In this paper, we consider how religious leaders and Civil Defence authorities might collaborate to establish a two-way information conduit during the aftermath of a disaster. Using surveys and in-person interviews, clergy in different Christian denominations were asked about their roles in the earthquake, the needs of their congregations and the possibilities and obstacles to deeper collaboration with Civil Defence authorities.
The extent of liquefaction in the eastern suburbs of Christchurch (Aranui, Bexley, Avonside, Avonhead and Dallington) from the February 22 2011 Earthquake resulted in extensive damage to in-ground waste water pipe systems. This caused a huge demand for portable toilets (or port-a-loos) and companies were importing them from outside Canterbury and in some instances from Australia. However, because they were deemed “assets of importance” under legislation, their allocation had to be coordinated by Civil Defence and Emergency Management (CDEM). Consequently, companies supplying them had to ignore requests from residents, businesses and rest homes; and commitments to large events outside of the city such as the Hamilton 400 V8 Supercars and the Pasifika Festival in Auckland were impacted. Frustrations started to show as neighbourhoods questioned the equity of the port-a-loos distribution. The Prime Minister was reported as reassuring citizens in the eastern suburbs in the first week of March that1 “a report about the distribution of port-a-loos and chemical toilets shows allocation has been fair. Key said he has asked Civil Defence about the distribution process and where the toilets been sent. He said there aren’t enough for the scale of the event but that is quickly being rectified and the need for toilets is being reassessed all the time.” Nonetheless, there still remained a deep sense of frustration and exclusion over the equity of the port-a-loos distribution. This study took the simple approach of mapping where those port-a-loos were on 11-12 March for several areas in the eastern suburbs and this suggested that their distribution was not equitable and was not well done. It reviews the predictive tools available for estimating damage to waste water pipes and asks the question could this situation have been better planned so that pot-a-loo locations could have been better prioritised? And finally it reviews the integral roles of communication and monitoring as part of disaster management strategy. The impression from this study is that other New Zealand urban centres could or would also be at risk and that work is need to developed more rational management approaches for disaster planning.
This study followed two similarly affected, but socio-economically disparate suburbs as residents responded to and attempted to recover from the devastating 6.3 magnitude earthquake that struck Christchurch, New Zealand, on February 22, 2011. More specifically, it focuses on the role of local churches, community-based organisations (CBOs) and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), here referred to broadly as civil society, in meeting the immediate needs of local residents and assisting with the longer-term recovery of each neighbourhood. Despite considerable socioeconomic differences between the two neighbourhoods, civil society in both suburbs has been vital in addressing the needs of locals in the short and long term following the earthquake. Institutions were able to utilise local knowledge of both residents and the extent of damage in the area to a) provide a swifter local response than government or civil defence and then help direct the relief these agencies provided locally; b) set up central points for distribution of supplies and information where locals would naturally gather; c) take action on what were perceived to be unmet needs; and d) act as a way of bridging locals to a variety of material, informational, and emotional resources. However the findings also support literature which indicates that other factors are also important in understanding neighbourhood recovery and the role of civil society, including: local leadership; a shared, place-based identity; the type and form of civil society organizations; social capital; and neighbourhood- and household-level indicators of relative vulnerability and inequality. The intertwining of these various factors seems to influence how these neighbourhoods have coped with and taken steps in recovering from this disaster. It is recommended that future research be directed at developing a better understanding of how this occurs. It is suggested that a model similar to Yasui’s (2007) Community Vulnerability and Capacity model be developed as a useful way to approach future research in this area.
At 00:02 on 14th November 2016, a Mw 7.8 earthquake occurred in and offshore of the northeast of the South Island of New Zealand. Fault rupture, ground shaking, liquefaction, and co-seismic landslides caused severe damage to distributed infrastructure, and particularly transportation networks; large segments of the country’s main highway, State Highway 1 (SH1), and the Main North Line (MNL) railway line, were damaged between Picton and Christchurch. The damage caused direct local impacts, including isolation of communities, and wider regional impacts, including disruption of supply chains. Adaptive measures have ensured immediate continued regional transport of goods and people. Air and sea transport increased quickly, both for emergency response and to ensure routine transport of goods. Road diversions have also allowed critical connections to remain operable. This effective response to regional transport challenges allowed Civil Defence Emergency Management to quickly prioritise access to isolated settlements, all of which had road access 23 days after the earthquake. However, 100 days after the earthquake, critical segments of SH1 and the MNL remain closed and their ongoing repairs are a serious national strategic, as well as local, concern. This paper presents the impacts on South Island transport infrastructure, and subsequent management through the emergency response and early recovery phases, during the first 100 days following the initial earthquake, and highlights lessons for transportation system resilience.
In response to the February 2011 earthquake, Parliament enacted the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Act. This emergency legislation provided the executive with extreme powers that extended well beyond the initial emergency response and into the recovery phase. Although New Zealand has the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002, it was unable to cope with the scale and intensity of the Canterbury earthquake sequence. Considering the well-known geological risk facing the Wellington region, this paper will consider whether a standalone “Disaster Recovery Act” should be established to separate an emergency and its response from the recovery phase. Currently, Government policy is to respond reactively to a disaster rather than proactively. In a major event, this typically involves the executive being given the ability to make rules, regulations and policy without the delay or oversight of normal legislative process. In the first part of this paper, I will canvas what a “Disaster Recovery Act” could prescribe and why there is a need to separate recovery from emergency. Secondly, I will consider the shortfalls in the current civil defence recovery framework which necessitates this kind of heavy governmental response after a disaster. In the final section, I will examine how
Though there is a broad consensus that communities play a key role in disaster response and recovery, most of the existing work in this area focuses on the activities of donor agencies, formal civil defence authorities, and local/central government. Consequently, there is a paucity of research addressing the on-going actions and activities undertaken by communities and ‘emergent groups’ , particularly as they develop after the immediate civil defence or ‘response’ phase is over. In an attempt to address this gap, this inventory of community-led recovery initiatives was undertaken approximately one year after the most devastating February 2011 earthquake. It is part of on-going project at Lincoln University documenting – and seeking a better understanding of - various emergent communities’ roles in recovery, their challenges, and strategies for overcoming them. This larger project also seeks to better understand how collaborative work between informal and formal recovery efforts might be facilitated at different stages of the process. This inventory was conducted over the December 2011 – February 2012 period and builds on Landcare Research’s Christchurch Earthquake Activity Inventory which was a similar snapshot taken in April 2011. The intention behind conducting this updated inventory is to gain a longitudinal perspective of how community-led recovery activities evolve over time. Each entry is ordered alphabetically and contact details have been provided where possible. A series of keywords have also been assigned that describe the main attributes of each activity to assist searches within this document.
In this dissertation it is argued that the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Act 2011 and the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority were both necessary and inevitable given the trends and traditions of civil defence emergency management (CDEM) in New Zealand. The trends and traditions of civil defence are such that principles come before practice, form before function, and change is primarily brought about through crisis and criticism. The guiding question of the research was why were a new governance system and law made after the Canterbury earthquakes in 2010 and 2011? Why did this outcome occur despite the establishment of a modern emergency management system in 2002 which included a recovery framework that had been praised by international scholars as leading edge and a model for other countries? The official reason was the unprecedented scale and demands of the recovery – but a disaster of such scale is the principle reason for having a national emergency management system. Another explanation is the lack of cooperation among local authorities – but that raises the question of whether the CDEM recovery framework would have been successful in another locality. Consequentially, the focus of this dissertation is on the CDEM recovery framework and how New Zealand came to find itself making disaster law during a disaster. Recommendations include a review of emergency powers for recovery, a review of the capabilities needed to fulfil the mandate of Recovery Managers, and the establishment of a National Recovery Office with a cadre of Recovery Managers that attend every recovery to observe, advise, or assume control as needed. CDEM Group Recovery Managers would be seconded to the National Recovery Office which would allow for experience in recovery management to be developed and institutionalised through regular practice.
At 00:02 on 14th November 2016, a Mw 7.8 earthquake occurred in and offshore of the northeast of the South Island of New Zealand. Fault rupture, ground shaking, liquefaction, and co-seismic landslides caused severe damage to distributed infrastructure, and particularly transportation networks; large segments of the country’s main highway, State Highway 1 (SH1), and the Main North Line (MNL) railway line, were damaged between Picton and Christchurch. The damage caused direct local impacts, including isolation of communities, and wider regional impacts, including disruption of supply chains. Adaptive measures have ensured immediate continued regional transport of goods and people. Air and sea transport increased quickly, both for emergency response and to ensure routine transport of goods. Road diversions have also allowed critical connections to remain operable. This effective response to regional transport challenges allowed Civil Defence Emergency Management to quickly prioritise access to isolated settlements, all of which had road access 23 days after the earthquake. However, 100 days after the earthquake, critical segments of SH1 and the MNL remain closed and their ongoing repairs are a serious national strategic, as well as local, concern. This paper presents the impacts on South Island transport infrastructure, and subsequent management through the emergency response and early recovery phases, during the first 100 days following the initial earthquake, and highlights lessons for transportation system resilience.
Two days after the 22 February 2011 M6.3 earthquake in Christchurch, New Zealand, three of the authors conducted a transect of the central city, with the goal of deriving an estimate of building damage levels. Although smaller in magnitude than the M7.1 4 September 2010 Darfield earthquake, the ground accelerations, ground deformation and damage levels in Christchurch central city were more severe in February 2011, and the central city was closed down to the general public. Written and photographic notes of 295 buildings were taken, including construction type, damage level, and whether the building would likely need to be demolished. The results of the transect compared favourably to Civil Defence rapid assessments made over the following month. Now, more than one year and two major aftershocks after the February 2011 earthquake these initial estimates are compared to the current demolition status to provide an updated understanding of the state of central Christchurch.
Geological research in the immediate aftermath of the 2016 Kaikōura Earthquake, New Zealand, was necessary due to the importance and perishability of field data. It also reflects a real desire on the part of researchers to contribute not only to immediate scientific understanding but also to the societal recovery effort by enhancing knowledge of the event for the benefit of affected communities, civil defence organizations and regional and national decision makers. This commitment to outreach and engagement is consistent with the recent IAPG statement of Geoethics. More immediately, it was informed by experience of the 2010-2011 Canterbury Earthquake sequence. After that earlier disaster, intense interactions between researchers and various response agencies as well as local communities informed the development and dissemination of a set of ethical guidelines for researchers immediately following the Mw7.8 14 November 2016 Kaikōura Earthquake. In this presentation, I argue that ethical engagement of this kind is the key to gathering high quality research data immediately after the event. Creating trusting and mutually respectful, mutually beneficial relationships is also vital to ongoing engagement to facilitate further “in depth” research in collaboration with communities.
On September the 4th 2010 and February 22nd 2011 the Canterbury region of New Zealand was shaken by two massive earthquakes. This paper is set broadly within the civil defence and emergency management literature and informed by recent work on community participation and social capital in the building of resilient cities. Work in this area indicates a need to recognise both the formal institutional response to the earthquakes as well as the substantive role communities play in their own recovery. The range of factors that facilitate or hinder community involvement also needs to be better understood. This paper interrogates the assumption that recovery agencies and officials are both willing and able to engage communities who are themselves willing and able to be engaged in accordance with recovery best practice. Case studies of three community groups – CanCERN, Greening the Rubble and Gap Filler – illustrate some of the difficulties associated with becoming a community during the disaster recovery phase. Based on my own observations and experiences, combined with data from approximately 50 in-depth interviews with Christchurch residents and representatives from community groups, the Christchurch City Council, the Earthquake Commission and so on, this paper outlines some practical strategies emerging communities may use in the early disaster recovery phase that then strengthens their ability to ‘participate’ in the recovery process.
In 2010 and 2011, Aotearoa New Zealand was hit by a number of major disasters involving loss of human life and severe disruption to social, ecological and economic wellbeing. The Pike River mine explosions were closely followed by a sequence of major earthquakes in Christchurch, seismic events that have permanently altered the lives of thousands of people in our third largest city, the closure of the central business district and the effective abandonment of whole residential areas. In early October 2011, the ship, Rena, grounded on a reef off the port of Tauranga and threatened a major oil spill throughout the Bay of Plenty, where local communities with spiritual and cultural connections to the land depend on sea food as well as thrive on tourism. The Council for Social Work Education Aotearoa New Zealand (CSWEANZ), representing all the Schools of Social Work in New Zealand, held a ‘Disaster Curriculum’ day in November 2011, at which social workers and Civil Defence leaders involved in the Christchurch earthquakes, the Rena Disaster, Fiji floods and the Boxing Day tsunami presented their narrative experience of disaster response and recovery. Workshops discussed and identified core elements that participants considered vital to a social work curriculum that would enable social work graduates in a range of community and cultural settings to respond in safe, creative and informed ways. We present our core ideas for a social work disaster curriculum and consider a wide range of educational content based on existing knowledge bases and new content within a disaster framework. http://www.swsd-stockholm-2012.org/
Wellington is located on a fault line which will inevitably, one day be impacted by a big earthquake. Due to where this fault line geographically sits, the central city and southern suburbs may be cut off from the rest of the region, effectively making these areas an ‘island’. This issue has absorbed a lot of attention, in particular at a large scale by many different fields: civil engineering, architecture, infrastructure planning & design, policymaking. Due to heightened awareness, and evolved school of practice, contemporary landscape architects deal with post-disaster design – Christchurch, NZ has seen this. A number of landscape architects work with nature, following increased application of ecological urbanism, and natural systems thinking, most notably at larger scales. To create parks that are designed to flood, or implement projects to protect shorelines. A form of resilience less often considered is how design for the small scale - people’s 1:1 relationship with their immediate context in exterior space - can be influential in forming a resilient response to the catastrophe of a major earthquake. This thesis intends to provide a response to address the shift of scales, as a paradigm for preparation and recovery. After a large-scale earthquake, state and civic policies and agencies may or subsequentially not go into action. The most important thinking and acting will be what happens in the minds, and the immediate needs, of each and every person; and how they act communally. This is considered in general social terms in state and civic education programmes of civil defence, for example, but much less considered in how the physical design of the actual spaces we inhabit day-to-day can educate us to be mentally prepared to help each other survive a catastrophe. Specifically, the identification of design of typologies can provide these educative functions. Typology inherently a physical form or manipulation of a generic and substantial prototype applicable in contexts is something that exists in the mind. Working with the physical and social appearance and experience of typologies can also/will change people’s minds. Socially, and economically driven, the community-building power of community gardening is well-proven and documented, and a noticeably large part of contemporary landscape architecture. The designs of this thesis will focus on community gardening specifically to form typologies of resilience preparation and response to disaster. The foundation will remain at the small scale of the local community. The specific question this thesis poses: Can we design local typologies in landscape architecture to integrate community gardens, with public space by preparing for and acting as recovery from a disaster?
There is strong consensus in the civil defence and emergency management literature that public participation is essential for a 'good' recovery. However, there is a paucity of research detailing how this community-led planning should be carried out in the real world. There are few processes or timelines for communities to follow when wanting to plan for themselves, nor is there a great deal of advice for communities who want to plan for their own recovery. In short, despite this consensus that community involvement is desireable, there is very little information available as to the nature of this involvement or how communities might facilitate this. It is simply assumed that communities are willing and able to participate in the recovery process and that recovery authorities will welcome, encourage, and enable this participation. This is not always the case, and the result is that community groups can be left feeling lost and ineffective when trying to plan for their own recovery. In attempting to address this gap, my study contributes to a better understanding of community involvement in recovery planning, based on research with on particular a community group (SPRIG), who has undertaken their own form of community-led planning in a post-disaster environment. Through group observations and in-depth interviews with members of SPRIG, I was able to identify various roles for such groups in the post-disaster recovery process. My research also contributes to an enhanced understanding of the process a community group might follow to implement their own form of post-disaster recovery planning, with the main point being that any planning should be done side by side with local authorities. Finally, I discovered that a community group will face organisational, community and institutional challenges when trying to plan for their area; however, despite these challenges, opportunities exist, such as the chance to build a better future.
Case study analysis of the 2010-2011 Canterbury Earthquake Sequence (CES), which particularly impacted Christchurch City, New Zealand, has highlighted the value of practical, standardised and coordinated post-earthquake geotechnical response guidelines for earthquake-induced landslides in urban areas. The 22nd February 2011 earthquake, the second largest magnitude event in the CES, initiated a series of rockfall, cliff collapse and loess failures around the Port Hills which severely impacted the south-eastern part of Christchurch. The extensive slope failure induced by the 22nd February 200 earthquake was unprecedented; and ground motions experienced significantly exceeded the probabilistic seismic hazard model for Canterbury. Earthquake-induced landslides initiated by the 22nd February 2011 earthquake posed risk to life safety, and caused widespread damage to dwellings and critical infrastructure. In the immediate aftermath of the 22nd February 2011 earthquake, the geotechnical community responded by deploying into the Port Hills to conduct assessment of slope failure hazards and life safety risk. Coordination within the voluntary geotechnical response group evolved rapidly within the first week post-earthquake. The lack of pre-event planning to guide coordinated geotechnical response hindered the execution of timely and transparent management of life safety risk from coseismic landslides in the initial week after the earthquake. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with municipal, management and operational organisations involved in the geotechnical response during the CES. Analysis of interview dialogue highlighted the temporal evolution of priorities and tasks during emergency response to coseismic slope failure, which was further developed into a phased conceptual model to inform future geotechnical response. Review of geotechnical responses to selected historical earthquakes (Northridge, 1994; Chi-Chi, 1999; Wenchuan, 2008) has enabled comparison between international practice and local response strategies, and has emphasised the value of pre-earthquake preparation, indicating the importance of integration of geotechnical response within national emergency management plans. Furthermore, analysis of the CES and international earthquakes has informed pragmatic recommendations for future response to coseismic slope failure. Recommendations for future response to earthquake-induced landslides presented in this thesis include: the integration of post-earthquake geotechnical response with national Civil Defence and Emergency Management; pre-earthquake development of an adaptive management structure and standard slope assessment format for geotechnical response; and emergency management training for geotechnical professionals. Post-earthquake response recommendations include the development of geographic sectors within the area impacted by coseismic slope failure, and the development of a GIS database for analysis and management of data collected during ground reconnaissance. Recommendations provided in this thesis aim to inform development of national guidelines for geotechnical response to earthquake-induced landslides in New Zealand, and prompt debate concerning international best practice.
