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Research papers, University of Canterbury Library

Background: We are in a period of history where natural disasters are increasing in both frequency and severity. They are having widespread impacts on communities, especially on vulnerable communities, those most affected who have the least ability to prepare or respond to a disaster. The ability to assemble and effectively manage Interagency Emergency Response Teams (IERTs) is critical to navigating the complexity and chaos found immediately following disasters. These teams play a crucial role in the multi-sectoral, multi-agency, multi-disciplinary, and inter-organisational response and are vital to ensuring the safety and well-being of vulnerable populations such as the young, aged, and socially and medically disadvantaged in disasters. Communication is key to the smooth operation of these teams. Most studies of the communication in IERTs during a disaster have been focussed at a macro-level of examining larger scale patterns and trends within organisations. Rarely found are micro-level analyses of interpersonal communication at the critical interfaces between collaborating agencies. This study set out to understand the experiences of those working at the interagency interfaces in an IERT set up by the Canterbury District Health Board to respond to the needs of the vulnerable people in the aftermath of the destructive earthquakes that hit Canterbury, New Zealand, in 2010-11. The aim of the study was to gain insights about the complexities of interpersonal communication (micro-level) involved in interagency response coordination and to generate an improved understanding into what stabilises the interagency communication interfaces between those agencies responding to a major disaster. Methods: A qualitative case study research design was employed to investigate how interagency communication interfaces were stabilised at the micro-level (“the case”) in the aftermath of the destructive earthquakes that hit Canterbury in 2010-11 (“the context”). Participant recruitment was undertaken by mapping which agencies were involved within the IERT and approaching representatives from each of these agencies. Data was collected via individual interviews using a semi-structured interview guide and was based on the “Critical Incident Technique”. Subsequently, data was transcribed verbatim and subjected to inductive analysis. This was underpinned theoretically by Weick’s “Interpretive Approach” and supported by Nvivo qualitative data analysis software. Results: 19 participants were interviewed in this study. Out of the inductive analysis emerged two primary themes, each with several sub-factors. The first major theme was destabilising/disruptive factors of interagency communication with five sub-factors, a) conflicting role mandates, b) rigid command structures, c) disruption of established communication structures, d) lack of shared language and understanding, and e) situational awareness disruption. The second major theme stabilising/steadying factors in interagency communication had four sub-factors, a) the establishment of the IERT, b) emergent novel communication strategies, c) establishment of a liaison role and d) pre-existing networks and relationships. Finally, there was a third sub-level identified during inductive analysis, where sub-factors from both primary themes were noted to be uniquely interconnected by emergent “consequences” arising out of the disaster context. Finally, findings were synthesised into a conceptual “Model of Interagency Communication at the Micro-level” based on this case study of the Canterbury earthquake disaster response. Discussion: The three key dimensions of The People, The Connections and The Improvisations served as a framework for the discussion of what stabilises interagency communication interfaces in a major disaster. The People were key to stabilising the interagency interfaces through functioning as a flexible conduit, guiding and navigating communication at the interagency interfaces and improving situational awareness. The Connections provided the collective competence, shared decision-making and prior established relationships that stabilised the micro-level communication at interagency interfaces. And finally, The Improvisations i.e., novel ideas and inventiveness that emerge out of rapidly changing post-disaster environments, also contributed to stabilisation of micro-level communication flows across interagency interfaces in the disaster response. “Command and control” hierarchical structures do provide clear processes and structures for teams working in disasters to follow. However, improvisations and novel solutions are also needed and often emerge from first responders (who are best placed to assess the evolving needs in a disaster where there is a high degree of uncertainty). Conclusion: This study highlights the value of incorporating an interface perspective into any study that seeks to understand the processes of IERTs during disaster responses. It also strengthens the requirement for disaster management frameworks to formally plan for and to allow for the adaptive responsiveness of local teams on the ground, and legitimise and recognise the improvisations of those in the role of emergent boundary spanners in a disaster response. This needs to be in addition to existing formal disaster response mechanisms. This study provides a new conceptual model that can be used to guide future case studies exploring stability at the interfaces of other IERTs and highlights the centrality of communication in the experiences of members of teams in the aftermath of a disaster. Utilising these new perspectives on stabilising communication at the interagency interfaces in disaster responses will have practical implications in the future to better serve the needs of vulnerable people who are at greatest risk of adverse outcomes in a disaster.

Research papers, The University of Auckland Library

The connections between walls of unreinforced masonry (URM) buildings and flexible timber diaphragms are critical building components that must perform adequately before desirable earthquake response of URM buildings may be achieved. Field observations made during the initial reconnaissance and the subsequent damage surveys of clay brick URM buildings following the 2010/2011 Canterbury, New Zealand, earthquakes revealed numerous cases where anchor connections joining masonry walls or parapets with roof or floor diaphragms appeared to have failed prematurely. These observations were more frequent for adhesive anchor connections than for through-bolt connections (i.e., anchorages having plates on the exterior facade of the masonry walls). Subsequently, an in-field test program was undertaken in an attempt to evaluate the performance of adhesive anchor connections between unreinforced clay brick URM walls and roof or floor diaphragm. The study consisted of a total of almost 400 anchor tests conducted in eleven existing URM buildings located in Christchurch, Whanganui and Auckland. Specific objectives of the study included the identification of failure modes of adhesive anchors in existing URM walls and the influence of the following variables on anchor load-displacement response: adhesive type, strength of the masonry materials (brick and mortar), anchor embedment depth, anchor rod diameter, overburden level, anchor rod type, quality of installation, and the use of metal mesh sleeves. In addition, the comparative performance of bent anchors (installed at an angle of minimum 22.5° to the perpendicular projection from the wall surface) and anchors positioned horizontally was investigated. Observations on the performance of wall-to-diaphragm connections in the 2010/2011 Canterbury earthquakes, a summary of the performed experimental program and test results, and a proposed pull-out capacity relationship for adhesive anchors installed into multi-leaf clay brick masonry are presented herein. AM - Accepted Manuscript

Images, eqnz.chch.2010

Manchester Courts, a seven-storey building on the corner of Hereford and Manchester Streets, is a category one historic place built in 1905-1906 that up until the 7.1 earthquake, housed offices. News of the scheduled demolition provoked an emotional response from the people of Christchurch. UPDATE 14 October 2010: A group of residents is campaig...

Images, UC QuakeStudies

A photograph looking north-west down High Street towards the intersection with Manchester Street. Rubble from several earthquake-damaged buildings lines both sides of the street. In the distance members of the Wellington Emergency Management Office Emergency Response Team and several excavators are working.

Images, UC QuakeStudies

Members of the New Zealand Fire Service and USAID Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) shaking hands outside the Christchurch City Fire Station on Kilmore Street. DART travelled to Christchurch after the 22 February 2011 earthquake to help out in the relief efforts.

Research papers, University of Canterbury Library

In the period between September 2010 and December 2011, Christchurch was shaken by a series of strong earthquakes including the MW7.1 4 September 2010, Mw 6.2 22 February 2011, MW6.2 13 June 2011 and MW6.0 23 December 2011 earthquakes. These earthquakes produced very strong ground motions throughout the city and surrounding areas that resulted in soil liquefaction and lateral spreading causing substantial damage to buildings, infrastructure and the community. The stopbank network along the Kaiapoi and Avon River suffered extensive damage with repairs projected to take several years to complete. This presented an opportunity to undertake a case-study on a regional scale of the effects of liquefaction on a stopbank system. Ultimately, this information can be used to determine simple performance-based concepts that can be applied in practice to improve the resilience of river protection works. The research presented in this thesis draws from data collected following the 4th September 2010 and 22nd February 2011 earthquakes. The stopbank damage is categorised into seven key deformation modes that were interpreted from aerial photographs, consultant reports, damage photographs and site visits. Each deformation mode provides an assessment of the observed mechanism of failure behind liquefaction-induced stopbank damage and the factors that influence a particular style of deformation. The deformation modes have been used to create a severity classification for the whole stopbank system, being ‘no or low damage’ and ‘major or severe damage’, in order to discriminate the indicators and factors that contribute to ‘major to severe damage’ from the factors that contribute to all levels of damage a number of calculated, land damage, stopbank damage and geomorphological parameters were analysed and compared at 178 locations along the Kaiapoi and Avon River stopbank systems. A critical liquefiable layer was present at every location with relatively consistent geotechnical parameters (cone resistance (qc), soil behaviour type (Ic) and Factor of Safety (FoS)) across the study site. In 95% of the cases the critical layer occurred within two times the Height of the Free Face (HFF,). A statistical analysis of the geotechnical factors relating to the critical layer was undertaken in order to find correlations between specific deformation modes and geotechnical factors. It was found that each individual deformation mode involves a complex interplay of factors that are difficult to represent through correlative analysis. There was, however, sufficient data to derive the key factors that have affected the severity of deformation. It was concluded that stopbank damage is directly related to the presence of liquefaction in the ground materials beneath the stopbanks, but is not critical in determining the type or severity of damage, instead it is merely the triggering mechanism. Once liquefaction is triggered it is the gravity-induced deformation that causes the damage rather than the shaking duration. Lateral spreading and specifically the depositional setting was found to be the key aspect in determining the severity and type of deformation along the stopbank system. The presence or absence of abandoned or old river channels and point bar deposits was found to significantly influence the severity and type of deformation. A review of digital elevation models and old maps along the Kaiapoi River found that all of the ‘major to severe’ damage observed occurred within or directly adjacent to an abandoned river channel. Whilst a review of the geomorphology along the Avon River showed that every location within a point bar deposit suffered some form of damage, due to the depositional environment creating a deposit highly susceptible to liquefaction.

Audio, Radio New Zealand

Major Australian law firm Maurice Blackburn has agreed to underwrite a class action law suit against Southern Response seeking redress for Canterbury earthquake claimants. Christchurch lawyer Grant Cameron says "hidden costs" led to significant underpayments to about 3000 people. Maurice Blackburn is a law firm which specialises in class actions, its principal lawyer Martin Hyde joins Kathryn, along with Grant Cameron, to talk about why they think they have a strong case.

Research papers, Victoria University of Wellington

©2019. American Geophysical Union. All Rights Reserved. Earthquakes have been inferred to induce hydrological changes in aquifers on the basis of either changes to well water-levels or tidal behavior, but the relationship between these changes remains unclear. Here, changes in tidal behavior and water-levels are quantified using a hydrological network monitoring gravel aquifers in Canterbury, New Zealand, in response to nine earthquakes (of magnitudes M w 5.4 to 7.8) that occurred between 2008 and 2015. Of the 161 wells analyzed, only 35 contain water-level fluctuations associated with “Earth + Ocean” (7) or “Ocean” (28) tides. Permeability reduction manifest as changes in tidal behavior and increased water-levels in the near field of the Canterbury earthquake sequence of 2010–2011 support the hypothesis of shear-induced consolidation. However, tidal behavior and water-level changes rarely occurred simultaneously (~2%). Water-level changes that occurred with no change in tidal behavior reequilibrated at a new postseismic level more quickly (on timescales of ~50 min) than when a change in tidal behavior occurred (~240 min to 10 days). Water-level changes were more than likely to occur above a peak dynamic stress of ~50 kPa and were more than likely to not occur below ~10 kPa. The minimum peak dynamic stress required for a tidal behavior change to occur was ~0.2 to 100 kPa.

Images, UC QuakeStudies

A photograph of members of the Wellington Emergency Management Office Emergency Response Team walking down Lichfield Street towards the intersection of Manchester Street. Buildings on either side of the team have been damaged by the earthquake. Plastic and wire fences line the street to the right.

Images, UC QuakeStudies

A photograph of members of the Wellington Emergency Management Office Emergency Response Team and the Red Cross, standing on the corner of Lichfield and Manchester Street. In the background an excavator is parked on the road. Behind the excavator is a block of earthquake-damaged buildings.

Images, UC QuakeStudies

A photograph of a member of the Wellington Emergency Management Office Emergency Response Team walking down Manchester Street. In the background is a group of earthquake-damaged shops. The outer walls of the top storeys of the shops have collapsed, the bricks spilling onto the street.

Images, UC QuakeStudies

A photograph of a media briefing on the Christchurch earthquake response. The briefing was held in the in the Christchurch Art Gallery, which served as the temporary Civil Defence headquarters after the 22 February 2011 earthquake. Mayor Bob Parker is about to speak.

Images, UC QuakeStudies

A member of the New Zealand Police photographed with a member of the Los Angeles County Fire Department. Personnel from the Los Angeles County Fire Department travelled to New Zealand to help out with the search and rescue response to the 22 February 2011 earthquake.

Images, UC QuakeStudies

A photograph of the Wellington Emergency Management Office Emergency Response Team standing in a car park on Lichfield Street. The team are wearing face and gas masks, hard hats, safety glasses, knee pads, and rubber gloves. In the background are several earthquake-damaged buildings.

Images, UC QuakeStudies

A photograph of members of the Wellington Emergency Management Office Emergency Response Team standing on the intersection of Manchester and Lichfield Streets. In the background is the Majestic Theatre. Piles of rubble from earthquake-damaged buildings has been piled on the road below the building.