Observations in major earthquakes have shown that rockable structures suffered less to no damage. During rocking, that is, partial and temporary footing separations, the influx of seismic energy is interrupted and thus the impact of the base excitation is reduced. Rocking causes the structure to deform more rigid like. Consequently, the structure experiences less deformation along the height and thus a lower damage potential. Although many researchers have studied the influence of rockable footings, most of these are either analytical or numerical, and only a very few structures have been built with rockable footings worldwide, for example, the chimney at Christchurch Airport and the South Rangitikei Viaduct in New Zealand. Despite these studies, a thorough and understanding is not yet available, especially with respect to experimental validations. This work is the first to investigate the rocking behaviour of bridges with different slenderness using large‐scale shake table experiments. To limit the number of influence factors, a stiff footing support and the same fixed‐base fundamental frequency of the bridges were assumed. The result shows that the girder displacement and the footing rotation of the tall bridge do not always move in phase, which cannot be observed in the short bridge. The results demonstrate the important role of slenderness in the overall responses of rockable bridges. This behaviour cannot be observed in bridges with a commonly assumed fixed base since the slenderness effect cannot be activated.
The 2010 Darfield earthquake is the largest earthquake on record to have occurred within 40 km of a major city and not cause any fatalities. In this paper the authors have reflected on their experiences in Christchurch following the earthquake with a view to what worked, what didn’t, and what lessons can be learned from this for the benefit of Australian earthquake preparedness. Owing to the fact that most of the observed building damage occurred in Unreinforced Masonry (URM) construction, this paper focuses in particular on the authors’ experience conducting rapid building damage assessment during the first 72 hours following the earthquake and more detailed examination of the performance of unreinforced masonry buildings with and without seismic retrofit interventions.
In the early morning of 4th September 2010 the region of Canterbury, New Zealand, was subjected to a magnitude 7.1 earthquake. The epicentre was located near the town of Darfield, 40 km west of the city of Christchurch. This was the country’s most damaging earthquake since the 1931 Hawke’s Bay earthquake (GeoNet, 2010). Since 4th September 2010 the region has been subjected to thousands of aftershocks, including several more damaging events such as a magnitude 6.3 aftershock on 22nd February 2011. Although of a smaller magnitude, the earthquake on 22nd February produced peak ground accelerations in the Christchurch region three times greater than the 4th September earthquake and in some cases shaking intensities greater than twice the design level (GeoNet, 2011; IPENZ, 2011). While in September 2010 most earthquake shaking damage was limited to unreinforced masonry (URM) buildings, in February all types of buildings sustained damage. Temporary shoring and strengthening techniques applied to buildings following the Darfield earthquake were tested in February 2011. In addition, two large aftershocks occurred on 13th June 2011 (magnitudes 5.7 and 6.2), further damaging many already weakened structures. The damage to unreinforced and retrofitted clay brick masonry buildings in the 4th September 2010 Darfield earthquake has already been reported by Ingham and Griffith (2011) and Dizhur et al. (2010b). A brief review of damage from the 22nd February 2011 earthquake is presented here
The 2010–2011 Canterbury earthquakes, which involved widespread damage during the February 2011 event and ongoing aftershocks near the Christchurch Central Business District, left this community with more than $NZD 40 billion in losses (~20 % GDP), demolition of approximately 60 % of multi-storey concrete buildings (3 storeys and up), and closure of the core business district for over 2 years. The aftermath of the earthquake sequence has revealed unique issues and complexities for the owners of commercial and multi-storey residential buildings in relation to unexpected technical, legal, and financial challenges when making decisions regarding the future of their buildings impacted by the earthquakes. The paper presents a framework to understand the factors influencing post-earthquake decisions (repair or demolish) on multi-storey concrete buildings in Christchurch. The study, conducted in 2014, includes in-depth investigations on 15 case-study buildings using 27 semi-structured interviews with various property owners, property managers, insurers, engineers, and government authorities in New Zealand. The interviews revealed insights regarding the multitude of factors influencing post-earthquake decisions and losses. As expected, the level of damage and repairability (cost to repair) generally dictated the course of action. There is strong evidence, however, that other variables have significantly influenced the decision on a number of buildings, such as insurance, business strategies, perception of risks, building regulations (and compliance costs), and government decisions. The decision-making process for each building is complex and unique, not solely driven by structural damage. Furthermore, the findings have put the spotlight on insurance policy wordings and the paradoxical effect of insurance on the recovery of Christchurch, leading to other challenges and issues going forward.
