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Research Papers, Lincoln University

This report forms part of a research project examining rural community resilience to natural hazard events, with a particular focus on transient population groups. A preliminary desktop and scoping exercise was undertaken to examine nine communities affected by the Kaikoura earthquake and to identify the variety of transient population groups that are commonly (and increasingly) found in rural New Zealand (see Wilson & Simmons, 2017). From this, four case study communities – Blenheim, Kaikoura, Waiau and St Arnaud – were selected to represent a range of settlement types. These communities varied in respect of social, economic and geographic features, including the presence of particular transient population groups, and earthquake impact. While the 2016 Kaikoura earthquake provided a natural hazard event on which to focus the research, the research interest was in long-term (and broad) community resilience, rather than short-term (and specific) response and recovery actions which occurred post-earthquake.

Research Papers, Lincoln University

The 2013 Seddon earthquake (Mw 6.5), the 2013 Lake Grassmere earthquake (Mw 6.6), and the 2016 Kaikōura earthquake (Mw 7.8) provided an opportunity to assemble the most extensive damage database to wine storage tanks ever compiled worldwide. An overview of this damage database is presented herein based on the in-field post-earthquake damage data collected for 2058 wine storage tanks (1512 legged tanks and 546 flat-based tanks) following the 2013 earthquakes and 1401 wine storage tanks (599 legged tanks and 802 flat-based tanks) following the 2016 earthquake. Critique of the earthquake damage database revealed that in 2013, 39% and 47% of the flat-based wine tanks sustained damage to their base shells and anchors respectively, while due to resilience measures implemented following the 2013 earthquakes, in the 2016 earthquake the damage to tank base shells and tank anchors of flat-based wine tanks was reduced to 32% and 23% respectively and instead damage to tank barrels (54%) and tank cones (43%) was identified as the two most frequently occurring damage modes for this type of tank. Analysis of damage data for legged wine tanks revealed that the frame-legs of legged wine tanks sustained the greatest damage percentage among different parts of legged tanks in both the 2013 earthquakes (40%) and in the 2016 earthquake (44%). Analysis of damage data and socio-economic findings highlight the need for industry-wide standards, which may have socio-economic implications for wineries.

Research Papers, Lincoln University

On 4 September 2010, a 7.1 magnitude earthquake struck near Darfield, 40 kilometres west of Christchurch, New Zealand. The quake caused significant damage to land and buildings nearby, with damage extending to Christchurch city. On 22 February 2011, a 6.3 magnitude earthquake struck Christchurch, causing extensive and significant damage across the city and with the loss of 185 lives. Years on from these events, occasional large aftershocks continue to shake the region. Two main entomological collections were situated within close proximity to the 2010/11 Canterbury earthquakes. The Lincoln University Entomology Research Collection, which is housed on the 5th floor of a 7 storey building, was 27.5 km from the 2010 Darfield earthquake epicentre. The Canterbury Museum Entomology Collection, which is housed in the basement of a multi-storeyed heritage building, was 10 km from the 2011 Christchurch earthquake epicentre. We discuss the impacts of the earthquakes on these collections, the causes of the damage to the specimens and facilities, and subsequent efforts that were made to prevent further damage in the event of future seismic events. We also discuss the wider need for preparedness against the risks posed by natural disasters and other catastrophic events.

Images, Alexander Turnbull Library

The cartoon shows a family standing proudly in front of their tent which has 'No leaks!', is 'Earthquake-proof!', and 'Affordable!' An 'Optional extra' is an 'inflatable base for tsunami-prone areas'. Text below reads 'Not suitable for volcanic areas. Refers to the problems that have been experienced in the last couple of decades with leaky homes because of slack building codes (which have now been tightened), refers also to the Canterbury earthquake of 4th September with its aftermath of rebuilding for greater earthquake proofing and lastly refers to the problem of people being unable to afford houses. Quantity: 1 digital cartoon(s).

Research papers, University of Canterbury Library

This report provides an initial overview and gap analysis of the multi-hazards interactions that might affect fluvial and pluvial flooding (FPF) hazard in the Ōpāwaho Heathcote catchment. As per the terms of reference, this report focuses on a one-way analysis of the potential effects of multi-hazards on FPF hazard, as opposed to a more complex multi-way analysis of interactions between all hazards. We examined the relationship between FPF hazard and hazards associated with the phenomena of tsunamis; coastal erosion; coastal inundation; groundwater; earthquakes; and mass movements. Tsunamis: Modelling research indicates the worst-case tsunami scenarios potentially affecting the Ōpāwaho Heathcote catchment are far field. Under low probability, high impact tsunami scenarios waves could travel into Pegasus Bay and the Avon-Heathcote Estuary Ihutai, reaching the mouth and lower reaches of the Heathcote catchment and river, potentially inundating and eroding shorelines in sub-catchments 1 to 5, and temporarily blocking fluvial drainage more extensively. Any flooding infrastructure or management actions implemented in the area of tsunami inundation would ideally be resilient to tsunami-induced inundation and erosion. Model results currently available are a first estimate of potential tsunami inundation under contemporary sea and land level conditions. In terms of future large tsunami events, these models likely underestimate effects in riverside sub-catchments, as well as effects under future sea level, shoreline and other conditions. Also of significance when considering different FPF management structures, it is important to be mindful that certain types of flood structures can ‘trap’ inundating water coming from ocean directions, leading to longer flood durations and salinization issues. Coastal erosion: Model predictions indicate that sub-catchments 1 to 3 could potentially be affected by coastal erosion by the timescale of 2065, with sub-catchments 1-6 predicted to be potentially affected by coastal erosion by the time scale of 2115. In addition, the predicted open coast effects of this hazard should not be ignored since any significant changes in the New Brighton Spit open coast would affect erosion rates and exposure of the landward estuary margins, including the shorelines of the Ōpāwaho Heathcote catchment. Any FPF flooding infrastructure or management activities planned for the potentially affected sub-catchments needs to recognise the possibility of coastal erosion, and to have a planned response to the predicted potential shoreline translation. Coastal inundation: Model predictions indicate coastal inundation hazards could potentially affect sub-catchments 1 to 8 by 2065, with a greater area and depth of inundation possible for these same sub-catchments by 2115. Low-lying areas of the Ōpāwaho Heathcote catchment and river channel that discharge into the estuary are highly vulnerable to coastal inundation since elevated ocean and estuary water levels can block the drainage of inland systems, compounding FPF hazards. Coastal inundation can overwhelm stormwater and other drainage network components, and render river dredging options ineffective at best, flood enhancing at worst. A distinction can be made between coastal inundation and coastal erosion in terms of the potential impacts on affected land and assets, including flood infrastructure, and the implications for acceptance, adaptation, mitigation, and/or modification options. That is, responding to inundation could include structural and/or building elevation solutions, since unlike erosion, inundation does not necessarily mean the loss of land. Groundwater: Groundwater levels are of significant but variable concern when examining flooding hazards and management options in the Ōpāwaho Heathcote catchment due to variability in soils, topographies, elevations and proximities to riverine and estuarine surface waterbodies. Much of the Canterbury Plains part of the Ōpāwaho Heathcote catchment has a water table that is at a median depth of <1m from the surface (with actual depth below surface varying seasonally, inter-annually and during extreme meteorological events), though the water table depth rapidly shifts to >6m below the surface in the upper Plains part of the catchment (sub-catchments 13 to 15). Parts of Waltham/Linwood (sub-catchments 5 & 6) and Spreydon (sub-catchment 10) have extensive areas with a particularly high water table, as do sub-catchments 18, 19 and 20 south of the river. In all of the sub-catchments where groundwater depth below surface is shallow, it is necessary to be mindful of cascading effects on liquefaction hazard during earthquake events, including earthquake-induced drainage network and stormwater infrastructure damage. In turn, subsidence induced by liquefaction and other earthquake processes during the CES directly affected groundwater depth below surface across large parts of the central Ōpāwaho Heathcote catchment. The estuary margin of the catchment also faces increasing future challenges with sea level rise, which has the potential to elevate groundwater levels in these areas, compounding existing liquefaction and other earthquake associated multi-hazards. Any increases in subsurface runoff due to drainage system, development or climate changes are also of concern for the loess covered hill slopes due to the potential to enhance mass movement hazards. Earthquakes: Earthquake associated vertical ground displacement and liquefaction have historically affected, or are in future predicted to affect, all Ōpāwaho Heathcote sub-catchments. During the CES, these phenomena induced a significant cascades of changes in the city’s drainage systems, including: extensive vertical displacement and liquefaction induced damage to stormwater ‘greyware’, reducing functionality of the stormwater system; damage to the wastewater system which temporarily lowered groundwater levels and increased stormwater drainage via the wastewater network on the one hand, creating a pollution multi-hazard for FPF on the other hand; liquefaction and vertical displacement induced river channel changes affected drainage capacities; subsidence induced losses in soakage and infiltration capacities; changes occurred in topographic drainage conductivity; estuary subsidence (mainly around the Ōtākaro Avon rivermouth) increased both FPF and coastal inundation hazards; estuary bed uplift (severe around the Ōpāwaho Heathcote margins), reduced tidal prisms and increased bed friction, producing an overall reduction the waterbody’s capacity to efficiently flush catchment floodwaters to sea; and changes in estuarine and riverine ecosystems. All such possible effects need to be considered when evaluating present and future capacities of the Ōpāwaho Heathcote catchment FPF management systems. These phenomena are particularly of concern in the Ōpāwaho Heathcote catchment since stormwater networks must deal with constraints imposed by stream and river channels (past and present), estuarine shorelines and complex hill topography. Mass movements: Mass movements are primarily a risk in the Port Hills areas of the Ōpāwaho Heathcote catchment (sub-catchments 1, 2, 7, 9, 11, 16, 21), though there are one or two small but susceptible areas on the banks of the Ōpāwaho Heathcote River. Mass movements in the form of rockfalls and debris flows occurred on the Port Hills during the CES, resulting in building damage, fatalities and evacuations. Evidence has also been found of earthquake-triggered tunnel gully collapsesin all Port Hill Valleys. Follow-on effects of these mass movements are likely to occur in major future FPF and other hazard events. Of note, elevated groundwater levels, coastal inundation, earthquakes (including liquefaction and other effects), and mass movement exhibit the most extensive levels of multi-hazard interaction with FPF hazard. Further, all of the analysed multi-hazard interactions except earthquakes were found to consistently produce increases in the FPF hazard. The implications of these analyses are that multihazard interactions generally enhance the FPF hazard in the Ōpāwaho Heathcote catchment. Hence, management plans which exclude adjustments for multi-hazard interactions are likely to underestimate the FPF hazard in numerous different ways. In conclusion, although only a one-way analysis of the potential effects of selected multi-hazards on FPF hazard, this review highlights that the Ōpāwaho Heathcote catchment is an inherently multi- hazard prone environment. The implications of the interactions and process linkages revealed in this report are that several significant multi-hazard influences and process interactions must be taken into account in order to design a resilient FPF hazard management strategy.

Other, National Library of New Zealand

Website of Canterbury CDEM Group, which is a partnership of local authorities, emergency services and other organisations tasked with providing effective and comprehensive management of major hazards and their consequences anywhere in Canterbury. Includes community preparedness information, information for emergency managers and CDEM Group plan.

Research papers, University of Canterbury Library

Christchurch City Council (Council) is undertaking the Land Drainage Recovery Programme in order to assess the effects of the earthquakes on flood risk to Christchurch. In the course of these investigations it has become better understood that floodplain management should be considered in a multi natural hazards context. Council have therefore engaged the Jacobs, Beca, University of Canterbury, and HR Wallingford project team to investigate the multihazards in eastern areas of Christchurch and develop flood management options which also consider other natural hazards in that context (i.e. how other hazards contribute to flooding both through temporal and spatial coincidence). The study has three stages:  Stage 1 Gap Analysis – assessment of information known, identification of gaps and studies required to fill the gaps.  Stage 2 Hazard Studies – a gap filling stage with the studies identified in Stage 1.  Stage 3 Collating, Optioneering and Reporting – development of options to manage flood risk. This present report is to document findings of Stage 1 and recommends the studies that should be completed for Stage 2. It has also been important to consider how Stage 3 would be delivered and the gaps are prioritised to provide for this. The level of information available and hazards to consider is extensive; requiring this report to be made up of five parts each identifying individual gaps. A process of identifying information for individual hazards in Christchurch has been undertaken and documented (Part 1) followed by assessing the spatial co-location (Part 2) and probabilistic presence of multi hazards using available information. Part 3 considers multi hazard presence both as a temporal coincidence (e.g. an earthquake and flood occurring at one time) and as a cascade sequence (e.g. earthquake followed by a flood at some point in the future). Council have already undertaken a number of options studies for managing flood risk and these are documented in Part 4. Finally Part 5 provides the Gap Analysis Summary and Recommendations to Council. The key findings of Stage 1 gap analysis are: - The spatial analysis showed eastern Christchurch has a large number of hazards present with only 20% of the study area not being affected by any of the hazards mapped. Over 20% of the study area is exposed to four or more hazards at the frequencies and data available. - The majority of the Residential Red Zone is strongly exposed to multiple hazards, with 86% of the area being exposed to 4 or more hazards, and 24% being exposed to 6 or more hazards. - A wide number of gaps are present; however, prioritisation needs to consider the level of benefit and risks associated with not undertaking the studies. In light of this 10 studies ranging in scale are recommended to be done for the project team to complete the present scope of Stage 3. - Stage 3 will need to consider a number of engineering options to address hazards and compare with policy options; however, Council have not established a consistent policy on managed retreat that can be applied for equal comparison; without which substantial assumptions are required. We recommend Council undertake a study to define a managed retreat framework as an option for the city. - In undertaking Stage 1 with floodplain management as the focal point in a multi hazards context we have identified that Stage 3 requires consideration of options in the context of economics, implementation and residual risk. Presently the scope of work will provide a level of definition for floodplain options; however, this will not be at equal levels of detail for other hazard management options. Therefore, we recommend Council considers undertaking other studies with those key hazards (e.g. Coastal Hazards) as a focal point and identifies the engineering options to address such hazards. Doing so will provide equal levels of information for Council to make an informed and defendable decision on which options are progressed following Stage 3.

Images, eqnz.chch.2010

Rolleston/Burnham, South Island, NZ It's been a busy few weeks! Was away on geology fieldtrips all the previous two weeks, then on Saturday morning 4th September 2010 at 4.35 am we got woken in Westport to a reasonable but very long earthquake. My husband was back in Christchurch at the time and texted me saying "are you ok?". I replied, "yes!"...

Images, Alexander Turnbull Library

A Christchurch seismic monitor churns out reams of paper with wild fluctuations showing earthquakes and aftershocks. Nearby two men examine a second monitor and one of them says 'This one's connected to Gerry Brownlee!' The reams of paper show a perfectly straight line - it appears that nothing is going on in Gerry Brownlee's head. Context - A sense that the Minister for Earthquake Recovery is being less than effective. Colour and black and white versions available Quantity: 2 digital cartoon(s).

Research papers, University of Canterbury Library

Landslides are significant hazards, especially in seismically-active mountainous regions, where shaking amplified by steep topography can result in widespread landsliding. These landslides present not only an acute hazard, but a chronic hazard that can last years-to-decades after the initial earthquake, causing recurring impacts. The Mw 7.8 Kaikōura earthquake caused more than 20,000 landslides throughout North Canterbury and resulted in significant damage to nationally significant infrastructure in the coastal transport corridor (CTC), isolating Kaikōura from the rest of New Zealand. In the years following, ongoing landsliding triggered by intense rainfall exacerbated the impacts and slowed the recovery process. However, while there is significant research on co-seismic landslides and their initial impacts in New Zealand, little research has explored the evolution of co-seismic landslides and how this hazard changes over time. This research maps landslides annually between 2013 and 2021 to evaluate the changes in pre-earthquake, co-seismic and post-earthquake rates of landsliding to determine how landslide hazard has changed over this time. In particular, the research explores how the number, area, and spatial distribution of landslides has changed since the earthquake, and whether post-earthquake mitigation works have in any way affected the long-term landslide hazard. Mapping of landslides was undertaken using open-source, medium resolution Landsat-8 and Sentinel-2 satellite imagery, with landslides identified visually and mapped as single polygons that capture both the source zone and deposit. Three study areas with differing levels of post-earthquake mitigation are compared: (i) the northern CTC, where the majority of mitigation was in the form of active debris removal; (ii) the southern CTC, where mitigation was primarily via passive protection measures; and (iii) Mount Fyffe, which has had no mitigation works since the earthquake. The results show that despite similar initial impacts during the earthquake, the rate of recovery in terms of landslide rates varies substantially across the three study areas. In Mount Fyffe, the number and area of landslides could take 45 and 22 years from 2021 respectively to return to pre-earthquake levels at the current rate. Comparatively, in the CTC, it could take just 5 years and 3-4 years from 2021 respectively. Notably, the fastest recovery in terms of landslide rates in the CTC was primarily located directly along the transport network, whereas what little recovery did occur in Mount Fyffe appeared to follow no particular pattern. Importantly, recovery rates in the northern CTC were notably higher than in the southern CTC, despite greater co-seismic impacts in the former. Combined, these results suggest the active, debris removal mitigation undertaken in the northern CTC may have had the effect of dramatically reducing the time for landslide rates to return to pre-earthquake levels. The role of slope angle and slope aspect were explored to evaluate if these observations could be driven by local differences in topography. The Mount Fyffe study area has higher slope angles than the CTC as a whole and landslides predominantly occurred on slightly steeper slopes than in the CTC. This may have contributed to the longer recovery times for landsliding in Mount Fyffe due to greater gravitational instability, however the observed variations are minor compared to the differences in recovery rates. In terms of slope aspect, landslides in Mount Fyffe preferentially occurred on north- and south-facing slopes whereas landslides in the CTC preferred the east- and south-facing slopes. The potential role of these differences in landslide recovery remains unclear but may be related to the propagation direction of the earthquake and the tracking direction of post-earthquake ex-tropical cyclones. Finally, landslides in the CTC are observed to be moving further away from the transport network and the number of landslides impacting the CTC decreased significantly since the earthquake. Nevertheless, the potential for further landslide reactivation remains. Therefore, despite the recovery in the CTC, it is clear that there is still risk of the transport network being impacted by further landsliding, at least for the next 3-5 yrs.