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Images, eqnz.chch.2010

This is how the building looked when it was built - fine indeed! democam.iopen.co.nz/ An engineer who owns a similar building in Dunedin, and is willing to put money into this building's restoration, is sure it could be stabilised, just like the Railway Clock Tower. And the t...

Images, UC QuakeStudies

A green notice on a building on Manchester Street, indicating that it has been assessed by structural engineers and is safe. Every building in Christchurch was assessed in this way, a green, yellow or red notice placed on the front door or window. Green means ok to enter; yellow, restricted use; red, not safe to enter.

Images, eqnz.chch.2010

Here's Prarie, outside our flat, the day after the 7.1 earthquake hit Christchurch. You see the damage to the street, which continued through our flat. We were forced to move out once an engineer examined the cracks in our balcony, walls, floors, and ceilings, and told us the building was unsafe for living. One crack ran from the street, pres...

Images, UC QuakeStudies

A photograph of a green sticker on the window of The Dolls House Shop antique store on Colombo Street. The sticker indicates that the store is safe to enter. The sign reads, "Inspected, no restriction on use or occupancy. This building has received a brief inspection only. While no apparent structural or other safety hazards have been found, a more comprehensive inspection of the exterior and interior may reveal safety hazards". The structural engineer has written on the sign "propping to rear of building inadequate, fire egress also at rear inappropriate, no occupancy to second storey".

Images, Alexander Turnbull Library

Maori Party MP for Te Tai Tonga, Rahui Katene' is buried up to her neck in earthquake rubble as she reads a newspaper headline referring to her statement that the aftermath of the earthquake has demonstrated 'racism and ethnic profiling'. Rahui Katene's head is disintegrating and two engineers who are examining the damage decide that 'This can't be repaired, it needs to be condemned'. Rahui Katene says the authorities, who kicked a Christchurch family out of a welfare centre that was set up after the Christchurch earthquake that struck on the 4th September, should apologise for judging them too early and shaming them publicly. Mrs Katene was also concerned about claims that Maori youth were being targeted by police. "I've heard from whanau that in one particular area rangatahi who were volunteering in their community and helping their whanau were accused by police of theft. The whanau are trying to work these issues through with the police, but I'm growing concerned about what appears to be ethnic profiling." Quantity: 1 digital cartoon(s).

Research papers, University of Canterbury Library

On 4 September 2010, a magnitude Mw 7.1 earthquake struck the Canterbury region on the South Island of New Zealand. The epicentre of the earthquake was located in the Darfield area about 40 km west of the city of Christchurch. Extensive damage occurred to unreinforced masonry buildings throughout the region during the mainshock and subsequent large aftershocks. Particularly extensive damage was inflicted to lifelines and residential houses due to widespread liquefaction and lateral spreading in areas close to major streams, rivers and wetlands throughout Christchurch and Kaiapoi. Despite the severe damage to infrastructure and residential houses, fortunately, no deaths occurred and only two injuries were reported in this earthquake. From an engineering viewpoint, one may argue that the most significant aspects of the 2010 Darfield Earthquake were geotechnical in nature, with liquefaction and lateral spreading being the principal culprits for the inflicted damage. Following the earthquake, a geotechnical reconnaissance was conducted over a period of six days (10–15 September 2010) by a team of geotechnical/earthquake engineers and geologists from New Zealand and USA (GEER team: Geo-engineering Extreme Event Reconnaissance). JGS (Japanese Geotechnical Society) members from Japan also participated in the reconnaissance team from 13 to 15 September 2010. The NZ, GEER and JGS members worked as one team and shared resources, information and logistics in order to conduct thorough and most efficient reconnaissance covering a large area over a very limited time period. This report summarises the key evidence and findings from the reconnaissance.

Research papers, University of Canterbury Library

Research Report: 2010-02The objective in writing this report is to provide a guide to structural engineers on how to assess the potential seismic performance of existing hollow-core floors in buildings and the steps involved in the design of new floors. Hollow-core units in New Zealand do not contain stirrups within the precast concrete section. This is due to the way that they are manufactured. The only reinforcement in the great majority of hollow-core units consists of pretensioned strands that are located close to the soffit. A consequence of this is that hollow-core units have a number of potential brittle failure modes that can occur when adverse structural actions are induced in the units. These adverse actions can be induced in a major earthquake due to the relative vertical, horizontal and rotational displacements that occur between hollow-core units and adjacent structural elements, such as beams or structural walls. A number of large scale structural tests backed up by analytical research has shown that extensive interaction occurs between floors containing prestressed precast units and other structural elements, such as walls and beams. The constraint that prestressed units in a floor can apply to adjacent beams can result in an increase in strength of the beams to a considerably greater strength than that indicated in editions of the New Zealand Structural Concrete Standard published prior to 2006. The extent of this increase is such that it could in some cases result in the development of a non-ductile failure mechanism instead of the ductile failure mechanism assumed in the design. Prestressed floor units tie the floor bays together leaving a weak section where the floor joins to supporting structural elements. The restraint provided by the prestress restricts the opening of cracks within the bay. In the event of an earthquake this restraint can result in wide cracks developing at some of the boundaries to floor bays. These cracks may have a significant influence on the performance of the floor when it acts as a diaphragm to transfer seismic forces to the lateral force resisting structural elements in the building. The report contains details of; 1. The different failure modes, which may be induced in hollow-core floors, and the failure modes that may develop in a buildings due to the presence of hollow-core units in the floors; 2. Criteria that may be used to assess the magnitude of the design earthquake which may be safely resisted by a hollow-core floor in a building; 3. Details of how construction practice related to the use of hollow-core floors in New Zealand has changed over the last five decades. This highlights particular aspects that need to be considered in carrying out an assessment of existing hollow-core floors; 4. Information on how a new hollow-core floor may be designed to be consistent with the Earthquake Actions Standard, NZS1170.5: 2004 and the Structural Concrete Standard, NZS3101: 2006 (plus Amendment 2); 5. A review of the research findings relevant to the behaviour of New Zealand hollow-core floors under earthquake conditions. Research that was used to develop the assessment and design criteria is described together with details of how the different criteria were developed from this work.