This manuscript provides a critical examination of the ground motions recorded in the near-source region resulting from the 22 February 2011 Christchurch earthquake. Particular attention is given to reconciling the observed spatial distribution of ground motions in terms of physical phenomena related to source, path and site effects. The large number of near-source observed strong ground motions show clear evidence of: forward-directivity, basin generated surface waves, liquefaction and other significant nonlinear site response. The pseudo-acceleration response spectra (SA) amplitudes and significant duration of strong motions agree well with empirical prediction models, except at long vibration periods where the influence of basin-generated surface waves and nonlinear site response are significant and not adequately accounted for in empirical SA models. Pseudo-acceleration response spectra are also compared with those observed in the 4 September 2010 Darfield earthquake and routine design response spectra used in order to emphasise the amplitude of ground shaking and elucidate the importance of local geotechnical characteristics on surface ground motions. The characteristics of the observed vertical component accelerations are shown to be strongly dependent on source-to-site distance and are comparable with those from the 4 September 2010 Darfield earthquake, implying the large amplitudes observed are simply a result of many observations at close distances rather than a peculiar source effect.
Two images of a house, taken before and after the earthquakes. In the after photograph the chimneys are gone, a column supporting the car port has partly collapsed, windows are broken, and the previously neat lawn and driveway are overgrown. The photographer comments, "This was a house that I was selling up to the September 2010 earthquake in Christchurch. It was on Avonside Drive, which was an area that has been badly hit in every earthquake that has hit the area. In the September quake parts of the house moved in different directions and one of the upstairs doors had to be smashed open to release one of the sons from his bedroom. This occurred in the dark with numerous aftershocks shaking the house. Liquefaction poured up through the floor and flowed down the drive. Everyone got out OK, but soon after the house was red stickered meaning it was dangerous to enter. The house was looted many times even though there was constant police patrols. When the most violent earthquake occurred on 22 February 2012 both the tall heavy chimneys came crashing through into the living areas. Subsequent earthquakes and aftershocks have caused one of the brick fence pillars to fall and the front garage pillar to break up and twist. The family's troubles did not end there. They moved into the home of one of their parents and this mansion of a home was so badly affected by the February earthquake that no one could enter to collect any of their or their parents' belongings. They now own a new home, which they are fond of except when the ground shakes yet again. There has been to date 10,712 earthquakes and aftershocks since 4 September 2010".
The extent of liquefaction in the eastern suburbs of Christchurch (Aranui, Bexley, Avonside, Avonhead and Dallington) from the February 22 2011 Earthquake resulted in extensive damage to in-ground waste water pipe systems. This caused a huge demand for portable toilets (or port-a-loos) and companies were importing them from outside Canterbury and in some instances from Australia. However, because they were deemed “assets of importance” under legislation, their allocation had to be coordinated by Civil Defence and Emergency Management (CDEM). Consequently, companies supplying them had to ignore requests from residents, businesses and rest homes; and commitments to large events outside of the city such as the Hamilton 400 V8 Supercars and the Pasifika Festival in Auckland were impacted. Frustrations started to show as neighbourhoods questioned the equity of the port-a-loos distribution. The Prime Minister was reported as reassuring citizens in the eastern suburbs in the first week of March that1 “a report about the distribution of port-a-loos and chemical toilets shows allocation has been fair. Key said he has asked Civil Defence about the distribution process and where the toilets been sent. He said there aren’t enough for the scale of the event but that is quickly being rectified and the need for toilets is being reassessed all the time.” Nonetheless, there still remained a deep sense of frustration and exclusion over the equity of the port-a-loos distribution. This study took the simple approach of mapping where those port-a-loos were on 11-12 March for several areas in the eastern suburbs and this suggested that their distribution was not equitable and was not well done. It reviews the predictive tools available for estimating damage to waste water pipes and asks the question could this situation have been better planned so that pot-a-loo locations could have been better prioritised? And finally it reviews the integral roles of communication and monitoring as part of disaster management strategy. The impression from this study is that other New Zealand urban centres could or would also be at risk and that work is need to developed more rational management approaches for disaster planning.