The objective of the study presented herein is to assess three commonly used CPT-based liquefaction evaluation procedures and three liquefaction severity index frameworks using data from the 2010–2011 Canterbury earthquake sequence. Specifically, post-event field observations, ground motion recordings, and results from a recently completed extensive geotechnical site investigation programme at selected strong motion stations (SMSs) in the city of Christchurch and surrounding towns are used herein. Unlike similar studies that used data from free-field sites, accelerogram characteristics at the SMS locations can be used to assess the performance of liquefaction evaluation procedures prior to their use in the computation of surficial manifestation severity indices. Results from this study indicate that for cases with evidence of liquefaction triggering in the accelerograms, the majority of liquefaction evaluation procedures yielded correct predictions, regardless of whether surficial manifestation of liquefaction was evident or not. For cases with no evidence of liquefaction in the accelerograms (and no observed surficial evidence of liquefaction triggering), the majority of liquefaction evaluation procedures predicted liquefaction was triggered. When all cases are used to assess the performance of liquefaction severity index frameworks, a poor correlation is shown between the observed severity of liquefaction surface manifestation and the calculated severity indices. However, only using those cases where the liquefaction evaluation procedures yielded correct predictions, there is an improvement in the correlation, with the Liquefaction Severity Number (LSN) being the best performing of the frameworks investigated herein. However scatter in the relationship between the observed and calculated surficial manifestation still remains for all liquefaction severity index frameworks.
This paper presents preliminary field observations on the performance of selected steel structures in Christchurch during the earthquake series of 2010 to 2011. This comprises 6 damaging earthquakes, on 4 September and 26 December 2010, February 22, June 6 and two on June 13, 2011. Most notable of these was the 4 September event, at Ms7.1 and MM7 (MM as observed in the Christchurch CBD) and most intense was the 22 February event at Ms6.3 and MM9-10 within the CBD. Focus is on performance of concentrically braced frames, eccentrically braced frames, moment resisting frames and industrial storage racks. With a few notable exceptions, steel structures performed well during this earthquake series, to the extent that inelastic deformations were less than what would have been expected given the severity of the recorded strong motions. Some hypotheses are formulated to explain this satisfactory performance. http://db.nzsee.org.nz/SpecialIssue/44%284%290297.pdf
The author followed five primary (elementary) schools over three years as they responded to and began to recover from the 2010–2011 earthquakes in and around the city of Christchurch in the Canterbury region of New Zealand. The purpose was to capture the stories for the schools themselves, their communities, and for New Zealand’s historical records. From the wider study, data from the qualitative interviews highlighted themes such as children’s responses or the changing roles of principals and teachers. The theme discussed in this article, however, is the role that schools played in the provision of facilities and services to meet (a) physical needs (food, water, shelter, and safety); and (b) emotional, social, and psychological needs (communication, emotional support, psychological counseling, and social cohesion)—both for themselves and their wider communities. The role schools played is examined across the immediate, short-, medium-, and long-term response periods before being discussed through a social bonding theoretical lens. The article concludes by recommending stronger engagement with schools when considering disaster policy, planning, and preparation http://www.schoolcommunitynetwork.org/SCJ.aspx
On 14 November 2016 a magnitude Mw 7.8 earthquake struck the upper South Island of New Zealand with effects also being observed in the capital city, Wellington. The affected area has low population density but is the largest wine production region in New Zealand and also hosts the main national highway and railway routes connecting the country’s three largest cities of Auckland, Wellington and Christchurch, with Marlborough Port in Picton providing connection between the South and North Islands. These transport facilities sustained substantial earthquake related damage, causing major disruptions. Thousands of landslides and multiple new faults were counted in the area. The winery facilities and a large number of commercial buildings and building components (including brick masonry veneers, historic masonry construction, and chimneys), sustained damage due to the strong vertical and horizontal acceleration. Presented herein are field observations undertaken the day immediately after the earthquake, with the aim to document earthquake damage and assess access to the affected area.
The 2010–2011 Canterbury earthquakes, which involved widespread damage during the February 2011 event and ongoing aftershocks near the Christchurch Central Business District, left this community with more than $NZD 40 billion in losses (~20 % GDP), demolition of approximately 60 % of multi-storey concrete buildings (3 storeys and up), and closure of the core business district for over 2 years. The aftermath of the earthquake sequence has revealed unique issues and complexities for the owners of commercial and multi-storey residential buildings in relation to unexpected technical, legal, and financial challenges when making decisions regarding the future of their buildings impacted by the earthquakes. The paper presents a framework to understand the factors influencing post-earthquake decisions (repair or demolish) on multi-storey concrete buildings in Christchurch. The study, conducted in 2014, includes in-depth investigations on 15 case-study buildings using 27 semi-structured interviews with various property owners, property managers, insurers, engineers, and government authorities in New Zealand. The interviews revealed insights regarding the multitude of factors influencing post-earthquake decisions and losses. As expected, the level of damage and repairability (cost to repair) generally dictated the course of action. There is strong evidence, however, that other variables have significantly influenced the decision on a number of buildings, such as insurance, business strategies, perception of risks, building regulations (and compliance costs), and government decisions. The decision-making process for each building is complex and unique, not solely driven by structural damage. Furthermore, the findings have put the spotlight on insurance policy wordings and the paradoxical effect of insurance on the recovery of Christchurch, leading to other challenges and issues going forward.
This study is a qualitative investigation into the decision-making behaviour of commercial property owners (investors and developers) who are rebuilding in a city centre after a major disaster. In 2010/2011, Christchurch, the largest city in the South Island of New Zealand, was a site of numerous earthquakes. The stronger earthquakes destroyed many buildings and public infrastructure in the commercial inner city. As a result, affected property owners lost all or most of their buildings, a significant proportion of which were old and in the last phase of their life span. They had to negotiate pay-outs with insurance companies and decide, once paid out, whether they should rebuild in Christchurch or sell up and invest elsewhere. The clear majority of those who decided to reinvest in and rebuild the city are ‘locals’, almost all of whom had no prior experience of property development. Thus, in a post-disaster environment, most of these property owners have transitioned from being just being passive investors to active property developers. Their experience was interpreted using primary data gathered from in-depth and semi-structured interviews with twenty-one “informed property people” who included commercial property owners; property agents or consultants; representatives of public-sector agencies and financial institutions. The study findings showed that the decision-making behaviour of property investors and developers rebuilding after a major disaster did not necessarily follow a strict financial or profit motive as prescribed in the mainstream or neo-classical economics property literature. Rather, their decision-making behaviour has been largely shaped by emotional connections and external factors associated with their immediate environment. The theoretical proposition emerging from this study is that after a major disaster, local urban property owners are faced with two choices “to stay” or “to go”. Those who decide to stay and rebuild are typically very committed individuals who have a feeling of ownership, belonging and attachment to the city in which they live and work. These are people who will often take the lead in commercial property development, proactively making decisions and seeking positive investment outcomes for themselves which in turn result in revitalised commercial urban precincts.
