Motivation This poster aims to present fragility functions for pipelines buried in liquefaction-prone soils. Existing fragility models used to quantify losses can be based on old data or use complex metrics. Addressing these issues, the proposed functions are based on the Christchurch network and soil and utilizes the Canterbury earthquake sequence (CES) data, partially represented in Figure 1. Figure 1 (a) presents the pipe failure dataset, which describes the date, location and pipe on which failures occurred. Figure 1 (b) shows the simulated ground motion intensity median of the 22nd February 2011 earthquake. To develop the model, the network and soil characteristics have also been utilized.
essential systems upon which the well-being and functioning of societies depend. They deliver a service or a good to the population using a network, a combination of spatially-distributed links and nodes. As they are interconnected, network elements’ functionality is also interdependent. In case of a failure of one component, many others could be momentarily brought out-of-service. Further problems arise for buried infrastructure when it comes to buried infrastructure in earthquake and liquefaction-prone areas for the following reasons: • Technically more demanding inspections than those required for surface horizontal infrastructure • Infrastructure subject to both permanent ground displacement and transient ground deformation • Increase in network maintenance costs (i.e. deterioration due to ageing material and seismic hazard) These challenges suggest careful studies on network resilience will yield significant benefits. For these reasons, the potable water network of Christchurch city (Figure 1) has been selected for its well-characterized topology and its extensive repair dataset.
Research following the 2010-2011 Canterbury earthquakes investigated the minimum vertical reinforcement required in RC walls to generate well distributed cracking in the plastic hinge region. However, the influence of the loading sequence and rate has not been fully addressed. The new minimum vertical reinforcement limits in NZS 3101:2006 (Amendment 3) include consideration of the material strengths under dynamic load rates, but these provisions have not been validated at a member or system level. A series of tests were conducted on RC prisms to investigate the effect of loading rate and sequence on the local behaviour of RC members. Fifteen axially loaded RC prisms with the designs representing the end region of RC walls were tested under various loading rates to cover the range of pseudo-static and earthquake loading scenarios. These tests will provide substantial data for understanding the local behaviour of RC members, including hysteretic load-deformation behaviour, crack patterns, failure mode, steel strain, strain rate and ductility. Recommendations will be made regarding the effect of loading rate and reinforcement content on the cracking behaviour and ductility of RC members.
Asset management in power systems is exercised to improve network reliability to provide confidence and security for customers and asset owners. While there are well-established reliability metrics that are used to measure and manage business-as-usual disruptions, an increasing appreciation of the consequences of low-probability high-impact events means that resilience is increasingly being factored into asset management in order to provide robustness and redundancy to components and wider networks. This is particularly important for electricity systems, given that a range of other infrastructure lifelines depend upon their operation. The 2010-2011 Canterbury Earthquake Sequence provides valuable insights into electricity system criticality and resilience in the face of severe earthquake impacts. While above-ground assets are relatively easy to monitor and repair, underground assets such as cables emplaced across wide areas in the distribution network are difficult to monitor, identify faults on, and repair. This study has characterised in detail the impacts to buried electricity cables in Christchurch resulting from seismically-induced ground deformation caused primarily by liquefaction and lateral spread. Primary modes of failure include cable bending, stretching, insulation damage, joint braking and, being pulled off other equipment such as substation connections. Performance and repair data have been compiled into a detailed geospatial database, which in combination with spatial models of peak ground acceleration, peak ground velocity and ground deformation, will be used to establish rigorous relationships between seismicity and performance. These metrics will be used to inform asset owners of network performance in future earthquakes, further assess component criticality, and provide resilience metrics.
Nowadays the telecommunication systems’ performance has a substantial impact on our lifestyle. Their operationality becomes even more substantial in a post-disaster scenario when these services are used in civil protection and emergency plans, as well as for the restoration of all the other critical infrastructure. Despite the relevance of loss of functionality of telecommunication networks on seismic resilience, studies on their performance assessment are few in the literature. The telecommunication system is a distributed network made up of several components (i.e. ducts, utility holes, cabinets, major and local exchanges). Given that these networks cover a large geographical area, they can be easily subjected to the effects of a seismic event, either the ground shaking itself, or co-seismic events such as liquefaction and landslides. In this paper, an analysis of the data collected after the 2010-2011 Canterbury Earthquake Sequence (CES) and the 2016 Kaikoura Earthquake in New Zealand is conducted. Analysing these data, information gaps are critically identified regarding physical and functional failures of the telecommunication components, the timeline of repair/reconstruction activities and service recovery, geotechnical tests and land planning maps. Indeed, if these missing data were presented, they could aid the assessment of the seismic resilience. Thus, practical improvements in the post-disaster collection from both a network and organisational viewpoints are proposed through consultation of national and international researchers and highly experienced asset managers from Chorus. Finally, an outline of future studies which could guide towards a more resilient seismic performance of the telecommunication network is presented.
