This study explores the nature of smaller businesses’ resilience following two major earthquakes that severely disrupted their place of doing business. Data from the owners of ten smaller businesses are qualitative and longitudinal, spanning the period 2011 through 2018, providing first-hand narrative accounts of their responses in the earthquakes’ aftermath. All ten owners showed some individual resilience; six businesses survived through to 2018, of which three have recovered strongly. All three owned their premises; operated business-tobusiness models; and were able to adapt and continue to follow path-extension strategies. All the other businesses had direct business-to-customer models operating from leased premises, typically in major retail malls. Four eventually recognised path-exhaustion at different times and so did not survive through to 2018. We conclude however that post-disaster recovery is best explained in terms of business model resilience. Even the most resilient of individual owners will struggle to survive if their business model is either not resilient or cannot be made so. Individual resilience is necessary but not sufficient.
This study analyses the success and limitations of the recovery process following the 2010–11 earthquake sequence in Christchurch, New Zealand. Data were obtained from in-depth interviews with 32 relocated households in Christchurch, and from a review of recovery policies implemented by the government. A top-down approach to disaster recovery was evident, with the creation of multiple government agencies and processes that made grassroots input into decision-making difficult. Although insurance proceeds enabled the repair and rebuilding of many dwellings, the complexity and adversarial nature of the claim procedures also impaired recovery. Householders’ perceptions of recovery reflected key aspects of their post-earthquake experiences (e.g. the housing offer they received, and the negotiations involved), and the outcomes of their relocation (including the value of the new home, their subjective well-being, and lifestyle after relocation). Protracted insurance negotiations, unfair offers and hardships in post-earthquake life were major challenges to recovery. Less-thanfavourable recovery experiences also transformed patterns of trust in local communities, as relocated householders came to doubt both the government and private insurance companies’ ability to successfully manage a disaster. At the same time, many relocated households expressed trust in their neighbours and communities. This study illuminates how government policies influence disaster recovery while also suggesting a need to reconsider centralised, top-down approaches to managing recovery.
This study analyses the Earthquake Commission’s (EQC) insurance claims database to investigate the influence of seismic intensity and property damage resulting from the Canterbury Earthquake Sequence (CES) on the repair costs and claim settlement duration for residential buildings. Firstly, the ratio of building repair cost to its replacement cost was expressed as a Building Loss Ratio (BLR), which was further extended to Regional Loss Ratio (RLR) for greater Christchurch by multiplying the average of all building loss ratios with the proportion of building stock that lodged an insurance claim. Secondly, the total time required to settle the claim and the time taken to complete each phase of the claim settlement process were obtained. Based on the database, the regional loss ratio for greater Christchurch for three events producing shakings of intensities 6, 7, and 8 on the modified Mercalli intensity scale were 0.013, 0.066, and 0.171, respectively. Furthermore, small (less than NZD15,000), medium (between NZD15,000 and NZD100,000), and large (more than NZD100,000) claims took 0.35-0.55, 1.95-2.45, and 3.35-3.85 years to settle regardless of the building’s construction period and earthquake intensities. The number of claims was also disaggregated by various building characteristics to evaluate their relative contribution to the damage and repair costs.
Following devastating earthquakes in 2010 and 2011 in Christchurch, there is an opportunity to use sustainable urban design variables to redevelop the central city in order to address climate change concerns and reduce CO₂ emissions from land transport. Literature from a variety of disciplines establishes that four sustainable urban design variables; increased density, mixed-use development, street layout and city design, and the provision of sustainable public transport, can reduce car dependency and vehicle kilometres travelled within urban populations- widely regarded as indicators of the negative environmental effects of transport. The key question for the research is; to what extent has this opportunity been seized by NZ’s Central Government who are overseeing the central city redevelopment? In order to explore this question the redevelopment plans for the central city of Christchurch are evaluated against an adapted urban design matrix to determine whether a reduction in CO₂ emissions from land transport is likely to be achieved through their implementation. Data obtained through interviews with experts is used to further explore the extent to which sustainable urban design variables can be employed to enhance sustainability and reduce CO₂ emissions. The analysis of this data shows that the four urban design variables will feature in the Central Government’s redevelopment plans although the extent to which they are employed and their likely success in reducing CO₂ emissions will vary. Ultimately, the opportunity to redevelop the central city of Christchurch to reduce CO₂ emissions from land transport will be undermined due to timeframe, co-ordination, and leadership barriers.
We aim to investigate the role of insurance in business recovery following the devastating Christchurch earthquake in February, 22nd, 2011. We analyze data from two business surveys conducted after the earthquake to examine how insurance affected business operation in the aftermath of the earthquake both in the short-term and longer-term. For the short-term analysis, we use a combination of propensity score matching (PSM) and linear probability model (LPM) to analyze the data. We first estimate the propensity scores for insurance take-up of each firm conditional on the firm’s individual characteristics. Stratification based on the estimated propensity scores is used to match the treated (insured) and the control (uninsured) firms. We then estimate the probability of firms’ continuing operations with a set of control variables to account for the level of damage and disruption caused by the quake in each stratum. We find little evidence of any beneficial effect of insurance coverage on business continuity in the short-run. For the longer-term analysis, we analyze the available survey data using logistic regression. The result suggests that business interruption insurance significantly promotes increased level of long-term productivity for surviving firms following the earthquake.
In response to the February 2011 earthquake, Parliament enacted the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Act. This emergency legislation provided the executive with extreme powers that extended well beyond the initial emergency response and into the recovery phase. Although New Zealand has the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002, it was unable to cope with the scale and intensity of the Canterbury earthquake sequence. Considering the well-known geological risk facing the Wellington region, this paper will consider whether a standalone “Disaster Recovery Act” should be established to separate an emergency and its response from the recovery phase. Currently, Government policy is to respond reactively to a disaster rather than proactively. In a major event, this typically involves the executive being given the ability to make rules, regulations and policy without the delay or oversight of normal legislative process. In the first part of this paper, I will canvas what a “Disaster Recovery Act” could prescribe and why there is a need to separate recovery from emergency. Secondly, I will consider the shortfalls in the current civil defence recovery framework which necessitates this kind of heavy governmental response after a disaster. In the final section, I will examine how
Though rare and unpredictable, earthquakes can and do cause catastrophic destruction when they impact unprepared and vulnerable communities. Extensive damage and failure of vulnerable buildings is a key factor which contributes to seismic-related disasters, making the proactive management of these buildings a necessity to reduce the risk of future disasters arising. The devastating Canterbury earthquakes of 2010 and 2011 brought the urgency of this issue to national importance in New Zealand. The national earthquake-prone building framework came into effect in 2017, obligating authorities to identify existing buildings with the greatest risk of collapse in strong earthquakes and for building owners to strengthen or demolish these buildings within a designated period of time. Though this framework is unique to New Zealand, the challenge of managing the seismic risk of such buildings is common amongst all seismically-active countries. Therefore, looking outward to examine how other jurisdictions legally manage this challenge is useful for reflecting on the approaches taken in New Zealand and understand potential lessons which could be adopted. This research compares the legal framework used to reduce the seismic risk of existing buildings in New Zealand with that of the similarly earthquake-prone countries of Japan and Italy. These legal frameworks are examined with a particular focus on the proactive goal of reducing risk and improving resilience, as is the goal of the international Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030. The Sendai Framework, which each of the case study countries have committed to and thus have obligations under, forms the legal basis of the need for states to reduce disaster risk in their jurisdictions. In particular, the states’ legal frameworks for existing building risk reduction are examined in the context of the Sendai priorities of understanding disaster risk, strengthening disaster risk governance, and investing in resilience. While this research illustrates that the case study countries have each adopted more proactive risk reduction frameworks in recent years in anticipation of future earthquakes, the frameworks currently focus on a very narrow range of existing buildings and thus are not currently sufficient for promoting the long-term resilience of building stocks. In order to improve resilience, it is argued, legal frameworks need to include a broader range of buildings subject to seismic risk reduction obligations and also to broaden the focus on long-term monitoring of potential risk to buildings.
Museums around the world are often affected by major catastrophes, and yet planning for these disasters is an often neglected aspect of museum practice. New Zealand is not immune from these events, as can be seen in the recent series of serious earthquakes in Christchurch in 2010 and 2011. This dissertation considers how prepared the New Zealand museum sector is to handle unexpected events that negatively affect its buildings, staff, operations and treasured collections. The central research question was: What is the overall state of emergency planning in the New Zealand museum sector? There was a significant gap in the literature, especially in the local context, as there has been only one other comparable study conducted in Britain, and nothing locally. This dissertation makes a valuable contribution to the field of museum studies by drawing on theory from relevant areas such as crises management literature and by conducting original empirical research on a topic which has received little attention hitherto. The research employed a number of methods, including a review of background secondary sources, a survey and interviews. After contextualising the study with a number of local examples, Ian online survey was then developed an which enabled precise understanding of the nature of current museum practices and policies around emergency planning. Following this I conducted several interviews with museum professionals from a variety of institutional backgrounds which explored their thoughts and feelings behind the existing practices within the industry. The findings of the research were significant and somewhat alarming: almost 40% of the museum and galleries in New Zealand do not have any emergency plan at all, and only 11% have what they considered ‘complete’ plans. The research revealed a clear picture of the current width and depth of planning, as well as practices around updating the plans and training related to them. Within the industry there is awareness that planning for emergencies is important, but museum staff typically lack the knowledge and guidance needed to conduct effective emergency planning. As a result of the analysis, several practical suggestions are presented aimed at improving emergency planning practices in New Zealand museums. However this study has implications for museum studies and for current museum practice everywhere, as many of the recommendations for resolving the current obstacles and problems are applicable anywhere in the world, suggesting that New Zealand museums could become leaders in this important area.
