The aim of this poster is to examine the seismic response of two structural systems when subjected to observed and simulated ground motions (GMs) for the 22 February 2011 (22Feb2011) Christchurch earthquake (Razafindrakoto et al. (2018)) via an automated workflow. The layout and technical details of the automated workflow are described at Motha et. al. (2019).
1-page The objective of this project is to collect perishable seismic response data from the baseisolated Christchurch Women's Hospital. The strong and continuing sequence of aftershocks presents a unique opportunity to capture high-fidelity data from a modern base-isolated facility. These measurements will provide quantitative information required to assess the mechanisms at play in this and in many other seismically-isolated structures.
This paper summarizes the development of a region-wide surficial shear wave velocity model based on the combination of the large high-spatial-density database of cone penetration test (CPT) logs in and around Christchurch, New Zealand and a recently-developed Christchurch-specific empirical correlation between soil shear wave velocity and CPT. The ongoing development of this near-surface shear wave velocity model has applications for site characterization efforts via the development of maps of time-averaged shear wave velocities over specific depths, and the identification of regional similarities and differences in soil shear stiffness.
The Canterbury earthquake sequence in New Zealand’s South Island induced widespread liquefaction phenomena across the Christchurch urban area on four occasions (4 Sept 2010; 22 Feb; 13 June; 23 Dec 2011), that resulted in widespread ejection of silt and fine sand. This impacted transport networks as well as infiltrated and contaminated the damaged storm water system, making rapid clean-up an immediate post-earthquake priority. In some places the ejecta was contaminated by raw sewage and was readily remobilised in dry windy conditions, creating a long-term health risk to the population. Thousands of residential properties were inundated with liquefaction ejecta, however residents typically lacked the capacity (time or resources) to clean-up without external assistance. The liquefaction silt clean-up response was co-ordinated by the Christchurch City Council and executed by a network of contractors and volunteer groups, including the ‘Farmy-Army’ and the ‘Student-Army’. The duration of clean-up time of residential properties and the road network was approximately 2 months for each of the 3 main liquefaction inducing earthquakes; despite each event producing different volumes of ejecta. Preliminary cost estimates indicate total clean-up costs will be over NZ$25 million. Over 500,000 tonnes of ejecta has been stockpiled at Burwood landfill since the beginning of the Canterbury earthquakes sequence. The liquefaction clean-up experience in Christchurch following the 2010-2011 earthquake sequence has emerged as a valuable case study to support further analysis and research on the coordination, management and costs of large volume deposition of fine grained sediment in urban areas.
On 22 February 2011, Canterbury and its largest city Christchurch experienced its second major earthquake within six months. The region is facing major economic and organisational challenges in the aftermath of these events. Approximately 25% of all buildings in the Christchurch CBD have been “red tagged” or deemed unsafe to enter. The New Zealand Treasury estimates that the combined cost of the February earthquake and the September earthquake is approximately NZ$15 billion[2]. This paper examines the national and regional economic climate prior to the event, discusses the immediate economic implications of this event, and the challenges and opportunities faced by organisations affected by this event. In order to facilitate recovery of the Christchurch area, organisations must adjust to a new norm; finding ways not only to continue functioning, but to grow in the months and years following these earthquakes. Some organisations relocated within days to areas that have been less affected by the earthquakes. Others are taking advantage of government subsidised aid packages to help retain their employees until they can make long-term decisions about the future of their organisation. This paper is framed as a “report from the field” in order to provide insight into the early recovery scenario as it applies to organisations affected by the February 2011 earthquake. It is intended both to inform and facilitate discussion about how organisations can and should pursue recovery in Canterbury, and how organisations can become more resilient in the face of the next crisis.
Interagency Emergency Response Teams (IERTs) play acrucial role in times of disasters. Therefore it is crucial to understand more thoroughly the communication roles and responsibilities of interagency team members and to examine how individual members communicate within a complex, evolving, and unstable environment. It is also important to understand how different organisational identities and their spatial geographies contribute to the interactional dynamics. Earthquakes hit the Canterbury region on September, 2010 and then on February 2011 a more devastating shallow earthquake struck resulting in severe damage to the Aged Residential Care (ARC) sector. Over 600 ARC beds were lost and 500 elderly and disabled people were displaced. Canterbury District Health Board (CDHB) set up an interagency emergency response team to address the issues of vulnerable people with significant health and disability needs who were unable to access their normal supports due to the effects of the earthquake. The purpose of this qualitative interpretive study is to focus on the case study of the response and evacuation of vulnerable people by interagencies responding to the event. Staff within these agencies were interviewed with a focus on the critical incidents that either stabilised or negatively influenced the outcome of the response. The findings included the complexity of navigating multiple agencies communication channels; understanding the different hierarchies and communication methods within each agency; data communication challenges when infrastructures were severely damaged; the importance of having the right skills, personal attributes and understanding of the organisations in the response; and the significance of having a liaison in situ representing and communicating through to agencies geographically dispersed from Canterbury. It is hoped that this research will assist in determining a future framework for interagency communication best practice and policy.
Whole document is available to authenticated members of The University of Auckland until Feb. 2014 The increasing scale of losses from earthquake disasters has reinforced the need for property owners to become proactive in seismic risk reduction programs. However, despite advancement in seismic design methods and legislative frameworks, building owners are often reluctant to adopt mitigation measures required to reduce earthquake losses. The magnitude of building collapses from the recent Christchurch earthquakes in New Zealand shows that owners of earthquake prone buildings (EPBs) are not adopting appropriate risk mitigation measures in their buildings. Owners of EPBs are found unwilling or lack motivation to adopt adequate mitigation measures that will reduce their vulnerability to seismic risks. This research investigates how to increase the likelihood of building owners undertaking appropriate mitigation actions that will reduce their vulnerability to earthquake disaster. A sequential two-phase mixed methods approach was adopted for the research investigation. Multiple case studies approach was adopted in the first qualitative phase, followed by the second quantitative research phase that includes the development and testing of a framework. The research findings reveal four categories of critical obstacles to building owners‘ decision to adopt earthquake loss prevention measures. These obstacles include perception, sociological, economic and institutional impediments. Intrinsic and extrinsic interventions are proposed as incentives for overcoming these barriers. The intrinsic motivators include using information communication networks such as mass media, policy entrepreneurs and community engagement in risk mitigation. Extrinsic motivators comprise the use of four groups of incentives namely; financial, regulatory, technological and property market incentives. These intrinsic and extrinsic interventions are essential for enhancing property owners‘ decisions to voluntarily adopt appropriate earthquake mitigation measures. The study concludes by providing specific recommendations that earthquake risk mitigation managers, city councils and stakeholders involved in risk mitigation in New Zealand and other seismic risk vulnerable countries could consider in earthquake risk management. Local authorities could adopt the framework developed in this study to demonstrate a combination of incentives and motivators that yield best-valued outcomes. Consequently, actions can be more specific and outcomes more effective. The implementation of these recommendations could offer greater reasons for the stakeholders and public to invest in building New Zealand‘s built environment resilience to earthquake disasters
Six months after the 4 September 2010 Mw 7.1 Darfield (Canterbury) earthquake, a Mw 6.2 Christchurch (Lyttelton) aftershock struck Christchurch on the 22 February 2011. This earthquake was centred approximately 10km south-east of the Christchurch CBD at a shallow depth of 5km, resulting in intense seismic shaking within the Christchurch central business district (CBD). Unlike the 4 Sept earthquake when limited-to-moderate damage was observed in engineered reinforced concrete (RC) buildings [35], in the 22 February event a high number of RC Buildings in the Christchurch CBD (16.2 % out of 833) were severely damaged. There were 182 fatalities, 135 of which were the unfortunate consequences of the complete collapse of two mid-rise RC buildings. This paper describes immediate observations of damage to RC buildings in the 22 February 2011 Christchurch earthquake. Some preliminary lessons are highlighted and discussed in light of the observed performance of the RC building stock. Damage statistics and typical damage patterns are presented for various configurations and lateral resisting systems. Data was collated predominantly from first-hand post-earthquake reconnaissance observations by the authors, complemented with detailed assessment of the structural drawings of critical buildings and the observed behaviour. Overall, the 22 February 2011 Mw 6.2 Christchurch earthquake was a particularly severe test for both modern seismically-designed and existing non-ductile RC buildings. The sequence of earthquakes since the 4 Sept 2010, particularly the 22 Feb event has confirmed old lessons and brought to life new critical ones, highlighting some urgent action required to remedy structural deficiencies in both existing and “modern” buildings. Given the major social and economic impact of the earthquakes to a country with strong seismic engineering tradition, no doubt some aspects of the seismic design will be improved based on the lessons from Christchurch. The bar needs to and can be raised, starting with a strong endorsement of new damage-resisting, whilst cost-efficient, technologies as well as the strict enforcement, including financial incentives, of active policies for the seismic retrofit of existing buildings at a national scale.