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Research papers, University of Canterbury Library

Two projects are documented within this MEM Report: I. The first project examined what was learnt involving the critical infrastructure in the aftermath of natural disasters in the Canterbury region of New Zealand – the most prominent being the series of earthquakes between 2010 and 2011. The project identified several learning gaps, leading to recommendations for further investigations that could add significant value for the lifeline infrastructure community. II. Following the Lifeline Lesson Learnt Project, the Disaster Mitigation Guideline series was initiated with two booklets, one on Emergency Potable Water and a second on Emergency Sanitation. The key message from both projects is that we can and must learn from disasters. The projects described are part of the emergency management, and critical infrastructure learning cycles – presenting knowledge captured by others in a digestible format, enabling the lessons to be reapplied. Without these kinds of projects, there will be fewer opportunities to learn from other’s successes and failures when it comes to preparing for natural disasters.

Research papers, University of Canterbury Library

Depending on their nature and severity, disasters can create large volumes of debris and waste. Waste volumes from a single event can be the equivalent of many times the annual waste generation rate of the affected community. These volumes can overwhelm existing solid waste management facilities and personnel. Mismanagement of disaster waste can affect both the response and long term recovery of a disaster affected area. Previous research into disaster waste management has been either context specific or event specific, making it difficult to transfer lessons from one disaster event to another. The aim of this research is to develop a systems understanding of disaster waste management and in turn develop context- and disaster-transferrable decision-making guidance for emergency and waste managers. To research this complex and multi-disciplinary problem, a multi-hazard, multi-context, multi-case study approach was adopted. The research focussed on five major disaster events: 2011 Christchurch earthquake, 2009 Victorian Bushfires, 2009 Samoan tsunami, 2009 L’Aquila earthquake and 2005 Hurricane Katrina. The first stage of the analysis involved the development of a set of ‘disaster & disaster waste’ impact indicators. The indicators demonstrate a method by which disaster managers, planners and researchers can simplify the very large spectra of possible disaster impacts, into some key decision-drivers which will likely influence post-disaster management requirements. The second stage of the research was to develop a set of criteria to represent the desirable environmental, economic, social and recovery effects of a successful disaster waste management system. These criteria were used to assess the effectiveness of the disaster waste management approaches for the case studies. The third stage of the research was the cross-case analysis. Six main elements of disaster waste management systems were identified and analysed. These were: strategic management, funding mechanisms, operational management, environmental and human health risk management, and legislation and regulation. Within each of these system elements, key decision-making guidance (linked to the ‘disaster & disaster waste’ indicators) and management principles were developed. The ‘disaster & disaster waste’ impact indicators, the effects assessment criteria and management principles have all been developed so that they can be practically applied to disaster waste management planning and response in the future.

Research papers, Lincoln University

The 2010 and 2011 earthquakes of Canterbury have had a serious and ongoing effect on Maori in the city (Lambert, Mark-Shadbolt, Ataria, & Black, 2012). Many people had to rely on themselves, their neighbours and their whanau for an extended period in 2011, and some are still required to organise and coordinate various activities such as schooling, health care, work and community activities such as church, sports and recreation in a city beset by ongoing disruption and distress. Throughout the phases of response and recovery, issues of leadership have been implicitly and explicitly woven through both formal and informal investigations and debates. This paper presents the results of a small sample of initial interviews of Maori undertaken in the response and early recovery period of the disaster and discusses some of the implications for Maori urban communities.

Research papers, University of Canterbury Library

Disasters can create the equivalent of 20 years of waste in only a few days. Disaster waste can have direct impacts on public health and safety, and on the environment. The management of such waste has a great direct cost to society in terms of labor, equipment, processing, transport and disposal. Disaster waste management also has indirect costs, in the sense that slow management can slow down a recovery, greatly affecting the ability of commerce and industry to re-start. In addition, a disaster can lead to the disruption of normal solid waste management systems, or result in inappropriate management that leads to expensive environmental remediation. Finally, there are social impacts implicit in disaster waste management decisions because of psychological impact we expect when waste is not cleared quickly or is cleared too quickly. The paper gives an overview of the challenge of disaster waste management, examining issues of waste quantity and composition; waste treatment; environmental, economic, and social impacts; health and safety matters; and planning. Christchurch, New Zealand, and the broader region of Canterbury were impacted during this research by a series of shallow earthquakes. This has led to the largest natural disaster emergency in New Zealand’s history, and the management of approximately 8 million tons of building and infrastructure debris has become a major issue. The paper provides an overview of the status of disaster waste management in Christchurch as a case study. A key conclusion is the vital role of planning in effective disaster waste management. In spite of the frequency of disasters, in most countries the ratio of time spent on planning for disaster waste management to the time spent on normal waste management is extremely low. Disaster waste management also requires improved education or training of those involved in response efforts. All solid waste professionals have a role to play to respond to the challenges of disaster waste management.

Images, UC QuakeStudies

The USAID Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) photographed outside their headquarters in Latimer Square. Latimer Square was set up as a temporary headquarters for emergency management personnel after the 22 February 2011 earthquake.

Images, UC QuakeStudies

Members of the Disaster Assistance Response Team outside the US headquarters in Latimer Square. Latimer Square was set up as a temporary headquarters for emergency management personnel after the 22 February 2011 earthquake.

Research papers, Lincoln University

The scale of damage from a series of earthquakes across Christchurch Otautahi in 2010 and 2011 challenged all networks in the city at a time when many individuals and communities were under severe economic pressure. Historically, Maori have drawn on traditional institutions such as whanau, marae, hapu and iwi in their endurance of past crises. This paper presents research in progress to describe how these Maori-centric networks supported both Maori and non-Maori through massive urban dislocation. Resilience to any disaster can be explained by configurations of economic, social and cultural factors. Knowing what has contributed to Maori resilience is fundamental to the strategic enhancement of future urban communities - Maori and non-Maori.

Images, UC QuakeStudies

Al Dwyer, and members of the Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) outside their headquarters in Latimer Square. Latimer Square was set up as a temporary headquarters for emergency management personnel after the 22 February 2011 earthquake.

Images, UC QuakeStudies

Deputy Administrator for Protection and National Preparedness at the Federal Emergency Management Agency, Tim Manning, briefing members of the Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) upon their arrival in Christchurch to assist with search and rescue efforts.

Images, UC QuakeStudies

Deputy Administrator for Protection and National Preparedness at the Federal Emergency Management Agency, Tim Manning, briefing members of the Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) upon their arrival in Christchurch to assist with search and rescue efforts.

Images, UC QuakeStudies

Members of the USAID Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) setting up a tent in Latimer Square after their early-morning arrival in Christchurch. Latimer Square was set up as a temporary headquarters for emergency management personnel after the 22 February 2011 earthquake.

Research papers, University of Canterbury Library

In response to the February 2011 earthquake, Parliament enacted the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Act. This emergency legislation provided the executive with extreme powers that extended well beyond the initial emergency response and into the recovery phase. Although New Zealand has the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002, it was unable to cope with the scale and intensity of the Canterbury earthquake sequence. Considering the well-known geological risk facing the Wellington region, this paper will consider whether a standalone “Disaster Recovery Act” should be established to separate an emergency and its response from the recovery phase. Currently, Government policy is to respond reactively to a disaster rather than proactively. In a major event, this typically involves the executive being given the ability to make rules, regulations and policy without the delay or oversight of normal legislative process. In the first part of this paper, I will canvas what a “Disaster Recovery Act” could prescribe and why there is a need to separate recovery from emergency. Secondly, I will consider the shortfalls in the current civil defence recovery framework which necessitates this kind of heavy governmental response after a disaster. In the final section, I will examine how

Research papers, University of Canterbury Library

This study analyses the success and limitations of the recovery process following the 2010–11 earthquake sequence in Christchurch, New Zealand. Data were obtained from in-depth interviews with 32 relocated households in Christchurch, and from a review of recovery policies implemented by the government. A top-down approach to disaster recovery was evident, with the creation of multiple government agencies and processes that made grassroots input into decision-making difficult. Although insurance proceeds enabled the repair and rebuilding of many dwellings, the complexity and adversarial nature of the claim procedures also impaired recovery. Householders’ perceptions of recovery reflected key aspects of their post-earthquake experiences (e.g. the housing offer they received, and the negotiations involved), and the outcomes of their relocation (including the value of the new home, their subjective well-being, and lifestyle after relocation). Protracted insurance negotiations, unfair offers and hardships in post-earthquake life were major challenges to recovery. Less-thanfavourable recovery experiences also transformed patterns of trust in local communities, as relocated householders came to doubt both the government and private insurance companies’ ability to successfully manage a disaster. At the same time, many relocated households expressed trust in their neighbours and communities. This study illuminates how government policies influence disaster recovery while also suggesting a need to reconsider centralised, top-down approaches to managing recovery.

Images, UC QuakeStudies

Al Dwyer, leader of the USAID Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART), outside the US headquarters in Latimer Square. Members of DART can be seen behind him. Latimer Square was set up as a temporary headquarters for emergency management personnel after the 22 February 2011 earthquake.

Research papers, University of Canterbury Library

In this dissertation it is argued that the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Act 2011 and the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority were both necessary and inevitable given the trends and traditions of civil defence emergency management (CDEM) in New Zealand. The trends and traditions of civil defence are such that principles come before practice, form before function, and change is primarily brought about through crisis and criticism. The guiding question of the research was why were a new governance system and law made after the Canterbury earthquakes in 2010 and 2011? Why did this outcome occur despite the establishment of a modern emergency management system in 2002 which included a recovery framework that had been praised by international scholars as leading edge and a model for other countries? The official reason was the unprecedented scale and demands of the recovery – but a disaster of such scale is the principle reason for having a national emergency management system. Another explanation is the lack of cooperation among local authorities – but that raises the question of whether the CDEM recovery framework would have been successful in another locality. Consequentially, the focus of this dissertation is on the CDEM recovery framework and how New Zealand came to find itself making disaster law during a disaster. Recommendations include a review of emergency powers for recovery, a review of the capabilities needed to fulfil the mandate of Recovery Managers, and the establishment of a National Recovery Office with a cadre of Recovery Managers that attend every recovery to observe, advise, or assume control as needed. CDEM Group Recovery Managers would be seconded to the National Recovery Office which would allow for experience in recovery management to be developed and institutionalised through regular practice.

Videos, UC QuakeStudies

A video of a conversation between John Hamilton, National Controller of the Civil Defence Emergency Response, and Dr Sonia Giovinazzi, Research Fellow at the Department of Civil and Natural Resource Engineering at the University of Canterbury. Hamilton and Giovinazzi discuss the Civil Defence's response to the 22 February 2011 earthquake and the lessons that they learned.The video includes footage from the Ministry of Civil Defence (licenced under Creative Commons Attribute 3.0 New Zealand).

Images, UC QuakeStudies

Prime Minister John Key preparing for a photograph with Al Dwyer, the leader of the USAID Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART), and members of DART, outside the US headquarters in Latimer Square. Latimer Square was set up as a temporary headquarters for emergency managements personnel after the 22 February 2011 earthquake.

Images, UC QuakeStudies

Prime Minister John Key preparing for a photograph with Al Dwyer, leader of the Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART), and members of DART, outside the US headquarters in Latimer Square. Latimer Square was set up as a temporary headquarters for emergency managements personnel after the 22 February 2011 earthquake.

Images, UC QuakeStudies

Prime Minister John Key preparing for a photograph with Al Dwyer, leader of the Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART), and members of DART, outside the US headquarters in Latimer Square. Latimer Square was set up as a temporary headquarters for emergency managements personnel after the 22 February 2011 earthquake.

Images, UC QuakeStudies

Members of the USAID Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) and the New Zealand Urban Search and Rescue Team conferring in a tent full of equipment in Latimer Square. Latimer Square was set up as a temporary headquarters for emergency management personnel after the 22 February 2011 earthquake.

Research papers, University of Canterbury Library

At 4.35am on Saturday 4 September 2010, a magnitude 7.1 earthquake struck near the township of Darfield in Canterbury leading to widespread damage in Christchurch and the wider central Canterbury region. Though it was reported no lives were lost, that was not entirely correct. Over 3,000 animals perished as a result of the earthquake and 99% of these deaths would have been avoidable if appropriate mitigation measures had been in place. Deaths were predominantly due to zoological vulnerability of birds in captive production farms. Other problems included lack of provision of animal welfare at evacuation centres, issues associated with multiple lost and found pet services, evacuation failure due to pet separation and stress impact on dairy herds and associated milk production. The Canterbury Earthquake has highlighted concerns over a lack of animal emergency welfare planning and capacity in New Zealand, an issue that is being progressed by the National Animal Welfare Emergency Management Group. As animal emergency management becomes better understood by emergency management and veterinary professionals, it is more likely that both sectors will have greater demands placed upon them by national guidelines and community expectations to ensure provisions are made to afford protection of animals in times of disaster. A subsequent and more devastating earthquake struck the region on Monday 22 February 2011; this article however is primarily focused on the events pertaining to the September 4 event.

Research papers, University of Canterbury Library

The Master of Engineering Management Project was sponsored by the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority (CERA) and consisted of two phases: The first was an analysis of existing information detailing the effects of hazardous natural events on Canterbury Lifeline Utilities in the past 15 years. The aim of this “Lessons Learned” project was to produce an analysis report that identified key themes from the research, gaps in the existing data and to provide recommendations from these “Lessons Learned.” The Second phase was the development of a practical “Disaster Mitigation Guideline” that outlined lessons in the field of Emergency Sanitation. This research would build upon the first stage and would draw from international reference to develop a guideline that has practical implementation possibilities throughout the world.