Whole document is available to authenticated members of The University of Auckland until Feb. 2014. The increasing scale of losses from earthquake disasters has reinforced the need for property owners to become proactive in seismic risk reduction programs. However, despite advancement in seismic design methods and legislative frameworks, building owners are often reluctant to adopt mitigation measures required to reduce earthquake losses. The magnitude of building collapses from the recent Christchurch earthquakes in New Zealand shows that owners of earthquake prone buildings (EPBs) are not adopting appropriate risk mitigation measures in their buildings. Owners of EPBs are found unwilling or lack motivation to adopt adequate mitigation measures that will reduce their vulnerability to seismic risks. This research investigates how to increase the likelihood of building owners undertaking appropriate mitigation actions that will reduce their vulnerability to earthquake disaster. A sequential two-phase mixed methods approach was adopted for the research investigation. Multiple case studies approach was adopted in the first qualitative phase, followed by the second quantitative research phase that includes the development and testing of a framework. The research findings reveal four categories of critical obstacles to building owners‘ decision to adopt earthquake loss prevention measures. These obstacles include perception, sociological, economic and institutional impediments. Intrinsic and extrinsic interventions are proposed as incentives for overcoming these barriers. The intrinsic motivators include using information communication networks such as mass media, policy entrepreneurs and community engagement in risk mitigation. Extrinsic motivators comprise the use of four groups of incentives namely; financial, regulatory, technological and property market incentives. These intrinsic and extrinsic interventions are essential for enhancing property owners‘ decisions to voluntarily adopt appropriate earthquake mitigation measures. The study concludes by providing specific recommendations that earthquake risk mitigation managers, city councils and stakeholders involved in risk mitigation in New Zealand and other seismic risk vulnerable countries could consider in earthquake risk management. Local authorities could adopt the framework developed in this study to demonstrate a combination of incentives and motivators that yield best-valued outcomes. Consequently, actions can be more specific and outcomes more effective. The implementation of these recommendations could offer greater reasons for the stakeholders and public to invest in building New Zealand‘s built environment resilience to earthquake disasters.
TE URUROA FLAVELL to the Minister of Justice: Is she satisfied with the Electoral Commission's engagement with whanau, hapū, iwi and marae around the 2013 Māori Electoral Option; if so, what advice has she received that would explain why halfway through the process there are only 5,000 new enrolments?
DAVID SHEARER to the Prime Minister: On what date was he, his office or the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet first informed that David Henry would not meet his deadline of the end of May as set out in the terms of reference for reporting back and what reason did Mr Henry provide for the delay?
KATRINA SHANKS to the Minister of Finance: What do recent indicators show about the economy's performance this year and its outlook for the next three to four years?
DAVID SHEARER to the Prime Minister: Has he received any information that shows foreign intelligence agencies are routinely collecting emails, other communication or location data on New Zealand citizens and residents while they are in New Zealand; if so, has the resulting information been passed on to the Government Communications Security Bureau?
ALFRED NGARO to the Minister of Education: What recent announcement has she made about achievement against National Standards?
METIRIA TUREI to the Minister for Economic Development: Will the Government sign the legal contract between it and SkyCity for the SkyCity Convention Centre this week; if not, when will it sign this agreement?
JAMI-LEE ROSS to the Minister of Housing: What policy conclusions, if any, does the Government draw from Priced Out – How New Zealand Lost its Housing Affordability and how consistent are its findings with those of the 2012 Productivity Commission Report on housing affordability?
Hon ANNETTE KING to the Minister of Health: Does he stand by all his statements on health; if not, why not?
NICKY WAGNER to the Minister for Canterbury Earthquake Recovery: How will the Government support the redevelopment and repopulation of the Christchurch Central Business District following the Canterbury earthquakes?
CHRIS HIPKINS to the Minister of Education: Is she confident that the National Standards data being released today gives an accurate picture of student progress; if not, why not?
Rt Hon WINSTON PETERS to the Prime Minister: Did he discuss with David Henry the requirement for Mr Henry to see the full unedited electronic record connected with the Kitteridge report leak; if not, why not?
JOHN HAYES to the Minister of Customs: What information has he received regarding the success of automated passenger processing systems at the border?
Questions to Ministers
1. Hon PHIL GOFF to the Prime Minister: Is he satisfied that actions to address the Christchurch earthquake are an adequate response; if not, what are his areas of concern?
2. AMY ADAMS to the Minister of Finance: What reports has he received on the economic impact of the earthquake in Christchurch on 22 February 2011?
3. Hon CLAYTON COSGROVE to the Minister for Canterbury Earthquake Recovery: Is he satisfied with the level of support being offered to the people of Christchurch in the wake of the earthquake on 22 February 2011?
4. NICKY WAGNER to the Minister for Social Development and Employment: What is the Government doing to support Canterbury businesses and employees through the earthquake recovery?
5. Hon ANNETTE KING to the Minister for Social Development and Employment: Is she confident that the Ministry of Social Development has responded adequately to the Christchurch earthquake?
6. METIRIA TUREI to the Minister of Finance: Has he considered raising a temporary levy on income to help fund the rebuilding of Christchurch; if so, how much could it raise?
7. AARON GILMORE to the Minister for Tertiary Education: What work has been done to help the families of tertiary students and tertiary institutions affected by the 22 February 2011 earthquake in Christchurch?
8. Hon JIM ANDERTON to the Minister for Canterbury Earthquake Recovery: Will he ensure that Christchurch homeowners and businesses are able to access insurance cover from existing policies or new cover they require since the 22 February 2011 earthquake?
9. Hon JOHN BOSCAWEN to the Attorney-General: Has he asked the Māori Party to agree to amendments to the Marine and Coastal Area (Takutai Moana) Bill that would make it explicitly clear that customary title holders would not be able to charge individuals for accessing a beach, and require any negotiated settlements to be referred back to Parliament for validation; if so, what response did he receive?
10. Hon DAVID PARKER to the Attorney-General: Does the Government intend to proceed this week with its legislation to replace the existing
Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004?
11. RAHUI KATENE to the Minister for Canterbury Earthquake Recovery: Did he agree with his spokesman's response to the situation for residents in Christchurch East following the earthquake of 22 February 2011, that, "It is apparent, given the scale out there, that there just wasn't sufficient hardware out there, loos and the like", and what urgent actions have been taken to give priority to communities in the eastern suburbs?
12. COLIN KING to the Minister of Civil Defence: Why was a state of national emergency declared on 23 February 2011?
In September 2010 and February 2011, the Canterbury region experienced devastating earthquakes with an estimated economic cost of over NZ$40 billion (Parker and Steenkamp, 2012; Timar et al., 2014; Potter et al., 2015). The insurance market played an important role in rebuilding the Canterbury region after the earthquakes. Homeowners, insurance and reinsurance markets and New Zealand government agencies faced a difficult task to manage the rebuild process. From an empirical and theoretic research viewpoint, the Christchurch disaster calls for an assessment of how the insurance market deals with such disasters in the future. Previous studies have investigated market responses to losses in global catastrophes by focusing on the insurance supply-side. This study investigates both demand-side and supply-side insurance market responses to the Christchurch earthquakes. Despite the fact that New Zealand is prone to seismic activities, there are scant previous studies in the area of earthquake insurance. This study does offer a unique opportunity to examine and document the New Zealand insurance market response to catastrophe risk, providing results critical for understanding market responses after major loss events in general. A review of previous studies shows higher premiums suppress demand, but how higher premiums and a higher probability of risk affect demand is still largely unknown. According to previous studies, the supply of disaster coverage is curtailed unless the market is subsidised, however, there is still unsettled discussion on why demand decreases with time from the previous disaster even when the supply of coverage is subsidised by the government. Natural disaster risks pose a set of challenges for insurance market players because of substantial ambiguity associated with the probability of such events occurring and high spatial correlation of catastrophe losses. Private insurance market inefficiencies due to high premiums and spatially concentrated risks calls for government intervention in the provision of natural disaster insurance to avert situations of noninsurance and underinsurance. Political economy considerations make it more likely for government support to be called for if many people are uninsured than if few people are uninsured. However, emergency assistance for property owners after catastrophe events can encourage most property owners to not buy insurance against natural disaster and develop adverse selection behaviour, generating larger future risks for homeowners and governments. On the demand-side, this study has developed an intertemporal model to examine how demand for insurance changes post-catastrophe, and how to model it theoretically. In this intertemporal model, insurance can be sought in two sequential periods of time, and at the second period, it is known whether or not a loss event happened in period one. The results show that period one demand for insurance increases relative to the standard single period model when the second period is taken into consideration, period two insurance demand is higher post-loss, higher than both the period one demand and the period two demand without a period one loss. To investigate policyholders experience from the demand-side perspective, a total of 1600 survey questionnaires were administered, and responses from 254 participants received representing a 16 percent response rate. Survey data was gathered from four institutions in Canterbury and is probably not representative of the entire population. The results of the survey show that the change from full replacement value policy to nominated replacement value policy is a key determinant of the direction of change in the level of insurance coverage after the earthquakes. The earthquakes also highlighted the plight of those who were underinsured, prompting policyholders to update their insurance coverage to reflect the estimated cost of re-building their property. The survey has added further evidence to the existing literature, such as those who have had a recent experience with disaster loss report increased risk perception if a similar event happens in future with females reporting a higher risk perception than males. Of the demographic variables, only gender has a relationship with changes in household cover. On the supply-side, this study has built a risk-based pricing model suitable to generate a competitive premium rate for natural disaster insurance cover. Using illustrative data from the Christchurch Red-zone suburbs, the model generates competitive premium rates for catastrophe risk. When the proposed model incorporates the new RMS high-definition New Zealand Earthquake Model, for example, insurers can find the model useful to identify losses at a granular level so as to calculate the competitive premium. This study observes that the key to the success of the New Zealand dual insurance system despite the high prevalence of catastrophe losses are; firstly the EQC’s flat-rate pricing structure keeps private insurance premiums affordable and very high nationwide homeowner take-up rates of natural disaster insurance. Secondly, private insurers and the EQC have an elaborate reinsurance arrangement in place. By efficiently transferring risk to the reinsurer, the cost of writing primary insurance is considerably reduced ultimately expanding primary insurance capacity and supply of insurance coverage.
Land cover change information in urban areas supports decision makers in dealing with public policy planning and resource management. Remote sensing has been demonstrated as an efficient and accurate way to monitor land cover change over large extents. The Canterbury Earthquake Sequence (CES) caused massive damage in Christchurch, New Zealand and resulted in significant land cover change over a short time period. This study combined two types of remote sensing data, aerial imagery (RGB) and LiDAR, as the basis for quantifying land cover change in Christchurch between 2011 – 2015, a period corresponding to the five years immediately following the 22 February 2011 earthquake, which was part of the CES. An object based image analysis (OBIA) approach was adopted to classify the aerial imagery and LiDAR data into seven land cover types (bare land, building, grass, shadow, tree and water). The OBIA approach consisted of two steps, image segmentation and object classification. For the first step, this study used multi-level segmentation to better segment objects. For the second step, the random forest (RF) classifier was used to assign a land cover type to each object defined by the segmentation. Overall classification accuracies for 2011 and 2015 were 94.0% and 94.32%, respectively. Based on the classification result, land cover changes between 2011 and 2015 were then analysed. Significant increases were found in road and tree cover, while the land cover types that decreased were bare land, grass, roof, water. To better understand the reasons for those changes, land cover transitions were calculated. Canopy growth, seasonal differences and forest plantation establishment were the main reasons for tree cover increase. Redevelopment after the earthquake was the main reason for road area growth. By comparing the spatial distribution of these transitions, this study also identified Halswell and Wigram as the fastest developing suburbs in Christchurch. These results provided quantitative information for the effects of CES, with respect to land cover change. They allow for a better understanding for the current land cover status of Christchurch. Among those land cover changes, the significant increase in tree cover aroused particularly interest as urban forests benefit citizens via ecosystem services, including health, social, economic, and environmental benefits. Therefore, this study firstly calculated the percentages of tree cover in Christchurch’s fifteen wards in order to provide a general idea of tree cover change in the city extent. Following this, an automatic individual tree detection and crown delineation (ITCD) was undertaken to determine the feasibility of automated tree counting. The accuracies of the proposed approach ranged between 56.47% and 92.11% in thirty different sample plots, with an overall accuracy of 75.60%. Such varied accuracies were later found to be caused by the fixed tree detection window size and misclassifications from the land cover classification that affected the boundary of the CHM. Due to the large variability in accuracy, tree counting was not undertaken city-wide for both time periods. However, directions for further study for ITCD in Christchurch could be exploring ITCD approaches with variable window size or optimizing the classification approach to focus more on producing highly accurate CHMs.
