERTs and highlights the centrality of communication in the experiences of members of teams in the aftermath of a disaster. Utilising these new perspectives on stabilising communication at the interagency interfaces in disaster responses will have practical implications in the future to better serve the needs of vulnerable people who are at greatest risk of adverse outcomes in a disaster.
Effective management of waste and debris generated by a disaster event is vital to ensure rapid and efficient response and recovery that supports disaster risk reduction (DRR). Disaster waste refers to any stream of debris that is created from a natural disaster that impacts the environment, infrastructure, and property. This waste can be problematic due to extensive volumes, environmental contamination and pollution, public health risks, and the disruption of response and recovery efforts. Due to the complexities in dealing with these diverse and voluminous materials, having disaster waste management (DWM) planning in place pre-event is crucial. In particular, coordinated, interagency plans that have been informed by estimates of waste volumes and types are vital to ensure management facilities, personnel, and recovery resources do not become overwhelmed. Globally, a priority when formulating DWM plans is the robust estimation of disaster waste stream types and volumes. This is a relatively under-researched area, despite the growing risk of natural disasters and increasingly inadequate waste management facilities. In Aotearoa New Zealand, a nation-wide DWM planning tool has been proposed for local government use, and waste amounts from events such as the Christchurch Earthquakes have been estimated. However, there has been little work undertaken to estimate waste types and volumes with a region-specific, multi-hazard focus, which is required to facilitate detailed regional DWM planning. This research provides estimates of potential disaster waste volumes and types in the Waitaha-Canterbury region of the South Island (Te Waipounamu) for three key hazard scenarios: a M8.0 Alpine Fault earthquake with a south-to-north rupture pattern, a far-sourced tsunami using a maximum credible event model for a Peru-sourced event, and major flooding using geospatial datasets taken from available local government modelling. Conducted in partnership with Environment Canterbury and Canterbury CDEM, this estimation work informed stakeholder engagement through multi-agency workshops at the district level. This research was comprised of two key parts. The first was enhancing and extending a disaster waste estimation model used in Wellington and applying it to the Canterbury region to quantify waste volumes and types. The second part was using this model and its estimates to inform engagement with stakeholders in multi-agency, district-level workshops in Kaikōura, Hurunui, and Waimakariri. In these workshops, the waste estimates were used to catalyse discussion around potential issues associated with the management of disaster waste. Regionally, model estimates showed that the earthquake scenario would generate the highest total volume of disaster waste (1.94 million m³), compared to the tsunami scenario (1.89 million m³) and the flood scenario (173,900 m³). Flood waste estimates are likely underrepresented due to limited flood modelling coverage, but still provide a valuable comparison. Whilst waste estimates differ significantly between districts, waste volumes were shown to be not solely dependent on building/population density. The district-level workshops showed that DWM challenges revolved around logistical constraints, public concerns, governance complexities, and environmental issues. Future work should further enhance this estimation model and apply it to other regions of Aotearoa New Zealand, to help develop a set of cohesive DWM plans for each region. The waste estimation model could also be adapted and applied internationally. The findings from this research provide a foundation for advancing DWM planning and stakeholder engagement in the Waitaha-Canterbury region. By offering region-specific waste estimates across multiple hazard scenarios, this work supports district councils and emergency managers in developing informed, proactive strategies for disaster preparedness and response. The insights gained from district-level workshops highlight key challenges that must be addressed in future planning. These outcomes contribute to a broader research agenda for DWM in Aotearoa New Zealand, and offer a framework adaptable to international contexts.
Printed as a proceedings on a USB. Available to ISWA members at <a shape="rect" href="http://www.iswa.org">www.iswa.org</a>Disasters can create the equivalent of 20 years of waste in only a few days. Disaster waste can have direct impacts on public health and safety, and on the environment. The management of such waste has a great direct cost to society in terms of labor, equipment, processing, transport and disposal. Disaster waste management also has indirect costs, in the sense that slow management can slow down a recovery, greatly affecting the ability of commerce and industry to re-start. In addition, a disaster can lead to the disruption of normal solid waste management systems, or result in inappropriate management that leads to expensive environmental remediation. Finally, there are social impacts implicit in disaster waste management decisions because of psychological impact we expect when waste is not cleared quickly or is cleared too quickly. The paper gives an overview of the challenge of disaster waste management, examining issues of waste quantity and composition; waste treatment; environmental, economic, and social impacts; health and safety matters; and planning. Christchurch, New Zealand, and the broader region of Canterbury were impacted during this research by a series of shallow earthquakes. This has led to the largest natural disaster emergency in New Zealand’s history, and the management of approximately 8 million tons of building and infrastructure debris has become a major issue. The paper provides an overview of the status of disaster waste management in Christchurch as a case study. A key conclusion is the vital role of planning in effective disaster waste management. In spite of the frequency of disasters, in most countries the ratio of time spent on planning for disaster waste management to the time spent on normal waste management is extremely low. Disaster waste management also requires improved education or training of those involved in response efforts. All solid waste professionals have a role to play to respond to the challenges of disaster waste management.
Fine grained sediment deposition in urban environments during natural hazard events can impact critical infrastructure and properties (urban terrain) leading to reduced social and economic function and potentially adverse public health effects. Therefore, clean-up of the sediments is required to minimise impacts and restore social and economic functionality as soon as possible. The strategies employed to manage and coordinate the clean-up significantly influence the speed, cost and quality of the clean-up operation. Additionally, the physical properties of the fine grained sediment affects the clean-up, transport, storage and future usage of the sediment. The goals of the research are to assess the resources, time and cost required for fine grained sediment clean-up in an urban environment following a disaster and to determine how the geotechnical properties of sediment will affect urban clean-up strategies. The thesis focuses on the impact of fine grained sediment (<1 mm) deposition from three liquefaction events during the Canterbury earthquake sequence (2010-2011) on residential suburbs and transport networks in Christchurch. It also presents how geotechnical properties of the material may affect clean-up strategies and methods by presenting geotechnical analysis of tephra material from the North Island of New Zealand. Finally, lessons for disaster response planning and decision making for clean-up of sediment in urban environments are presented. A series of semi-structured interviews of key stakeholders supported by relevant academic literature and media reports were used to record the clean-up operation coordination and management and to make a preliminary qualification of the Christchurch liquefaction ejecta clean-up (costs breakdown, time, volume, resources, coordination, planning and priorities). Further analysis of the costs and resources involved for better accuracy was required and so the analysis of Christchurch City Council road management database (RAMM) was done. In order to make a transition from general fine sediment clean-up to specific types of fine disaster sediment clean-up, adequate information about the material properties is required as they will define how the material will be handled, transported and stored. Laboratory analysis of young volcanic tephra from the New Zealand’s North Island was performed to identify their geotechnical properties (density, granulometry, plasticity, composition and angle of repose). The major findings of this research were that emergency planning and the use of the coordinated incident management system (CIMS) system during the emergency were important to facilitate rapid clean-up tasking, management of resources and ultimately recovery from widespread and voluminous liquefaction ejecta deposition in eastern Christchurch. A total estimated cost of approximately $NZ 40 million was calculated for the Christchurch City clean-up following the 2010-2011 Canterbury earthquake sequence with a partial cost of $NZ 12 million for the Southern part of the city, where up to 33% (418 km) of the road network was impacted by liquefaction ejecta and required clearing of the material following the 22 February 2011 earthquake. Over 500,000 tonnes of ejecta has been stockpiled at Burwood landfill for all three liquefaction inducing earthquake events. The average cost per kilometre for the event clean-up was $NZ 5,500/km (4 September 2010), $NZ 11,650/km (22 February 2011) and $NZ 11,185/km (13 June 2011). The duration of clean-up time of residential properties and the road network was approximately two to three months for each of the three liquefaction ejecta events; despite events volumes and spatial distribution of ejecta. Interviews and quantitative analysis of RAMM data revealed that the experience and knowledge gained from the Darfield earthquake (4 September 2010) clean-up increased the efficiency of the following Christchurch earthquake induced liquefaction ejecta clean-up events. Density, particle size, particle shape, clay content and moisture content, are the important geotechnical properties that need to be considered when planning for a clean-up method that incorporates collection, transport and disposal or storage. The geotechnical properties for the tephra samples were analysed to increase preparedness and reaction response of potentially affected North Island cities from possible product from the active volcanoes in their region. The geotechnical results from this study show that volcanic tephra could be used in road or construction material but the properties would have to be further investigated for a New Zealand context. Using fresh volcanic material in road, building or flood control construction requires good understanding of the material properties and precaution during design and construction to extra care, but if well planned, it can be economically beneficial.