The region in and around Christchurch, encompassing Christchurch city and the Selwyn and Waimakariri districts, contains more than 800 road, rail, and pedestrian bridges. Most of these bridges are reinforced concrete, symmetric, and have small to moderate spans (15–25 m). The 22 February 2011 moment magnitude (Mw) 6.2 Christchurch earthquake induced high levels of localized ground shaking (Bradley and Cubrinovski 2011, page 853 of this issue; Guidotti et al. 2011, page 767 of this issue; Smyrou et al. 2011, page 882 of this issue), with damage to bridges mainly confined to the central and eastern parts of Christchurch. Liquefaction was evident over much of this part of the city, with lateral spreading affecting bridges spanning both the Avon and Heathcote rivers.
This paper describes pounding damage sustained by buildings and bridges in the February 2011 Christchurch earthquake. Approximately 6% of buildings in Christchurch CBD were observed to have suffered some form of serious pounding damage. Almost all of this pounding damage occurred in masonry buildings, further highlighting their vulnerability to this phenomenon. Modern buildings were found to be vulnerable to pounding damage where overly stiff and strong ‘flashing’ components were installed in existing building separations. Soil variability is identified as a key aspect that amplifies the relative movement of buildings, and hence increases the likelihood of pounding damage. Pounding damage in bridges was found to be relatively minor and infrequent in the Christchurch earthquake.
There is a critical strand of literature suggesting that there are no ‘natural’ disasters (Abramovitz, 2001; Anderson and Woodrow, 1998; Clarke, 2008; Hinchliffe, 2004). There are only those that leave us – the people - more or less shaken and disturbed. There may be some substance to this; for example, how many readers recall the 7.8 magnitude earthquake centred in Fiordland in July 2009? Because it was so far away from a major centre and very few people suffered any consequences, the number is likely to be far fewer than those who remember (all too vividly) the relatively smaller 7.1 magnitude Canterbury quake of September 4th 2010 and the more recent 6.3 magnitude February 22nd 2011 event.
One implication of this construction of disasters is that seismic events, like those in Canterbury, are as much socio-political as they are geological. Yet, as this paper shows, the temptation in recovery is to tick boxes and rebuild rather than recover, and to focus on hard infrastructure rather than civic expertise and community involvement. In this paper I draw upon different models of community engagement and use Putnam’s (1995) notion of ‘social capital’ to frame the argument that ‘building bridges’ after a disaster is a complex blend of engineering, communication and collaboration. I then present the results of a qualitative research project undertaken after the September 4th earthquake. This research helps to illustrate the important connections between technical rebuilding, social capital, recovery processes and overall urban resilience.
The 22 February 2011, Mw6.2-6.3 Christchurch earthquake is the most costly earthquake to affect New Zealand, causing 181 fatalities and severely damaging thousands of residential and commercial buildings, and most of the city lifelines and infrastructure. This manuscript presents an overview of observed geotechnical aspects of this earthquake as well as some of the completed and on-going research investigations. A unique aspect, which is particularly emphasized, is the severity and spatial extent of liquefaction occurring in native soils. Overall, both the spatial extent and severity of liquefaction in the city was greater than in the preceding 4th September 2010 Darfield earthquake, including numerous areas that liquefied in both events. Liquefaction and lateral spreading, variable over both large and short spatial scales, affected commercial structures in the Central Business District (CBD) in a variety of ways including: total and differential settlements and tilting; punching settlements of structures with shallow foundations; differential movements of components of complex structures; and interaction of adjacent structures via common foundation soils. Liquefaction was most severe in residential areas located to the east of the CBD as a result of stronger ground shaking due to the proximity to the causative fault, a high water table approximately 1m from the surface, and soils with composition and states of high susceptibility and potential for liquefaction. Total and differential settlements, and lateral movements, due to liquefaction and lateral spreading is estimated to have severely compromised 15,000 residential structures, the majority of which otherwise sustained only minor to moderate damage directly due to inertial loading from ground shaking. Liquefaction also had a profound effect on lifelines and other infrastructure, particularly bridge structures, and underground services. Minor damage was also observed at flood stop banks to the north of the city, which were more severely impacted in the 4th September 2010 Darfield earthquake. Due to the large high-frequency ground motion in the Port hills numerous rock falls and landslides also occurred, resulting in several fatalities and rendering some residential areas uninhabitable.
