The University of Canterbury Dept. of Chemistry has weathered the Canterbury Earthquake of September 4, 2010 very well due to a combination of good luck, good planning and dedicated effort. We owe a great deal to university Emergency Response Team and Facilities Management Personnel. The overall emergency preparedness of the university was tested to a degree far beyond anything else in its history and shown to be well up to scratch. A strong cooperative relationship between the pan-campus controlling body and the departmental response teams greatly facilitated our efforts. Information and assistance was provided promptly, as and when we needed it without unnecessary bureaucratic overheads. At the departmental level we are indebted to the technical staff who implemented the invaluable pre-quake mitigation measures and carried the majority of the post-quake clean-up workload. These people put aside their personal concerns and anxieties at a time when magnitude-5 aftershocks were still a regular occurrence.
The 2010 Darfield earthquake is the largest earthquake on record to have occurred within 40 km of a major city and not cause any fatalities. In this paper the authors have reflected on their experiences in Christchurch following the earthquake with a view to what worked, what didn’t, and what lessons can be learned from this for the benefit of Australian earthquake preparedness. Owing to the fact that most of the observed building damage occurred in Unreinforced Masonry (URM) construction, this paper focuses in particular on the authors’ experience conducting rapid building damage assessment during the first 72 hours following the earthquake and more detailed examination of the performance of unreinforced masonry buildings with and without seismic retrofit interventions.
This report describes in-plane experimental testing and numerical modelling of timberconcrete floor diaphragms. The experimental tests investigated the in-plane stiffness of the diaphragm and the stiffness and strength of different connections between the diaphragm and the lateral load resisting system. The test model was 1/3 scale and three meters square in plan. Seven tests with a different kind of connection between the floor and the rigid lateral supports (which simulated a timber lateral load resisting system) have been performed. The results of the experimental testing are used to calibrate numerical models which are used to investigate the effects of the floor flexibility on the seismic behaviour of post-tensioned timber buildings. For the experimental tests, screw and nail fasteners were used to connected to floor unit to the lateral supports. These fasteners were embedded into the concrete slab or timber edge joints at different orientations. The stiffness of the diaphragm connections was vastly different for each detail. Screws installed at a 45? angle (inclined) to the lateral supports were four times stiffer than the screws installed orthogonal to the lateral supports. The initial stiffness of the inclined fasteners was similar for timber-to-timber and concrete-to-timber connections. For the timberto- timber connections the orientation did not seem to influence the strength of the connection. The tested diaphragm had an uncracked stiffness of 4000 kN/mm and a cracked stiffness of 300 kN/mm. For the tested floor unit it was concluded that the influence of the diaphragm flexibility was negligible compared to the connector flexibility. The floor flexibility can be idealized as three different parts, the deformation of the connectors, the shear deformation of the diaphragm and the flexural deformation of the diaphragm. The numerical analyses showed that in most perceivable situations the connection deformation will govern the in-plane seismic response of the floor. Hence, it is justified to model it as a single-degree-of-freedom (SDOF) element. The influence of the floor flexibility on the seismic response of post-tensioned timber buildings is small. In most cases neglecting the floor flexibility is a conservative approach for the structural design of the building. However, structures with stiff walls and long floor spans there can be a significant amplification of the seismic response. For that case, a simple SDOF representation is proposed. Code-based recommendations for predicting the peak floor accelerations are found to be inadequate. A methodology is proposed to more accurately predict the expected peak floor accelerations for design
Research Report: 2010-02The objective in writing this report is to provide a guide to structural engineers on how to assess the potential seismic performance of existing hollow-core floors in buildings and the steps involved in the design of new floors. Hollow-core units in New Zealand do not contain stirrups within the precast concrete section. This is due to the way that they are manufactured. The only reinforcement in the great majority of hollow-core units consists of pretensioned strands that are located close to the soffit. A consequence of this is that hollow-core units have a number of potential brittle failure modes that can occur when adverse structural actions are induced in the units. These adverse actions can be induced in a major earthquake due to the relative vertical, horizontal and rotational displacements that occur between hollow-core units and adjacent structural elements, such as beams or structural walls. A number of large scale structural tests backed up by analytical research has shown that extensive interaction occurs between floors containing prestressed precast units and other structural elements, such as walls and beams. The constraint that prestressed units in a floor can apply to adjacent beams can result in an increase in strength of the beams to a considerably greater strength than that indicated in editions of the New Zealand Structural Concrete Standard published prior to 2006. The extent of this increase is such that it could in some cases result in the development of a non-ductile failure mechanism instead of the ductile failure mechanism assumed in the design. Prestressed floor units tie the floor bays together leaving a weak section where the floor joins to supporting structural elements. The restraint provided by the prestress restricts the opening of cracks within the bay. In the event of an earthquake this restraint can result in wide cracks developing at some of the boundaries to floor bays. These cracks may have a significant influence on the performance of the floor when it acts as a diaphragm to transfer seismic forces to the lateral force resisting structural elements in the building. The report contains details of; 1. The different failure modes, which may be induced in hollow-core floors, and the failure modes that may develop in a buildings due to the presence of hollow-core units in the floors; 2. Criteria that may be used to assess the magnitude of the design earthquake which may be safely resisted by a hollow-core floor in a building; 3. Details of how construction practice related to the use of hollow-core floors in New Zealand has changed over the last five decades. This highlights particular aspects that need to be considered in carrying out an assessment of existing hollow-core floors; 4. Information on how a new hollow-core floor may be designed to be consistent with the Earthquake Actions Standard, NZS1170.5: 2004 and the Structural Concrete Standard, NZS3101: 2006 (plus Amendment 2); 5. A review of the research findings relevant to the behaviour of New Zealand hollow-core floors under earthquake conditions. Research that was used to develop the assessment and design criteria is described together with details of how the different criteria were developed from this work.
On 4 September 2010, a magnitude Mw 7.1 earthquake struck the Canterbury region on the South Island of New Zealand. The epicentre of the earthquake was located in the Darfield area about 40 km west of the city of Christchurch. Extensive damage was inflicted to lifelines and residential houses due to widespread liquefaction and lateral spreading in areas close to major streams, rivers and wetlands throughout Christchurch and Kaiapoi. Unreinforced masonry buildings also suffered extensive damage throughout the region. Despite the severe damage to infrastructure and residential houses, fortunately, no deaths occurred and only two injuries were reported in this earthquake. From an engineering viewpoint, one may argue that the most significant aspects of the 2010 Darfield Earthquake were geotechnical in nature, with liquefaction and lateral spreading being the principal culprits for the inflicted damage. Following the earthquake, an intensive geotechnical reconnaissance was conducted to capture evidence and perishable data from this event. This paper summarizes the observations and preliminary findings from this early reconnaissance work.
This paper presents site-specific and spatially-distributed ground-motion intensity estimates which have been utilized in the aftermath of the 2010-2011 Canterbury, New Zealand earthquakes. The methodology underpinning the ground motion intensity estimation makes use of both prediction models for ground motion intensity and its within-event spatial correlation. A key benefit of the methodology is that the estimated ground motion intensity at a given location is not a single value but a distribution of values. The distribution is comprised of both a mean and standard deviation, with the standard deviation being a function of the distance to nearby observations at strong motion stations. The methodology is illustrated for two applications. Firstly, maps of conditional peak ground acceleration (PGA) have been developed for the major events in the Canterbury earthquake sequence, which among other things, have been utilized for assessing liquefaction triggering susceptibility of land in residential areas. Secondly, the conditional distribution of response spectral ordinates is obtained at the location of the Canterbury Television building (CTV), which catastrophically collapsed in the 22 February 2011 earthquake. The conditional response spectra provide insight for the selection of ground motion records for use in forensic seismic response analyses of important structures at locations where direct recordings are absent.
On 4 September 2010, a magnitude Mw 7.1 earthquake struck the Canterbury region on the South Island of New Zealand. The epicentre of the earthquake was located in the Darfield area about 40 km west of the city of Christchurch. Extensive damage occurred to unreinforced masonry buildings throughout the region during the mainshock and subsequent large aftershocks. Particularly extensive damage was inflicted to lifelines and residential houses due to widespread liquefaction and lateral spreading in areas close to major streams, rivers and wetlands throughout Christchurch and Kaiapoi. Despite the severe damage to infrastructure and residential houses, fortunately, no deaths occurred and only two injuries were reported in this earthquake. From an engineering viewpoint, one may argue that the most significant aspects of the 2010 Darfield Earthquake were geotechnical in nature, with liquefaction and lateral spreading being the principal culprits for the inflicted damage. Following the earthquake, a geotechnical reconnaissance was conducted over a period of six days (10–15 September 2010) by a team of geotechnical/earthquake engineers and geologists from New Zealand and USA (GEER team: Geo-engineering Extreme Event Reconnaissance). JGS (Japanese Geotechnical Society) members from Japan also participated in the reconnaissance team from 13 to 15 September 2010. The NZ, GEER and JGS members worked as one team and shared resources, information and logistics in order to conduct thorough and most efficient reconnaissance covering a large area over a very limited time period. This report summarises the key evidence and findings from the reconnaissance.
