Queenstown and Christchurch are twin poles of New Zealand's landscape of risk. As the country's 'adventure capital', Queenstown is a spectacular landscape in which risk is a commodity. Christchurch's landscape is also risky, ruptured by earthquakes, tentatively rebuilding. As a far-flung group of tiny islands in a vast ocean, New Zealand is the poster-child of the sublime.
Queenstown and Christchurch tell two different, yet complementary, stories about the sublime.
Christchurch and Queenstown are vehicles for exploring the 21st-century sublime, for reflecting on its expansive influence on shaping cultural landscapes. Christchurch and Queenstown stretch and challenge the sublime's influence on the designed landscape. Circling the paradoxes of risk and safety, suffering and pleasure, the sublime feeds an infinite appetite for fear as entertainment, and at the same time calls for an empathetic caring for a broken landscape and its residents.
This dissertation addresses several fundamental and applied aspects of ground motion selection for seismic response analyses. In particular, the following topics are addressed: the theory and application of ground motion selection for scenario earthquake ruptures; the consideration of causal parameter bounds in ground motion selection; ground motion selection in the near-fault region where directivity effect is significant; and methodologies for epistemic uncertainty consideration and propagation in the context of ground motion selection and seismic performance assessment. The paragraphs below outline each contribution in more detail. A scenario-based ground motion selection method is presented which considers the joint distribution of multiple intensity measure (IM) types based on the generalised conditional intensity measure (GCIM) methodology (Bradley, 2010b, 2012c). The ground motion selection algorithm is based on generating realisations of the considered IM distributions for a specific rupture scenario and then finding the prospective ground motions which best fit the realisations using an optimal amplitude scaling factor. In addition, using different rupture scenarios and site conditions, two important aspects of the GCIM methodology are scrutinised: (i) different weight vectors for the various IMs considered; and (ii) quantifying the importance of replicate selections for ensembles with different numbers of desired ground motions. As an application of the developed scenario-based ground motion selection method, ground motion ensembles are selected to represent several major earthquake scenarios in New Zealand that pose a significant seismic hazard, namely, Alpine, Hope and Porters Pass ruptures for Christchurch city; and Wellington, Ohariu, and Wairarapa ruptures for Wellington city. A rigorous basis is developed, and sensitivity analyses performed, for the consideration of bounds on causal parameters (e.g., magnitude, source-to-site distance, and site condition) for ground motion selection. The effect of causal parameter bound selection on both the number of available prospective ground motions from an initial empirical as-recorded database, and the statistical properties of IMs of selected ground motions are examined. It is also demonstrated that using causal parameter bounds is not a reliable approach to implicitly account for ground motion duration and cumulative effects when selection is based on only spectral acceleration (SA) ordinates. Specific causal parameter bounding criteria are recommended for general use as a ‘default’ bounding criterion with possible adjustments from the analyst based on problem-specific preferences. An approach is presented to consider the forward directivity effects in seismic hazard analysis, which does not separate the hazard calculations for pulse-like and non-pulse-like ground motions. Also, the ability of ground motion selection methods to appropriately select records containing forward directivity pulse motions in the near-fault region is examined. Particular attention is given to ground motion selection which is explicitly based on ground motion IMs, including SA, duration, and cumulative measures; rather than a focus on implicit parameters (i.e., distance, and pulse or non-pulse classifications) that are conventionally used to heuristically distinguish between the near-fault and far-field records. No ad hoc criteria, in terms of the number of directivity ground motions and their pulse periods, are enforced for selecting pulse-like records. Example applications are presented with different rupture characteristics, source-to-site geometry, and site conditions. It is advocated that the selection of ground motions in the near-fault region based on IM properties alone is preferred to that in which the proportion of pulse-like motions and their pulse periods are specified a priori as strict criteria for ground motion selection. Three methods are presented to propagate the effect of seismic hazard and ground motion selection epistemic uncertainties to seismic performance metrics. These methods differ in their level of rigor considered to propagate the epistemic uncertainty in the conditional distribution of IMs utilised in ground motion selection, selected ground motion ensembles, and the number of nonlinear response history analyses performed to obtain the distribution of engineering demand parameters. These methods are compared for an example site where it is observed that, for seismic demand levels below the collapse limit, epistemic uncertainty in ground motion selection is a smaller uncertainty contributor relative to the uncertainty in the seismic hazard itself. In contrast, uncertainty in ground motion selection process increases the uncertainty in the seismic demand hazard for near-collapse demand levels.
At 00:02 on 14th November 2016, a Mw 7.8 earthquake occurred in and offshore of the northeast of the South Island of New Zealand. Fault rupture, ground shaking, liquefaction, and co-seismic landslides caused severe damage to distributed infrastructure, and particularly transportation networks; large segments of the country’s main highway, State Highway 1 (SH1), and the Main North Line (MNL) railway line, were damaged between Picton and Christchurch. The damage caused direct local impacts, including isolation of communities, and wider regional impacts, including disruption of supply chains. Adaptive measures have ensured immediate continued regional transport of goods and people. Air and sea transport increased quickly, both for emergency response and to ensure routine transport of goods. Road diversions have also allowed critical connections to remain operable. This effective response to regional transport challenges allowed Civil Defence Emergency Management to quickly prioritise access to isolated settlements, all of which had road access 23 days after the earthquake. However, 100 days after the earthquake, critical segments of SH1 and the MNL remain closed and their ongoing repairs are a serious national strategic, as well as local, concern. This paper presents the impacts on South Island transport infrastructure, and subsequent management through the emergency response and early recovery phases, during the first 100 days following the initial earthquake, and highlights lessons for transportation system resilience.
At 00:02 on 14th November 2016, a Mw 7.8 earthquake occurred in and offshore of the northeast of the South Island of New Zealand. Fault rupture, ground shaking, liquefaction, and co-seismic landslides caused severe damage to distributed infrastructure, and particularly transportation networks; large segments of the country’s main highway, State Highway 1 (SH1), and the Main North Line (MNL) railway line, were damaged between Picton and Christchurch. The damage caused direct local impacts, including isolation of communities, and wider regional impacts, including disruption of supply chains. Adaptive measures have ensured immediate continued regional transport of goods and people. Air and sea transport increased quickly, both for emergency response and to ensure routine transport of goods. Road diversions have also allowed critical connections to remain operable. This effective response to regional transport challenges allowed Civil Defence Emergency Management to quickly prioritise access to isolated settlements, all of which had road access 23 days after the earthquake. However, 100 days after the earthquake, critical segments of SH1 and the MNL remain closed and their ongoing repairs are a serious national strategic, as well as local, concern. This paper presents the impacts on South Island transport infrastructure, and subsequent management through the emergency response and early recovery phases, during the first 100 days following the initial earthquake, and highlights lessons for transportation system resilience.
