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Research papers, University of Canterbury Library

This report presents the simplified seismic assessment of a case study reinforced concrete (RC) building following the newly developed and refined NZSEE/MBIE guidelines on seismic assessment (NZSEE/MBIE, semi-final draft 26 October 2016). After an overview of the step-by-step ‘diagnostic’ process, including an holistic and qualitative description of the expected vulnerabilities and of the assessment strategy/methodology, focus is given, whilst not limited, to the implementation of a Detailed Seismic Assessment (DSA) (NZSEE/MBIE, 2016c). The DSA is intended to provide a more reliable and consistent outcome than what can be provided by an initial seismic assessment (ISA). In fact, while the Initial Seismic Assessment (ISA), of which the Initial Evaluation Procedure is only a part of, is the more natural and still recommended first step in the overall assessment process, it is mostly intended to be a coarse evaluation involving as few resources as reasonably possible. It is thus expected that an ISA will be followed by a Detailed Seismic Assessment (DSA) not only where the threshold of 33%NBS is not achieved but also where important decisions are intended that are reliant on the seismic status of the building. The use of %NBS (% New Building Standard) as a capacity/demand ratio to describe the result of the seismic assessment at all levels of assessment procedure (ISA through to DSA) is deliberate by the NZSEE/MBIE guidelines (Part A) (NZSEE/MBIE 2016a). The rating for the building needs only be based on the lowest level of assessment that is warranted for the particular circumstances. Discussion on how the %NBS rating is to be determined can be found in Section A3.3 (NZSEE/MBIE 2016a), and, more specifically, in Part B for the ISA (NZSEE/MBIE 2016b) and Part C for the DSA (NZSEE/MBIE 2016c). As per other international approaches, the DSA can be based on several analysis procedures to assess the structural behaviour (linear, nonlinear, static or dynamic, force or displacement-based). The significantly revamped NZSEE 2016 Seismic Assessment Guidelines strongly recommend the use of an analytical (basically ‘by hand’) method, referred to the Simple Lateral Mechanism Analysis (SLaMA) as a first phase of any other numerically-based analysis method. Significant effort has thus been dedicated to provide within the NZSEE 2016 guidelines (NZSEE/MBIE 2016c) a step-by-step description of the procedure, either in general terms (Chapter 2) or with specific reference to Reinforced Concrete Buildings (Chapter 5). More specifically, extract from the guidelines, NZSEE “recommend using the Simple Lateral Mechanism Analysis (SLaMA) procedure as a first step in any assessment. While SLaMA is essentially an analysis technique, it enables assessors to investigate (and present in a simple form) the potential contribution and interaction of a number of structural elements and their likely effect on the building’s global capacity. In some cases, the results of a SLaMA will only be indicative. However, it is expected that its use should help assessors achieve a more reliable outcome than if they only carried out a detailed analysis, especially if that analysis is limited to the elastic range For complex structural systems, a 3D dynamic analysis may be necessary to supplement the simplified nonlinear Simple Lateral Mechanism Analysis (SLaMA).” This report presents the development of a full design example for the the implementation of the SLaMA method on a case study buildings and a validation/comparison with a non-linear static (pushover) analysis. The step-by-step-procedure, summarized in Figure 1, will be herein demonstrated from a component level (beams, columns, wall elements) to a subassembly level (hierarchy of strength in a beam-column joint) and to a system level (frame, C-Wall) assuming initially a 2D behaviour of the key structural system, and then incorporating a by-hand 3D behaviour (torsional effects).

Research papers, University of Canterbury Library

Between September 2010 and February 2012 (a period of 18 months) the Canterbury region of New Zealand has experienced over 10,000 earthquakes (Nicholls, 2012). This report is the first in a series that will describe the impact of the Canterbury earthquake on businesses. This initial report gives a high level overview of the earthquake events and the impacts on the Canterbury economy and businesses. This report is intended to provide background and context for more in-depth analyses to come in future reports.

Research papers, University of Canterbury Library

Organisations locate strategically within Business Districts (CBDs) in order to cultivate their image, increase their profile, and improve access to customers, suppliers, and services. While CBDs offer an economic benefit to organisations, they also present a unique set of hazard vulnerabilities and planning challenges for businesses. As of May 2012, the Christchurch CBD has been partially cordoned off for over 14 months. Economic activity within the cordoned CBD, which previously contained 6,000 businesses and over 51,000 workers, has been significantly diminished and organisations have been forced to find new ways of operating. The vulnerabilities and resilience of CBDs not only influences outcomes for CBD organisations, but also the broader interconnected (urban/regional/national) system. A CBD is a hub of economic, social, and built infrastructure within a network of links and nodes. When the hub is disrupted all of the people, objects, and transactions that usually flow into and out of the hub must be redirected elsewhere. In an urban situation this means traffic jams in peripheries of the city, increased prices of commercial property, and capital flight; all of which are currently being faced in Canterbury. This report presents the lessons learned from organisations in CBDs affected by the Canterbury earthquakes. Here we focus on the Christchurch CBD; however, several urban town centres were extensively disrupted by the earthquakes. The statistics and discussion presented in this report are based on the results of an ongoing study conducted by Resilient Organisations (www.resorgs.org.nz). The data was captured using two questionnaire surveys of Canterbury organisations (issued November 2010 and May 2011), interviews with key informants, and in-depth case studies of organisations. Several industry sectors were sampled, and geographic samples of organisations in the Christchurch CBD, Lyttelton, and the Kaiapoi town centre were also collected. Results in this report describing “non-CBD organisations” refer to all organisations outside of the Christchurch CBD, Lyttelton, and Kaiapoi town centres.

Research papers, University of Canterbury Library

Fire following earthquakes have caused the largest single loss due to earthquakes and in most cases have caused more damage than the quake itself. This problem is regarded very seriously in Japan and in some parts of the United States of America (San Francisco), but is not very seriously considered in other earthquake prone countries, yet the potential for future conflagrations following earthquakes is enormous. Any discussion of post earthquake fire must take into account structural and non-structural damages, initial and spreading fire, wind, water availability, and emergency responses. In this paper we will look at initial fire ignitions, growth and spread and life and property damage. Prevention methods will also be discussed. We will also discuss as examples some case studies: - San Francisco 1989 - Napier 1931 -Christchurch (scenario)

Images, UC QuakeStudies

A photograph of a bookcase in the Civil Suite at the University of Canterbury after the 4 September 2010 earthquake. The photograph was taken on the day when the staff were allowed to return to the building. The shelves of the bookcase have been removed, exposing damage along the sides where they knocked against the back panel. Some books have been left on the bottom shelf.

Research papers, University of Canterbury Library

The extent of liquefaction in the eastern suburbs of Christchurch (Aranui, Bexley, Avonside, Avonhead and Dallington) from the February 22 2011 Earthquake resulted in extensive damage to in-ground waste water pipe systems. This caused a huge demand for portable toilets (or port-a-loos) and companies were importing them from outside Canterbury and in some instances from Australia. However, because they were deemed “assets of importance” under legislation, their allocation had to be coordinated by Civil Defence and Emergency Management (CDEM). Consequently, companies supplying them had to ignore requests from residents, businesses and rest homes; and commitments to large events outside of the city such as the Hamilton 400 V8 Supercars and the Pasifika Festival in Auckland were impacted. Frustrations started to show as neighbourhoods questioned the equity of the port-a-loos distribution. The Prime Minister was reported as reassuring citizens in the eastern suburbs in the first week of March that1 “a report about the distribution of port-a-loos and chemical toilets shows allocation has been fair. Key said he has asked Civil Defence about the distribution process and where the toilets been sent. He said there aren’t enough for the scale of the event but that is quickly being rectified and the need for toilets is being reassessed all the time.” Nonetheless, there still remained a deep sense of frustration and exclusion over the equity of the port-a-loos distribution. This study took the simple approach of mapping where those port-a-loos were on 11-12 March for several areas in the eastern suburbs and this suggested that their distribution was not equitable and was not well done. It reviews the predictive tools available for estimating damage to waste water pipes and asks the question could this situation have been better planned so that pot-a-loo locations could have been better prioritised? And finally it reviews the integral roles of communication and monitoring as part of disaster management strategy. The impression from this study is that other New Zealand urban centres could or would also be at risk and that work is need to developed more rational management approaches for disaster planning.