The 2010 and 2011 earthquakes in the region of Canterbury, New Zealand caused widespread damage and the deaths of 185 people. Suburbs on the eastern side of Christchurch and in the satellite town of Kaiapoi, 20 kilometres north of Christchurch, were badly damaged by liquefaction. The Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority (CERA), a government organisation set up in the wake of the earthquakes, began to systematically zone all residential land in 2011. Based on the possibility for land remediation, 7860 houses in Christchurch and Kaiapoi were zoned red. Those who were in this zone were compensated and had to buy or build elsewhere. The other zone examined within this research – that of TC3 – lies within the green zone. Residents, in this zone, were able to stay in their houses but land was moderately damaged and required site-specific geotechnical investigations. This research sought to understand how residents’ senses of home were impacted by a disaster and the response efforts. Focusing on the TC3 and red zone of the eastern suburbs and the satellite town of Kaiapoi, this study interviewed 29 residents within these zones. The concept of home was explored with the respondents at three scales: home as a household; home as a community; and home as a city. There was a large amount of resistance to the zoning process and the handling of claims by insurance companies and the Earthquake Commission (EQC) after the earthquakes. Lack of transparency and communication, as well as extremely slow timelines were all documented as failings of these agencies. This research seeks to understand how participant’s sense of home changed on an individual level and how it was impacted by outside agencies. Homemaking techniques were also focused on showing that a changed sense of home will impact on how a person interacts with a space.
In this paper, we consider how religious leaders and Civil Defence authorities might collaborate to establish a two-way information conduit during the aftermath of a disaster. Using surveys and in-person interviews, clergy in different Christian denominations were asked about their roles in the earthquake, the needs of their congregations and the possibilities and obstacles to deeper collaboration with Civil Defence authorities.
The Canterbury earthquakes and the rebuild are generation-defining events for twenty-first century Aotearoa/ New Zealand. This article uses an actor network approach to explore 32 women’s narratives of being shaken into dangerous disaster situations and reconstituting themselves to cope in socially innovative ways. The women’s stories articulate on-going collective narratives of experiencing disaster and coping with loss in ‘resilient’ ways. In these women’s experiences, coping in disasters is not achieved by talking through the emotional trauma. Instead, coping comes from seeking solace through engagement with one’s own and others’ personal risk and resourcefulness in ways that feed into the emergence of socially innovative voluntary organisations. These stories offer conceptual insight into the multivalent interconnections between resilience and vulnerabilities and the contested nature of post-disaster recovery in Aotearoa/New Zealand. These women gave voice to living through disasters resiliently in ways that forged new networks of support across collective and personal narratives and broader social goals and aspirations for Aotearoa/New Zealand’s future.
At 4.35 a.m. on the 4th of September 2010 Christchurch
residents were shaken awake by a magnitude
7.1 earthquake, the largest earthquake to hit
urban New Zealand for nearly 80 years. It was a
large earthquake. On average the world only has 17
earthquakes a year larger than magnitude seven.
Haiti’s earthquake in January 2010 was magnitude
7.1 and Chile’s earthquake in February was magnitude
8.8. Although it was a big quake, Christchurch
was lucky. In Haiti’s earthquake over 230,000
people were killed and in Chile 40,000 homes were
destroyed.
Happily this was not the situation in Christchurch,
however the earthquake has caused considerable
damage. The challenge for the Landscape Architecture
community is to contribute to the city’s
reconstruction in ways that will not only fix the
problems of housing, and the city’s urban, suburban
and neighbourhood fabric but that will do so
in ways that will help solve the landscape problems
that dogged the city before the earthquake struck.
On September the 4th 2010 and February 22nd 2011
the Canterbury region of New Zealand was shaken by
two massive earthquakes. This paper is set broadly
within the civil defence and emergency management
literature and informed by recent work on community
participation and social capital in the building of resilient
cities. Work in this area indicates a need to recognise
both the formal institutional response to the earthquakes
as well as the substantive role communities play in their
own recovery. The range of factors that facilitate or
hinder community involvement also needs to be better
understood. This paper interrogates the assumption
that recovery agencies and officials are both willing
and able to engage communities who are themselves
willing and able to be engaged in accordance with
recovery best practice. Case studies of three community
groups – CanCERN, Greening the Rubble and Gap
Filler – illustrate some of the difficulties associated
with becoming a community during the disaster
recovery phase. Based on my own observations and
experiences, combined with data from approximately
50 in-depth interviews with Christchurch residents
and representatives from community groups, the
Christchurch City Council, the Earthquake Commission
and so on, this paper outlines some practical strategies
emerging communities may use in the early disaster
recovery phase that then strengthens their ability to
‘participate’ in the recovery process.
On the second day of teaching for 2011, the University of Canterbury (UC) faced the most significant crisis of its 138-year history. After being shaken severely by a magnitude 7.1 earthquake on 4 September 2010, UC felt it was well along the pathway to getting back to ‘normal’. That all changed at 12:51pm on 22 February 2011, when Christchurch city was hit by an even more devastating event. A magnitude 6.3 (Modified Mercalli intensity ten – MM X) earthquake, just 13km south-east of the Christchurch city centre, caused vertical peak ground accelerations amongst the highest ever recorded in an urban environment, in some places more than twice the acceleration due to gravity. The earthquake caused immediate evacuation of the UC campus and resulted in significant damage to many buildings. Thankfully there were no serious injuries or fatalities on campus, but 185 people died in the city and many more suffered serious injuries. At the time of writing, eighteen months after the first earthquake in September, Christchurch is still experiencing regular earthquakes. Seismologists warn that the region may experience heightened seismicity for a decade or more. While writing this report we have talked with many different people from across the University. People’s experiences are different and we have not managed to talk with everyone, but we hope that by drawing together many different perspectives from across the campus that this report will serve two purposes; to retain our institutional memory of what we have learnt over the past eighteen months, and also to share our learnings with other organisations in New Zealand and around the world who, we hope, will benefit from learning about our experience.
There is a critical strand of literature suggesting that there are no ‘natural’ disasters (Abramovitz, 2001; Anderson and Woodrow, 1998; Clarke, 2008; Hinchliffe, 2004). There are only those that leave us – the people - more or less shaken and disturbed. There may be some substance to this; for example, how many readers recall the 7.8 magnitude earthquake centred in Fiordland in July 2009? Because it was so far away from a major centre and very few people suffered any consequences, the number is likely to be far fewer than those who remember (all too vividly) the relatively smaller 7.1 magnitude Canterbury quake of September 4th 2010 and the more recent 6.3 magnitude February 22nd 2011 event.
One implication of this construction of disasters is that seismic events, like those in Canterbury, are as much socio-political as they are geological. Yet, as this paper shows, the temptation in recovery is to tick boxes and rebuild rather than recover, and to focus on hard infrastructure rather than civic expertise and community involvement. In this paper I draw upon different models of community engagement and use Putnam’s (1995) notion of ‘social capital’ to frame the argument that ‘building bridges’ after a disaster is a complex blend of engineering, communication and collaboration. I then present the results of a qualitative research project undertaken after the September 4th earthquake. This research helps to illustrate the important connections between technical rebuilding, social capital, recovery processes and overall urban resilience.
This thesis is about many things, not least of all the September 4th 2010 and February 22nd 2011 earthquakes that shook Christchurch, New Zealand. A city was shaken, events which worked to lay open the normally invisible yet vital objects, processes and technologies which are the focus of inquiry: the sewers, pipes, pumps, the digital technologies, the land and politics which constitute the Christchurch wastewater networks. The thesis is an eclectic mix drawing together methods and concepts from Bruno Latour, John Law, Giles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, Nigel Thrift, Donna Haraway and Patrick Joyce. It is an exploration of how the technologies and objects of sanitation perform the city, and how such things which are normally hidden and obscured, are made visible. The question of visibility is also turned toward the research itself: how does one observe, and describe? How are sociological visibilities constructed? Through the research, the encountering of objects in the field, the processes of method, the pedagogy of concepts, and the construction of risk, the thesis comes to be understood as a particular kind of social scientific artefact which assembles four different accounts: the first regards the construction of visibility; the second explores Christchurch city from the control room where the urban sanitary infrastructures are monitored; the third chapter looks at the formatted and embodied practices which emerge with the correlation of the city and sanitation; the fourth looks at the changing politics of a city grappling with severely damaged essential services, land and structures. The final chapter considers how the differences between romantic and baroque sensibilities mean that these four accounts elicit knowing not through smoothness or uniformity, but in partiality and non-coherence. This thesis is about pipes, pump stations, and treatment plants; about the effluent of a city; about the messiness of social science when confronted by the equally messy world of wastewater.
The Canterbury region of New Zealand was shaken by major earthquakes on the 4th September 2010 and 22nd February 2011. The quakes caused 185 fatalities and extensive land, infrastructure and building damage, particularly in the Eastern suburbs of Christchurch city. Almost 450 ha of residential and public land was designated as a ‘Red Zone’ unsuitable for residential redevelopment because land damage was so significant, engineering solutions were uncertain, and repairs would be protracted. Subsequent demolition of all housing and infrastructure in the area has left a blank canvas of land stretching along the Avon River corridor from the CBD to the sea.
Initially the Government’s official – but enormously controversial – position was that this land would be cleared and lie fallow until engineering solutions could be found that enabled residential redevelopment. This paper presents an application of a choice experiment (CE) that identified and assessed Christchurch residents’ preferences for different land use options of this Red Zone. Results demonstrated strong public support for the development of a recreational reserve comprising a unique natural environment with native fauna and flora, healthy wetlands and rivers, and recreational opportunities that align with this vision. By highlighting the value of a range of alternatives, the CE provided a platform for public participation and expanded the conversational terrain upon which redevelopment policy took place. We conclude the method has value for land use decision-making beyond the disaster recovery context.
On 14 November 2016, the Mw 7.8 Kaikōura earthquake caused widespread damage along the east coast of the South Island, New Zealand. Kaikōura town itself was isolated from the rest of the country by landslides blocking off major roads. While impacts from the Kaikōura earthquake on large, urban population centres have been generally well documented, this thesis aims to fill gaps in academic knowledge regarding small rural towns. This thesis investigates what, where and when critical infrastructure and lifeline service disruption occurred following the 2016 Kaikōura earthquake in a selection of small towns, and how the communities in these areas adapted to disruption. Following a robust review of literature and news media, four small rural towns were selected from North Canterbury (Culverden & Waiau) and Marlborough (Seddon & Ward) in the South Island, New Zealand. Semi-structured interview sessions with a special focus on these towns were held with infrastructure managers, emergency response and recovery officials, and organisation leaders with experience or expertise in the 2016 Kaikōura earthquake. Findings were supplemented with emergency management situation reports to produce hazard maps and infrastructure exposure maps. A more detailed analysis was conducted for Waiau involving interdependence analyses and a level of service timeline for select lifeline services. The earthquake impacted roads by blocking them with landslides, debris and surface rupture. Bridges where shaken off their abutments, breaking infrastructure links such as fibre landlines as they went. Water supplies and other forms of infrastructure relied heavily on the level of service of roads, as rough rural terrain left few alternatives. Adapting to an artificial loss of road service, some Waiau locals created their own detour around a road cordon in order to get home to family and farms. Performance of dwellings was tied to socioeconomic factors as much as proximity to the epicentre. Farmers who lost water access pulled out fences to allow stock to drink from rivers. Socioeconomic differences between farmland and township residents also contributed to resilience variations between the towns assessed in this study. Understanding how small rural towns respond and adapt to disaster allows emergency management officials and policy to be well informed and flexible with planning for multiple size classes of towns.
In the period between September 2010 and December 2011, Christchurch was shaken by a series of strong earthquakes including the MW7.1 4 September 2010, Mw 6.2 22 February 2011, MW6.2 13 June 2011 and MW6.0 23 December 2011 earthquakes. These earthquakes produced very strong ground motions throughout the city and surrounding areas that resulted in soil liquefaction and lateral spreading causing substantial damage to buildings, infrastructure and the community. The stopbank network along the Kaiapoi and Avon River suffered extensive damage with repairs projected to take several years to complete. This presented an opportunity to undertake a case-study on a regional scale of the effects of liquefaction on a stopbank system. Ultimately, this information can be used to determine simple performance-based concepts that can be applied in practice to improve the resilience of river protection works. The research presented in this thesis draws from data collected following the 4th September 2010 and 22nd February 2011 earthquakes. The stopbank damage is categorised into seven key deformation modes that were interpreted from aerial photographs, consultant reports, damage photographs and site visits. Each deformation mode provides an assessment of the observed mechanism of failure behind liquefaction-induced stopbank damage and the factors that influence a particular style of deformation. The deformation modes have been used to create a severity classification for the whole stopbank system, being ‘no or low damage’ and ‘major or severe damage’, in order to discriminate the indicators and factors that contribute to ‘major to severe damage’ from the factors that contribute to all levels of damage a number of calculated, land damage, stopbank damage and geomorphological parameters were analysed and compared at 178 locations along the Kaiapoi and Avon River stopbank systems. A critical liquefiable layer was present at every location with relatively consistent geotechnical parameters (cone resistance (qc), soil behaviour type (Ic) and Factor of Safety (FoS)) across the study site. In 95% of the cases the critical layer occurred within two times the Height of the Free Face (HFF,). A statistical analysis of the geotechnical factors relating to the critical layer was undertaken in order to find correlations between specific deformation modes and geotechnical factors. It was found that each individual deformation mode involves a complex interplay of factors that are difficult to represent through correlative analysis. There was, however, sufficient data to derive the key factors that have affected the severity of deformation. It was concluded that stopbank damage is directly related to the presence of liquefaction in the ground materials beneath the stopbanks, but is not critical in determining the type or severity of damage, instead it is merely the triggering mechanism. Once liquefaction is triggered it is the gravity-induced deformation that causes the damage rather than the shaking duration. Lateral spreading and specifically the depositional setting was found to be the key aspect in determining the severity and type of deformation along the stopbank system. The presence or absence of abandoned or old river channels and point bar deposits was found to significantly influence the severity and type of deformation. A review of digital elevation models and old maps along the Kaiapoi River found that all of the ‘major to severe’ damage observed occurred within or directly adjacent to an abandoned river channel. Whilst a review of the geomorphology along the Avon River showed that every location within a point bar deposit suffered some form of damage, due to the depositional environment creating a deposit highly susceptible to liquefaction.
