Disasters can create the equivalent of 20 years of waste in only a few days. Disaster waste can have direct impacts on public health and safety, and on the environment. The management of such waste has a great direct cost to society in terms of labor, equipment, processing, transport and disposal. Disaster waste management also has indirect costs, in the sense that slow management can slow down a recovery, greatly affecting the ability of commerce and industry to re-start. In addition, a disaster can lead to the disruption of normal solid waste management systems, or result in inappropriate management that leads to expensive environmental remediation. Finally, there are social impacts implicit in disaster waste management decisions because of psychological impact we expect when waste is not cleared quickly or is cleared too quickly. The paper gives an overview of the challenge of disaster waste management, examining issues of waste quantity and composition; waste treatment; environmental, economic, and social impacts; health and safety matters; and planning. Christchurch, New Zealand, and the broader region of Canterbury were impacted during this research by a series of shallow earthquakes. This has led to the largest natural disaster emergency in New Zealand’s history, and the management of approximately 8 million tons of building and infrastructure debris has become a major issue. The paper provides an overview of the status of disaster waste management in Christchurch as a case study. A key conclusion is the vital role of planning in effective disaster waste management. In spite of the frequency of disasters, in most countries the ratio of time spent on planning for disaster waste management to the time spent on normal waste management is extremely low. Disaster waste management also requires improved education or training of those involved in response efforts. All solid waste professionals have a role to play to respond to the challenges of disaster waste management.
The region in and around Christchurch, encompassing Christchurch city and the Selwyn and Waimakariri districts, contains more than 800 road, rail, and pedestrian bridges. Most of these bridges are reinforced concrete, symmetric, and have small to moderate spans (15–25 m). The 22 February 2011 moment magnitude (Mw) 6.2 Christchurch earthquake induced high levels of localized ground shaking (Bradley and Cubrinovski 2011, page 853 of this issue; Guidotti et al. 2011, page 767 of this issue; Smyrou et al. 2011, page 882 of this issue), with damage to bridges mainly confined to the central and eastern parts of Christchurch. Liquefaction was evident over much of this part of the city, with lateral spreading affecting bridges spanning both the Avon and Heathcote rivers.
An often overlooked aspect of urban housing development is the composition of the space between buildings; the streetscape. The pressures of suppressing suburban sprawl have seen housing developments respond by increasing residential density within more centralised city sites. Medium-density housing typologies are often used as urban infill in response to the challenge of accommodating an increasing population. A by-product of these renewed areas is the creation of new open space which serves as the fundamental public space for sociability to develop in communities. Street space should emphasise this public expression by encouraging social exchange and interaction. As a result, a neighbourhood owes its liveliness (or lack thereof) to its streets. The issue of density when applied to the urban housing landscape encompasses two major components: the occupancy of both the private realms, constituting the residential built form, and the public spaces that adjoins them, the streets. STREETSCAPE: dialogues of street + house. Continual transition between the realms of public and private (building and street space) enact active edges, giving way to public stimulation; the opportunity for experiencing other people. The advent of seeing and hearing other people in connection with daily comings and goings encourages social events to evolve, enhancing the notion of neighbourly conduct. Within New Zealand, and specifically in Christchurch as considered here, the compositions of current streetscapes lack the demeanor to really encourage and facilitate the idea of neighbourly interaction and public expression. Here lies the potential for new street design to significantly heighten the interplay of human activity. In response, this research project operates under the notion that the street spaces of urban residential areas are largely underutilised. This lack is particularly evident in the street. Street design should strive to produce spaces which stimulate the public life of residents. There exists a need to reassert eminence of the street as a space for vibrant neighbourhood life. This thesis employs design as a tool for researching and will involve using numerous concept generators to trigger the production of multiple scenarios. These scenarios are to explore the ways in which the streetscapes within medium-density urban communities could respond in the event of (re) development.
Earthquakes and other major disasters present communities and their authorities with an extraordinary challenge. While a lot can be done to prepare a city’s response in the event of a disaster, few cities are truly prepared for the initial impact, devastation, grief, and the seemingly formidable challenge of recovery. Many people find themselves overwhelmed with facing critical problems; ones which they have often never had experience with before. While the simple part is agreeing on a desired outcome for recovery, it appears the argument that exists between stakeholders is the conflicting ideas of How To effectively achieve the main objective. What I have identified as an important step toward collaborating on the How To of recovery is to identify the ways in which each discipline can most effectively contribute to the recovery. Landscape architecture is just one of the many disciplines (that should be) invovled in the How To of earthquake recovery. Canterbury has an incredible opportunity to set the benchmark for good practice in earthquake recovery. To make the most of this opportuntiy, it is critical that landscape architects are more effectively engaged in roles of recovery across a much broader spectrum of recovery activities. The overarching purpose of this research is to explore and provide insight to the current and potential of landscape architects in the earthquake recovery period in Canterbury, using international good practice as a benchmark. The research is aimed at stimulating and guiding landscape architects dealing with the earthquake recovery in Canterbury, while informing stakeholders: emergency managers, authorities, other disciplines and the wider community of themost effective role(s) for landscape architects in the recovery period.
This paper describes the performance of (or damage to) ceilings in buildings during the 22nd February 2011 Christchurch earthquake and the subsequent aftershocks. In buildings that suffered severe structural damage, ceilings and other non-structural components (rather expectedly) failed, but even in buildings with little damage to their structural systems, ceilings were found to be severely damaged. The extent of ceiling damage, where the ceilings were subject to severe shaking, depended on the type of the ceiling system, the size and weight of the ceilings and the interaction of ceilings with other elements. The varieties and extent of observed ceiling damage are discussed in this paper with the help of photographs taken after the earthquake.
The 22 February 2011, Mw6.2-6.3 Christchurch earthquake is the most costly earthquake to affect New Zealand, causing 181 fatalities and severely damaging thousands of residential and commercial buildings, and most of the city lifelines and infrastructure. This manuscript presents an overview of observed geotechnical aspects of this earthquake as well as some of the completed and on-going research investigations. A unique aspect, which is particularly emphasized, is the severity and spatial extent of liquefaction occurring in native soils. Overall, both the spatial extent and severity of liquefaction in the city was greater than in the preceding 4th September 2010 Darfield earthquake, including numerous areas that liquefied in both events. Liquefaction and lateral spreading, variable over both large and short spatial scales, affected commercial structures in the Central Business District (CBD) in a variety of ways including: total and differential settlements and tilting; punching settlements of structures with shallow foundations; differential movements of components of complex structures; and interaction of adjacent structures via common foundation soils. Liquefaction was most severe in residential areas located to the east of the CBD as a result of stronger ground shaking due to the proximity to the causative fault, a high water table approximately 1m from the surface, and soils with composition and states of high susceptibility and potential for liquefaction. Total and differential settlements, and lateral movements, due to liquefaction and lateral spreading is estimated to have severely compromised 15,000 residential structures, the majority of which otherwise sustained only minor to moderate damage directly due to inertial loading from ground shaking. Liquefaction also had a profound effect on lifelines and other infrastructure, particularly bridge structures, and underground services. Minor damage was also observed at flood stop banks to the north of the city, which were more severely impacted in the 4th September 2010 Darfield earthquake. Due to the large high-frequency ground motion in the Port hills numerous rock falls and landslides also occurred, resulting in several fatalities and rendering some residential areas uninhabitable.
This paper describes pounding damage sustained by buildings and bridges in the February 2011 Christchurch earthquake. Approximately 6% of buildings in Christchurch CBD were observed to have suffered some form of serious pounding damage. Almost all of this pounding damage occurred in masonry buildings, further highlighting their vulnerability to this phenomenon. Modern buildings were found to be vulnerable to pounding damage where overly stiff and strong ‘flashing’ components were installed in existing building separations. Soil variability is identified as a key aspect that amplifies the relative movement of buildings, and hence increases the likelihood of pounding damage. Pounding damage in bridges was found to be relatively minor and infrequent in the Christchurch earthquake.
Six months after the 4 September 2010 Mw 7.1 Darfield (Canterbury) earthquake, a Mw 6.2 Christchurch (Lyttelton) aftershock struck Christchurch on the 22 February 2011. This earthquake was centred approximately 10km south-east of the Christchurch CBD at a shallow depth of 5km, resulting in intense seismic shaking within the Christchurch central business district (CBD). Unlike the 4 Sept earthquake when limited-to-moderate damage was observed in engineered reinforced concrete (RC) buildings [35], in the 22 February event a high number of RC Buildings in the Christchurch CBD (16.2 % out of 833) were severely damaged. There were 182 fatalities, 135 of which were the unfortunate consequences of the complete collapse of two mid-rise RC buildings. This paper describes immediate observations of damage to RC buildings in the 22 February 2011 Christchurch earthquake. Some preliminary lessons are highlighted and discussed in light of the observed performance of the RC building stock. Damage statistics and typical damage patterns are presented for various configurations and lateral resisting systems. Data was collated predominantly from first-hand post-earthquake reconnaissance observations by the authors, complemented with detailed assessment of the structural drawings of critical buildings and the observed behaviour. Overall, the 22 February 2011 Mw 6.2 Christchurch earthquake was a particularly severe test for both modern seismically-designed and existing non-ductile RC buildings. The sequence of earthquakes since the 4 Sept 2010, particularly the 22 Feb event has confirmed old lessons and brought to life new critical ones, highlighting some urgent action required to remedy structural deficiencies in both existing and “modern” buildings. Given the major social and economic impact of the earthquakes to a country with strong seismic engineering tradition, no doubt some aspects of the seismic design will be improved based on the lessons from Christchurch. The bar needs to and can be raised, starting with a strong endorsement of new damage-resisting, whilst cost-efficient, technologies as well as the strict enforcement, including financial incentives, of active policies for the seismic retrofit of existing buildings at a national scale.
On 22 February 2011，a magnitude Mw 6.3 earthquake occurred with an epicenter located near Lyttelton at about 10km from Christchurch in Canterbury region on the South Island of New Zealand (Figure 1). Since this earthquake occurred in the midst of the aftershock activity which had continued since the 4 September 2010 Darfield Earthquake occurrence, it was considered to be an aftershock of the initial earthquake. Because of the short distance to the city and the shallower depth of the epicenter, this earthquake caused more significant damage to pipelines, traffic facilities, residential houses/properties and multi-story buildings in the central business district than the September 2010 Darfield Earthquake in spite of its smaller earthquake magnitude. Unfortunately, this earthquake resulted in significant number of casualties due to the collapse of multi-story buildings and unreinforced masonry structures in the city center of Christchurch. As of 4 April, 172 casualties were reported and the final death toll is expected to be 181. While it is extremely regrettable that Christchurch suffered a terrible number of victims, civil and geotechnical engineers have this hard-to-find opportunity to learn the response of real ground from two gigantic earthquakes which occurred in less than six months from each other. From geotechnical engineering point of view, it is interesting to discuss the widespread liquefaction in natural sediments, repeated liquefaction within short period and further damage to earth structures which have been damaged in the previous earthquake. Following the earthquake, an intensive geotechnical reconnaissance was conducted to capture evidence and perishable data from this event. The team included the following members: Misko Cubrinovski (University of Canterbury, NZ, Team Leader), Susumu Yasuda (Tokyo Denki University, Japan, JGS Team Leader), Rolando Orense (University of Auckland, NZ), Kohji Tokimatsu (Tokyo Institute of Technology, Japan), Ryosuke Uzuoka (Tokushima University, Japan), Takashi Kiyota (University of Tokyo, Japan), Yasuyo Hosono (Toyohashi University of Technology, Japan) and Suguru Yamada (University of Tokyo, Japan).
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The 48hr Design Challenge, run by the Christchurch City Council and held at Lincoln University, provided an opportunity for Council to gain inspiration from the design and architecture industry, while testing the draft Central City Plan currently being developed. The Challenge was a response to the recent earthquakes in Christchurch and brought together local and international talent. A total of 15 teams took part in the Challenge, with seven people in each including engineers, planners, urban designers, architects and landscape architects, as well as one student on each team. The four sites within the Red Zone included the Cathedral Square and BNZ Building; 160 Gloucester Street; the Orion NZ Building at 203 Gloucester Street; and 90 Armagh Street, including the Avon River and Victoria Square. The fifth site, which sits outside the Red Zone, is the former Christchurch Women’s Hospital at 885 Colombo Street. This is team SoLA's entry for 160 Gloucester Street.
This paper presents preliminary field observations on the performance of selected steel structures in Christchurch during the earthquake series of 2010 to 2011. This comprises 6 damaging earthquakes, on 4 September and 26 December 2010, February 22, June 6 and two on June 13, 2011. Most notable of these was the 4 September event, at Ms7.1 and MM7 (MM as observed in the Christchurch CBD) and most intense was the 22 February event at Ms6.3 and MM9-10 within the CBD. Focus is on performance of concentrically braced frames, eccentrically braced frames, moment resisting frames and industrial storage racks. With a few notable exceptions, steel structures performed well during this earthquake series, to the extent that inelastic deformations were less than what would have been expected given the severity of the recorded strong motions. Some hypotheses are formulated to explain this satisfactory performance. http://db.nzsee.org.nz/SpecialIssue/44%284%290297.pdf
An overview of the 22 February 2011 Christchurch earthquake is presented in the context of characterization of extreme/rare events. Focus is given to the earthquake source, observed near-source strong ground motions, and effects of site response, while structural response and consequences are mentioned for completeness. For each of the above topics comparisons and discussions are made with predictive models for each of phenomena considered. In light of the observations and predictive model comparisons, the author’s opinion on improving the characterization of such extreme/rare events, and their appropriate consideration in seismic design is presented
In the aftermath of the 22 February 2011 earthquake, the Natural Hazards Research Platform (NHRP) initiated a series of Short Term Recovery Projects (STRP) aimed at facilitating and supporting the recovery of Christchurch from the earthquake impacts. This report presents the outcomes of STRP 6: Impacts of Liquefaction on Pipe Networks, which focused on the impacts of liquefaction on the potable water and wastewater systems of Christchurch. The project was a collaborative effort of NHRP researchers with expertise in liquefaction, CCC personnel managing and designing the systems and a geotechnical practitioner with experience/expertise in Christchurch soils and seismic geotechnics.
A magnitude 6.3 earthquake struck the city of Christchurch at 12:51pm on Tuesday 22 February 2011. The earthquake caused 182 fatalities, a large number of injuries, and resulted in widespread damage to the built environment, including significant disruption to the lifelines. The event created the largest lifeline disruption in a New Zealand city in 80 years, with much of the damage resulting from extensive and severe liquefaction in the Christchurch urban area. The Christchurch earthquake occurred when the Canterbury region and its lifelines systems were at the early stage of recovering from the 4 September 2010 Darfield (Canterbury) magnitude 7.1 earthquake. This paper describes the impact of the Christchurch earthquake on lifelines by briefly summarising the physical damage to the networks, the system performance and the operational response during the emergency management and the recovery phase. Special focus is given to the performance and management of the gas, electric and road networks and to the liquefaction ejecta clean-up operations that contributed to the rapid reinstatement of the functionality of many of the lifelines. The water and wastewater system performances are also summarized. Elements of resilience that contributed to good network performance or to efficient emergency and recovery management are highlighted in the paper.
As part of the 'Project Masonry' Recovery Project funded by the New Zealand Natural Hazards Research Platform, commencing in March 2011, an international team of researchers was deployed to document and interpret the observed earthquake damage to masonry buildings and to churches as a result of the 22nd February 2011 Christchurch earthquake. The study focused on investigating commonly encountered failure patterns and collapse mechanisms. A brief summary of activities undertaken is presented, detailing the observations that were made on the performance of and the deficiencies that contributed to the damage to approximately 650 inspected unreinforced clay brick masonry (URM) buildings, to 90 unreinforced stone masonry buildings, to 342 reinforced concrete masonry (RCM) buildings, to 112 churches in the Canterbury region, and to just under 1100 residential dwellings having external masonry veneer cladding. In addition, details are provided of retrofit techniques that were implemented within relevant Christchurch URM buildings prior to the 22nd February earthquake and brief suggestions are provided regarding appropriate seismic retrofit and remediation techniques for stone masonry buildings. http://www.nzsee.org.nz/publications/nzsee-quarterly-bulletin/
The Christchurch region of New Zealand experienced a series of major earthquakes and aftershocks between September 2010 and June 2011 which caused severe damage to the city’s infrastructure. The performance of tilt-up precast concrete buildings was investigated and initial observations are presented here. In general, tilt-up buildings performed well during all three major earthquakes, with mostly only minor, repairable damage occurring. For the in-plane loading direction, both loadbearing and cladding panels behaved exceptionally well, with no significant damage or failure observed in panels and their connections. A limited number of connection failures occurred due to large out-of-plane panel inertia forces. In several buildings, the connections between the panel and the internal structural frame appeared to be the weakest link, lacking in both strength and ductility. This weakness in the out-of-plane load path should be prevented in future designs.
This manuscript provides a critical examination of the ground motions recorded in the near-source region resulting from the 22 February 2011 Christchurch earthquake. Particular attention is given to reconciling the observed spatial distribution of ground motions in terms of physical phenomena related to source, path and site effects. The large number of near-source observed strong ground motions show clear evidence of: forward-directivity, basin generated surface waves, liquefaction and other significant nonlinear site response. The pseudo-acceleration response spectra (SA) amplitudes and significant duration of strong motions agree well with empirical prediction models, except at long vibration periods where the influence of basin-generated surface waves and nonlinear site response are significant and not adequately accounted for in empirical SA models. Pseudo-acceleration response spectra are also compared with those observed in the 4 September 2010 Darfield earthquake and routine design response spectra used in order to emphasise the amplitude of ground shaking and elucidate the importance of local geotechnical characteristics on surface ground motions. The characteristics of the observed vertical component accelerations are shown to be strongly dependent on source-to-site distance and are comparable with those from the 4 September 2010 Darfield earthquake, implying the large amplitudes observed are simply a result of many observations at close distances rather than a peculiar source effect.
In the early morning of 4th September 2010 the region of Canterbury, New Zealand, was subjected to a magnitude 7.1 earthquake. The epicentre was located near the town of Darfield, 40 km west of the city of Christchurch. This was the country’s most damaging earthquake since the 1931 Hawke’s Bay earthquake (GeoNet, 2010). Since 4th September 2010 the region has been subjected to thousands of aftershocks, including several more damaging events such as a magnitude 6.3 aftershock on 22nd February 2011. Although of a smaller magnitude, the earthquake on 22nd February produced peak ground accelerations in the Christchurch region three times greater than the 4th September earthquake and in some cases shaking intensities greater than twice the design level (GeoNet, 2011; IPENZ, 2011). While in September 2010 most earthquake shaking damage was limited to unreinforced masonry (URM) buildings, in February all types of buildings sustained damage. Temporary shoring and strengthening techniques applied to buildings following the Darfield earthquake were tested in February 2011. In addition, two large aftershocks occurred on 13th June 2011 (magnitudes 5.7 and 6.2), further damaging many already weakened structures. The damage to unreinforced and retrofitted clay brick masonry buildings in the 4th September 2010 Darfield earthquake has already been reported by Ingham and Griffith (2011) and Dizhur et al. (2010b). A brief review of damage from the 22nd February 2011 earthquake is presented here
The 4th of September 2010 Mw 7.1 Darfield (Canterbury) earthquake had generated significant ground shaking within the Christchurch Central Business District (CBD). Despite the apparently significant shaking, the observed structural damage for pre-1970s reinforced concrete (RC) buildings was indeed limited and lower than what was expected for such typology of buildings. This paper explores analytically and qualitatively the different aspects of the "apparent‟ good seismic performance of the pre-1970s RC buildings in the Christchurch CBD, following the earthquake reconnaissance survey by the authors. Damage and building parameters survey result, based on a previously established inventory of building stock of these non-ductile RC buildings, is briefly reported. From an inventory of 75 buildings, one building was selected as a numerical case-study to correlate the observed damage with the non-linear analyses. The result shows that the pre-1970s RC frame buildings performed as expected given the intensity of the ground motion shaking during the Canterbury earthquake. Given the brittle nature of this type of structure, it was demonstrated that more significant structural damage and higher probability of collapse could occur when the buildings were subjected to alternative input signals with different frequency content and duration characteristics and still compatible to the seismicity hazard for Christchurch CBD.
On 22 February 2011, Canterbury and its largest city Christchurch experienced its second major earthquake within six months. The region is facing major economic and organisational challenges in the aftermath of these events. Approximately 25% of all buildings in the Christchurch CBD have been “red tagged” or deemed unsafe to enter. The New Zealand Treasury estimates that the combined cost of the February earthquake and the September earthquake is approximately NZ$15 billion[2]. This paper examines the national and regional economic climate prior to the event, discusses the immediate economic implications of this event, and the challenges and opportunities faced by organisations affected by this event. In order to facilitate recovery of the Christchurch area, organisations must adjust to a new norm; finding ways not only to continue functioning, but to grow in the months and years following these earthquakes. Some organisations relocated within days to areas that have been less affected by the earthquakes. Others are taking advantage of government subsidised aid packages to help retain their employees until they can make long-term decisions about the future of their organisation. This paper is framed as a “report from the field” in order to provide insight into the early recovery scenario as it applies to organisations affected by the February 2011 earthquake. It is intended both to inform and facilitate discussion about how organisations can and should pursue recovery in Canterbury, and how organisations can become more resilient in the face of the next crisis.
The extent of liquefaction in the eastern suburbs of Christchurch (Aranui, Bexley, Avonside, Avonhead and Dallington) from the February 22 2011 Earthquake resulted in extensive damage to in-ground waste water pipe systems. This caused a huge demand for portable toilets (or port-a-loos) and companies were importing them from outside Canterbury and in some instances from Australia. However, because they were deemed “assets of importance” under legislation, their allocation had to be coordinated by Civil Defence and Emergency Management (CDEM). Consequently, companies supplying them had to ignore requests from residents, businesses and rest homes; and commitments to large events outside of the city such as the Hamilton 400 V8 Supercars and the Pasifika Festival in Auckland were impacted. Frustrations started to show as neighbourhoods questioned the equity of the port-a-loos distribution. The Prime Minister was reported as reassuring citizens in the eastern suburbs in the first week of March that1 “a report about the distribution of port-a-loos and chemical toilets shows allocation has been fair. Key said he has asked Civil Defence about the distribution process and where the toilets been sent. He said there aren’t enough for the scale of the event but that is quickly being rectified and the need for toilets is being reassessed all the time.” Nonetheless, there still remained a deep sense of frustration and exclusion over the equity of the port-a-loos distribution. This study took the simple approach of mapping where those port-a-loos were on 11-12 March for several areas in the eastern suburbs and this suggested that their distribution was not equitable and was not well done. It reviews the predictive tools available for estimating damage to waste water pipes and asks the question could this situation have been better planned so that pot-a-loo locations could have been better prioritised? And finally it reviews the integral roles of communication and monitoring as part of disaster management strategy. The impression from this study is that other New Zealand urban centres could or would also be at risk and that work is need to developed more rational management approaches for disaster planning.
Unreinforced masonry (URM) buildings have repeatedly been shown to perform poorly in large magnitude earthquakes, with both New Zealand and Australia having a history of past earthquakes that have resulted in fatalities due to collapsed URM buildings. A comparison is presented here of the URM building stock and the seismic vulnerability of Christchurch and Adelaide in order to demonstrate the relevance to Australian cities of observations in Christchurch resulting from the 2010/2011 Canterbury earthquake swarm. It is shown that the materials, architecture and hence earthquake strength of URM buildings in both countries is comparable and that Adelaide and other cities of Australia have seismic vulnerability sufficient to cause major damage to their URM buildings should a design level earthquake occur. Such an earthquake is expected to cause major building damage, and fatalities should be expected.
The sequence of earthquakes that has greatly affected Christchurch and Canterbury since September 2010 has again demonstrated the need for seismic retrofit of heritage unreinforced masonry buildings. Commencing in April 2011, the damage to unreinforced stone masonry buildings in Christchurch was assessed and recorded with the primary objective being to document the seismic performance of these structures, recognising that they constitute an important component of New Zealand’s heritage architecture. A damage statistics database was compiled by combining the results of safety evaluation placarding and post-earthquake inspections, and it was determined that the damage observed was consistent with observations previously made on the seismic performance of stone masonry structures in large earthquakes. Details are also given on typical building characteristics and on failure modes observed. Suggestions on appropriate seismic retrofit and remediation techniques are presented, in relation also to strengthening interventions that are typical for similar unreinforced stone masonry structures in Europe.
There is a critical strand of literature suggesting that there are no ‘natural’ disasters (Abramovitz, 2001; Anderson and Woodrow, 1998; Clarke, 2008; Hinchliffe, 2004). There are only those that leave us – the people - more or less shaken and disturbed. There may be some substance to this; for example, how many readers recall the 7.8 magnitude earthquake centred in Fiordland in July 2009? Because it was so far away from a major centre and very few people suffered any consequences, the number is likely to be far fewer than those who remember (all too vividly) the relatively smaller 7.1 magnitude Canterbury quake of September 4th 2010 and the more recent 6.3 magnitude February 22nd 2011 event. One implication of this construction of disasters is that seismic events, like those in Canterbury, are as much socio-political as they are geological. Yet, as this paper shows, the temptation in recovery is to tick boxes and rebuild rather than recover, and to focus on hard infrastructure rather than civic expertise and community involvement. In this paper I draw upon different models of community engagement and use Putnam’s (1995) notion of ‘social capital’ to frame the argument that ‘building bridges’ after a disaster is a complex blend of engineering, communication and collaboration. I then present the results of a qualitative research project undertaken after the September 4th earthquake. This research helps to illustrate the important connections between technical rebuilding, social capital, recovery processes and overall urban resilience.
On September the 4th 2010 and February 22nd 2011 the Canterbury region of New Zealand was shaken by two massive earthquakes. This paper is set broadly within the civil defence and emergency management literature and informed by recent work on community participation and social capital in the building of resilient cities. Work in this area indicates a need to recognise both the formal institutional response to the earthquakes as well as the substantive role communities play in their own recovery. The range of factors that facilitate or hinder community involvement also needs to be better understood. This paper interrogates the assumption that recovery agencies and officials are both willing and able to engage communities who are themselves willing and able to be engaged in accordance with recovery best practice. Case studies of three community groups – CanCERN, Greening the Rubble and Gap Filler – illustrate some of the difficulties associated with becoming a community during the disaster recovery phase. Based on my own observations and experiences, combined with data from approximately 50 in-depth interviews with Christchurch residents and representatives from community groups, the Christchurch City Council, the Earthquake Commission and so on, this paper outlines some practical strategies emerging communities may use in the early disaster recovery phase that then strengthens their ability to ‘participate’ in the recovery process.
This paper outlines the deconstruction, redesign and reconstruction of a 2 storey timber building at the University of Canterbury, in Christchurch, New Zealand. The building consists of post tensioned timber frames and walls for lateral and gravity resistance, and timber concrete composite flooring. Originally a test specimen, the structure was subjected to extreme lateral displacements in the University structural testing laboratory. This large scale test of the structural form showed that post tensioned timber can withstand high levels of drift with little to no structural damage in addition to displaying full recentering characteristics with no residual displacements, a significant contributor to post earthquake cost. The building subsequently has been dismantled and reconstructed as offices for the Structural Timber Innovation Company (STIC). In doing this over 90% of the materials have been recycled which further enhances the sustainability of this construction system. The paper outlines the necessary steps to convert the structure from a test specimen into a functioning office building with minimal wastage and sufficient seismic resistance. The feasibility of recycling the structural system is examined using the key indicators of cost and time.
The M7.1 Darfield earthquake shook the town of Christchurch (New Zealand) in the early morning on Saturday 4th September 2010 and caused damage to a number of heritage unreinforced masonry buildings. No fatalities were reported directly linked to the earthquake, but the damage to important heritage buildings was the most extensive to have occurred since the 1931 Hawke‟s Bay earthquake. In general, the nature of damage was consistent with observations previously made on the seismic performance of unreinforced masonry buildings in large earthquakes, with aspects such as toppled chimneys and parapets, failure of gables and poorly secured face-loaded walls, and in-plane damage to masonry frames all being extensively documented. This report on the performance of the unreinforced masonry buildings in the 2010 Darfield earthquake provides details on typical building characteristics, a review of damage statistics obtained by interrogating the building assessment database that was compiled in association with post-earthquake building inspections, and a review of the characteristic failure modes that were observed.
Surface rupture of the previously unrecognised Greendale Fault extended west-east for ~30 km across alluvial plains west of Christchurch, New Zealand, during the Mw 7.1 Darfield (Canterbury) earthquake of September 2010. Surface rupture displacement was predominantly dextral strike-slip, averaging ~2.5 m, with maxima of ~5 m. Vertical displacement was generally less than 0.75 m. The surface rupture deformation zone ranged in width from ~30 to 300 m, and comprised discrete shears, localised bulges and, primarily, horizontal dextral flexure. About a dozen buildings, mainly single-storey houses and farm sheds, were affected by surface rupture, but none collapsed, largely because most of the buildings were relatively flexible and resilient timber-framed structures and also because deformation was distributed over a relatively wide zone. There were, however, notable differences in the respective performances of the buildings. Houses with only lightly-reinforced concrete slab foundations suffered moderate to severe structural and non-structural damage. Three other buildings performed more favourably: one had a robust concrete slab foundation, another had a shallow-seated pile foundation that isolated ground deformation from the superstructure, and the third had a structural system that enabled the house to tilt and rotate as a rigid body. Roads, power lines, underground pipes, and fences were also deformed by surface fault rupture and suffered damage commensurate with the type of feature, its orientation to the fault, and the amount, sense and width of surface rupture deformation.
At 4.35am on Saturday 4 September 2010, a magnitude 7.1 earthquake struck near the township of Darfield in Canterbury leading to widespread damage in Christchurch and the wider central Canterbury region. Though it was reported no lives were lost, that was not entirely correct. Over 3,000 animals perished as a result of the earthquake and 99% of these deaths would have been avoidable if appropriate mitigation measures had been in place. Deaths were predominantly due to zoological vulnerability of birds in captive production farms. Other problems included lack of provision of animal welfare at evacuation centres, issues associated with multiple lost and found pet services, evacuation failure due to pet separation and stress impact on dairy herds and associated milk production. The Canterbury Earthquake has highlighted concerns over a lack of animal emergency welfare planning and capacity in New Zealand, an issue that is being progressed by the National Animal Welfare Emergency Management Group. As animal emergency management becomes better understood by emergency management and veterinary professionals, it is more likely that both sectors will have greater demands placed upon them by national guidelines and community expectations to ensure provisions are made to afford protection of animals in times of disaster. A subsequent and more devastating earthquake struck the region on Monday 22 February 2011; this article however is primarily focused on the events pertaining to the September 4 event.
