This study explores the nature of smaller businesses’ resilience following two major earthquakes that severely disrupted their place of doing business. Data from the owners of ten smaller businesses are qualitative and longitudinal, spanning the period 2011 through 2018, providing first-hand narrative accounts of their responses in the earthquakes’ aftermath. All ten owners showed some individual resilience; six businesses survived through to 2018, of which three have recovered strongly. All three owned their premises; operated business-tobusiness models; and were able to adapt and continue to follow path-extension strategies. All the other businesses had direct business-to-customer models operating from leased premises, typically in major retail malls. Four eventually recognised path-exhaustion at different times and so did not survive through to 2018. We conclude however that post-disaster recovery is best explained in terms of business model resilience. Even the most resilient of individual owners will struggle to survive if their business model is either not resilient or cannot be made so. Individual resilience is necessary but not sufficient.
Following the recent earthquakes in Chile (2010) and New Zealand (2010/2011), peculiar failure modes were observed in Reinforced Concrete (RC) walls. These observations have raised a global concern on the contribution of bi-directional loading to these failure mechanisms. One of the failure modes that could potentially result from bidirectional excitations is out-of-plane shear failure. In this paper an overview of the recent experimental and numerical findings regarding out-of-plane shear failure in RC walls are presented. The numerical study presents the Finite Element (FE) simulation of wall D5-6 from the Grand Chancellor Hotel that failed in shear in the out-of-plane direction in the February 2011 Christchurch earthquake. The main objective of the numerical study was to investigate the reasons for this failure mode. The experimental campaign includes the recent experiments conducted in the Structural Engineering Laboratory of the University of Canterbury. The experimental study included three rectangular slender RC walls designed based on NZS3101: 2006-A3 (2017) for three different ductility levels, namely: nominally ductile, limited ductile and ductile. The numerical results showed that high axial load combined with bi-directional loading caused the out-of-plane shear failure in wall D5-6 from the Grand Chancellor Hotel. This was also confirmed and further investigated in the experimental phase of the study.
The extent of liquefaction in the eastern suburbs of Christchurch (Aranui, Bexley, Avonside, Avonhead and Dallington) from the February 22 2011 Earthquake resulted in extensive damage to in-ground waste water pipe systems. This caused a huge demand for portable toilets (or port-a-loos) and companies were importing them from outside Canterbury and in some instances from Australia. However, because they were deemed “assets of importance” under legislation, their allocation had to be coordinated by Civil Defence and Emergency Management (CDEM). Consequently, companies supplying them had to ignore requests from residents, businesses and rest homes; and commitments to large events outside of the city such as the Hamilton 400 V8 Supercars and the Pasifika Festival in Auckland were impacted. Frustrations started to show as neighbourhoods questioned the equity of the port-a-loos distribution. The Prime Minister was reported as reassuring citizens in the eastern suburbs in the first week of March that1 “a report about the distribution of port-a-loos and chemical toilets shows allocation has been fair. Key said he has asked Civil Defence about the distribution process and where the toilets been sent. He said there aren’t enough for the scale of the event but that is quickly being rectified and the need for toilets is being reassessed all the time.” Nonetheless, there still remained a deep sense of frustration and exclusion over the equity of the port-a-loos distribution. This study took the simple approach of mapping where those port-a-loos were on 11-12 March for several areas in the eastern suburbs and this suggested that their distribution was not equitable and was not well done. It reviews the predictive tools available for estimating damage to waste water pipes and asks the question could this situation have been better planned so that pot-a-loo locations could have been better prioritised? And finally it reviews the integral roles of communication and monitoring as part of disaster management strategy. The impression from this study is that other New Zealand urban centres could or would also be at risk and that work is need to developed more rational management approaches for disaster planning.
